

CHANGING PHASES OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT

SARKAR

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ABOUT THE BOOK

This book focuses the developed logic and philosophy of the four Buddhist schools and some eminent Buddhist thinkers beginning from the first century of the Christian era. It claims to show that the influence of the Buddhist schools and of the Buddhist thinkers is not local or confined to any specific period of history.

The advanced thought-process of the Buddhists is an efficient mode of reflection and discipline, and can be compared with the advanced thought-process of the West. The author ventures to suggest that the prospects of the phenomenological reflections of Husserl, existentialist deliberations of Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger, or Sartre, and the pragmatist-phenomenological modes of the Americans from Peirce to Lewis, lie more in the areas of Buddhist thought than in the general currents of Western philosophy.

The aim of this book is to suggest that the cultural process of mankind lies in a subtle and efficient functional process. The Buddha and the Buddhist thinkers try to build up a cultural trend where both religion and philosophy are to be combined in a co-operative function. Without these co-operative disciplines, further evolution of the human culture in any higher sphere is not possible. The present book, in various ways, tries to clarify this complex position, giving a new meaning to Religion and Philosophy, in process and prospect. With no exaggeration, it may be said, that the specialists in intercultural areas, will find this book immensely interesting.

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CHANGING PHASES OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT

CHANGING PHASES OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT

A study in the background of East-West Philosophy

by

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PREFACE

This book is mainly concerned with the clarification of the transcendent yet empirical thought-process of the four principal Buddhist schools which flourished in India in the dawn of the Christian era. It also refers to some eminent Buddhist thinkers who either generally influence the deliberations of the different schools or directly modify their tenets to prepare a ground for a further development of Indian thought. Aśvaghoṣa (Ch. II), an independent Buddhist thinker of the first century A.D., influenced the development of two later schools of Buddhism, while Nāgārjuna (Chs. III and IV), a revolutionary thinker of the second century A.D., reshaped the thoughts of the first two schools. Again, both Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna influenced the thoughts of the later emergent Buddhist schools, and indirectly, the Vedāntic thought of India in general. Dignāga (Ch. V), in the fifth century A.D., who was influenced by the four Buddhist schools in general, was responsible for what was known as the Logical School of Buddhism. It remained for Candrakīrti (Ch. III), a commentator and follower of Nāgārjuna, in the seventh century A.D., to confirm Nāgārjuna's standpoint by a criticism of Dignāga and some of his followers, and interpret Buddhism from a new perspective. Candrakīrti revived an aspect of Buddhist thought which facilitated the process for organising the complex Vedāntic current of India flowing upon this glorious period of

the Buddhist schools. The Buddhist current in its fusion with the emergent Vedāntic current in India, and in its multifarious Mahāyānist forms in different Asian countries, is not an extinct philosophy of the past. It is a living force today, and claims to occupy a challenging position along with such progressive currents of the Western culture as fostered by the phenomenological deliberation of Husserl or the advanced existentialist reflections of Sartre. Through the ideas of the four Buddhist schools and some Buddhist thinkers, this book provides a ground for a development of intercultural process in a new aspect for which one has to develop a sensibility and interest.

The writer finally wants to mention that the major portions of this book, have already been published in some journals or special volumes, but they have been remodelled considerably to suit the requirements of the present work. A care has however been taken to preserve the individuality of the published papers. In this attempt some repetitions could not be avoided, but the writer feels that in difficult philosophical deliberations, such repetitions often facilitate understanding.

The writer has taken full responsibility for the development of ideas of this volume; but, for the general order and the style of expression, he has greatly depended on the suggestions and criticisms of his wife. Without her help, the writer frankly admits, the book would not have taken this present shape.

Prof. Archie J. Bahm of the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, has gone through this entire work, and has given many valuable suggestions for which no word of thanks is adequate. The author is no less indebted to Mrs. Zeyen of the California State

College at Hayward for her great interest shown in typing the manuscript with accuracy.

Hayward, California, U. S. A.
May 20, 1967

ANIL K. SARKAR

INTRODUCTION

No one can deny that Buddhism as a cultural process has a very complex tradition. It began in India with the Buddha's attainment of *nirvāṇa* (the enlightenment or the dispassionate condition) and culminated with the Buddha's attainment of *parinirvāṇa* (a great demise from the bodily process and a detachment from the life-death-rebirth current).

The evolution of the Indian thought from the days of the Vedas (about 2500 B.C.) to the Upaniṣads (to 600 B.C.), is not so much a process of reflection as it is a process towards a continuous meditative mode of realising an experience which is transcendent, which when intellectualised can be expressed as *Tad-Ekam* (That One), or as *Ātman* (pure consciousness) or *Brahman* (pure existence). In the Upaniṣadic stage the transcendent experience was definitely determined as a non-reflective condition (*Turīya*) behind the states of deep-sleep, dream and waking, or as the unchanging persistent condition of pure existence (*Brahman*) beyond and behind the apparent cosmic orders, material, vital, mental, intellectual and the blissful. In this understanding of a transcendent condition beyond the inner and the outer aspects and orders, a nondual basis is realised, in one aspect, and, in another aspect, there is a total fluency, one supplementing the deficiency of the other. If in any sense the condition of transcendent pure consciousness has a finitude, that is overcome by the infinity of transcendent pure existence, and, if there is any in-

directness in the transcendent pure existence, that is overcome by the innate directness of transcendent pure consciousness. In spite of this meditative efficiency of the Upaniṣadic thought-process, the Buddha is not satisfied with the tendency to discuss as found in the Upaniṣadic mode of realising the transcendent experience. Refusing to intellectualise about the transcendent experience, the Buddha suggests threefold disciplines for realising the final condition, which, to him, is not a theoretic condition, but a practical achievement, a dispassionate condition (a *nirvāṇa*), where not only the passions but also the propensity to discuss is extinct; it is a disciplined peaceful situation. The triadic disciplines of the Buddha are a mode of conduct (*śīla*), a process of continuous meditation (*samādhi*) and an insightful experience (*prajñā*) resulting out of the disciplined processes. The triadic principles are not theoretic codes but practical ways for realising the dispassionate condition, which is a freedom from (i) passion, (ii) theoretic propensity, and (iii) the life-death-rebirth process.

The Buddha fully understands the complexity of experience from within and without, and hence he is not satisfied with any theoretic mode or code of discipline, detached from one's concrete experience. His understanding of the presented universe as transient (*anitya*), non-substantial (*anātma*), and sorrow (*duḥkha*), is not to introduce a new mode of reflection or attitude; it is only an admission of the presented order of experience as it is, and then, after the acceptance, there is his triadic method, enabling one to be out of this process and presented orders of experience. If the Buddha's acceptance of the presented universe is only granted without any theoretic

condition, then, obviously, the Buddha's interpretation of the transience, non-substantiality and sorrow, should not be taken as an opposite mode of life and thought of the Upaniṣads, conveniently misinterpreting Upaniṣadic thought-process as something theoretical and non-meditative. The Upaniṣadic thought-process is equally a meditative process and it is a detachment from the intellectual process as demonstrated in the last phase of the Vedic thought. The Buddha is fully conscious of the meditative tradition of the Upaniṣads, but still he differs from the remnant of theoretic element in the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads have still a theoretic propensity to determine the ultimate condition by a method of distinction of experience of the apparent orders or aspects. The Buddha wants to point out that one who is interested in determining the ultimate condition, must not adopt a theoretical attitude but should take recourse to the triadic practical method as suggested by him. His attention, therefore, is wholly in a practical aspect. After attaining the dispassionate condition, *nirvāṇa*, and living a life of discipline for over forty years with others who accepted his mode of life, he prepared a ground for a further meditative process. This insightful experience comes to him when he becomes deeply conscious of his own age, senility and possible disease. One who is conversant with the discourse of the Buddha with his disciple, Ānanda, before his final departure from his psycho-physical organism, knows that his decision for a *future meditative process and discipline*, is not a theoretic speculation of a Heidegger of the present century; it is not an admission of death as a final or capital event to happen; there is no dread or fear of death in the

Buddha. There is an acceptance of an event to happen, but there is a further deliberation, viz., whether it is possible by meditation to be detached from the historical process not only of *death* but also of a series of *birth*, *death*, and *rebirth* (which Heidegger will not accept). From the Indian point of view, the historical placement of man depends on a *basic ignorance*, which is a *psycho-physical disposition*; *ignorance* is an experiential phenomenon, which any reflective person can account for. But in the general scientific and philosophic thinking of the West, there is no attempt to interpret it. The Buddha as a unique psychologist, philosopher and scientist realised the human condition meditatively, in its ultimate disciplined condition and in its undisciplined condition. The latter condition is the ground of *ignorance*, which leads one to the triadic process of birth, death and rebirth. The Buddha's is not an uncritical faith, but a bold facing of life, and a refusal to admit that man is a historical creature subject to death. The Buddha thinks that man goes through the cycles of death and rebirth till he is free from the undisciplined condition. The Buddha is not a materialist, he is neither an empiricist nor an idealist, but he is one who extends his vision of experience continuously and meditatively.

With a full consciousness and discipline, the Buddha at a ripe old age and in a little diseased state, very frankly admits that he will not live in the frail material body for long, but that does not mean that he will be totally extinct after his quitting of the body. Hence to Ānanda, whom he loved most and criticised most, he demonstrated repeatedly the processes of ascending to a disciplined condition and coming

down to the body, by a process of descent. When he became perfectly adept in this meditative process, he decided to quit his body which he utilised fully for a period of eighty years. To think that the Buddha has gone forever, or that he is totally extinct after the quitting of his material body, is to ignore his *meditative disciplines*, and the subsequent cultural processes developed in India and outside India, after his great demise (*parinirvāṇa*). The *parinirvāṇa*, as demonstrated before Ānanda, is a different *order of meditative discipline* from that of the disciplines of *nirvāṇa*. In the condition of *nirvaṇa*, the dispassionate condition is realised; in the *parinirvāṇa*, a transcendent meditative condition is realised, with a freedom to come down to the cosmic-psychic process of life-death-rebirth process, to help others attain a similar transcendent condition. In the condition of *nirvāṇa*, there is an achievement of perfection for one's own self, or wherein there is an interest for the individual himself, but, in the condition of *parinirvāṇa*, the transcendent condition is realised for helping those who are suffering in the birth-death-rebirth process. It should be noted that the disciplined condition of *parinirvāṇa* is transcendent psycho-cosmic condition of continuous discipline; an individual in this condition is a *Bodhisattva* who has deferred his final liberation for the sake of others. By demonstrating the meditations of *parinirvāṇa*, the Buddha prepared the ground for an interpretation of his personality, viz., whether the personality as revealed by him during his life-time, is only historical or something more than the historical, i.e., transcendental.

This book has a dual emphasis. It gives importance to the Buddha's sayings and as well to his

personality. The Hīnayāna Buddhism, which is early Buddhism, has an emphasis on his sayings, but later Buddhism, which is Mahāyāna Buddhism, has an emphasis on his personality. But really speaking the two aspects of the Buddha's life, his sayings and personality, cannot be separated. There is a continuity between the first and the second aspect, the first cannot be meaningful without the second.

It should be noted that the Buddha's *admission* of the presented universe *as it is* in the form of ground-consequent relationship,—from birth to death, in stages, where *disease*, *senility* and *sorrow* are important factors, and wherein there is a supposition for the cause of birth in a *basic ignorance* (or *undisciplined condition*), and a consequent *rebirth*, on a similar ground of *ignorance*,—is not a mere dogmatic supposition. It is an expression in the background of two dominant modes of reflections then prevalent : Materialism (Nihilism) and Eternalism. The Buddha, in his admission of the presented universe as a ground-consequent process of birth, death, and rebirth, is neither a materialist (temporalist), nor a fatalist; he only demonstrates that one who is undisciplined, is subject to such theoretic propensities and may appear as destined or determined; but the Buddha also thinks on the basis of his detached experience that man is otherwise free,—if he chooses to discipline himself, thereby gaining freedom from the cyclic order of existence (birth, death and rebirth), and apparent orders of experience (all ending with sorrow). His admission of the birth and the apparent aspects of experience in a ground-consequent form (exhibiting a general law from a disciplined standpoint) is a challenge to the then Materialists and Temporalists,

like Ajita-Keśakambalin and Gośāla, who, in their belief in death as the final destiny, fostered a life of pleasure, denouncing all belief in *morality*, *law* or *ultimate questions*. To them, there is no further possibility beyond death. In that sense they were materialists, fatalists and determinists. But the Buddha, by admitting a disciplined condition in contrast to an undisciplined condition, places the apparent order with its experiences, as a sphere of possible order and experience, with *law* and a *possibility*, and indicates a disciplined order and experience, in terms of conduct (*śīla*), meditation (*samādhi*) and insightful understanding (*prajñā*); these triadic disciplines will free one from the abstract speculative tendencies in the metaphysical, theological and mystic aspects; they will prepare one to understand the transcendent meditative condition, which is nothing but a dispassionate and a peaceful condition (*nirvāna*), and, in another aspect, it is obtaining a transcendent cosmic-psychic disciplined ground (*dharmakāya*), wherefrom, one, with freedom, can descend to the sphere of the ground-consequent process (of life, death and rebirth), and yet can be detached from that sphere. The Buddha stands for that subtle disciplined condition, and opens for mankind that controlled transcendent meditative possibility. This discipline can save one from falling into materialism, fatalism and lawlessness, on the one hand, and from the speculative propensities leading to metaphysics, theology and mysticism (or obscurantism), on the other. In the following pages the deliberations of the Buddhist schools and the Buddhist thinkers will be presented to clarify these basic positions as initiated by the Buddha. The aim of this book is to suggest that the cultural process of

mankind lies in a subtle and efficient functional process of which there are enough of evidences in human history and culture. One can verify these currents of experiences in all cultural processes, Western or Eastern. If there is a choice between the religious and philosophic principles in the functional and detached senses of the terms, then the Buddha tries to build up a cultural trend, where both religion and philosophy are to be joined in a co-operative function. Religion will stand for a disciplined way of life, and philosophy will stand for an intellectual discipline with a freedom from materialism, and also from any abstract metaphysical, theological or mystical propensities. Without these two disciplines, in co-operation, the evolution of human culture is not possible. The present book, in various ways, tries to clarify this complex position, giving a new meaning to Religion and Philosophy, in process and prospect, through the Buddhist schools, Buddhist thinkers, and the kindred thinkers of some other cultures through the ages.

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Some Suggested Readings

For the development of Indian thought : Radhakrishnan and Moore : *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, 1957.

Suzuki : *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, Schocken Books, N. Y., 1963.

For the development of Western thought :

Zeller : *Outlines of History of Greek Philosophy*, Meridian Books, New York, 1962.

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For Eckhart, *vide* : Otto, R : *Mysticism East and West*, Meridian Books, 1957.

For Whitehead : *Adventures of Ideas*, A Mentor Book, 6th printing, 1964.

For Indian and Western Philosophy in general : Maitra, S. K. : *The Meeting of the East and the West in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy*, Sri Aurobindo Ashrama, Pondicherry (India), 1956.

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CHAPTER I

FOUR BUDDHIST SCHOOLS*

The evolution of the Buddhist thought in its various phases from the Vaibhāṣikas to the Yogācāras, cannot be fully comprehended, if the psychology behind each school with its novel thesis of *existence* as a continuous series of births, deaths, and rebirths, is not properly explained.

By introducing an intellectual scheme with an efficiency,[1] the Vaibhāṣikas[2] bring in a transcendent and objective tendency in Buddhist thought, and this is successively modified by superior psychological interpretations of intellectuality of later schools culminating in absolutistic suggestions. The later Buddhist schools—the Sautrāntikas, Mādhyamikas and the

* Major portion of this chapter was published previously in *The Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1954.

1. Efficiency here means *kāritva-lakṣaṇa*; cf. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Royal Asiatic Society, 1928), pp. 26, 43, 55, and *Buddhist Logic*, vol. 1., 1932, p. 124, also *vide Introduction*.

2. The importance of the Vaibhāṣikas lies in their deviation from the Theravādins, one of the eighteen schools mentioned in the *Kathā-vatthu* (*Points of Controversy*, translated by Aung & Rhys Davids, 1951). The Vaibhāṣikas are also known as Sarvāstivādins or Hetuvādins. They were the leaders of the Fourth Council during Kaniṣka's reign in the 1st Century A.C. For details *vide* Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy* (University of Hawaii, Second Edition, 1949), pp. 63, 81-4; Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 2-3; Raju: *The Idealist Thought of India* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1953), pp. 208-18; Swami Vimuktānanda in his paper, "Buddhism and the Philosophy of Nāgārjuna" in *Prabuddha Bharata*, February, 1939, refers to Harivarman (300 A.D.), who aimed at a compromise between the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāyānists. For details about Harivarman, *vide* Sogen: *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, Calcutta University, 1912.

Yogācāras—are wrongly interpreted by scholars as phenomenalists, nihilists and absolutists respectively, in their effort to conform to a traditional mode of Western thought. This discourse objects to such an interpretation, as the thought of the Buddhist schools, we shall see, is beyond the boundaries of any intellectual scheme; not that the Buddhist thinkers were unaware of the intellectual process, but that they wilfully wanted to detach themselves from such a culture. The Vaibhāṣikas are usually interpreted as realists, but they are not realists in any sense of Western philosophy—ancient, medieval or contemporary. Before interpreting the Vaibhāṣika standpoint, one has to understand the background of its reflections in the Buddha's deliberation in relation to the prevalent Upaniṣadic thought.

Both the Buddha and Upaniṣadic thinkers take for granted the real experience as transcendent, and hence to both the real is unapproachable by thought and speech, or, in other words, both thought and speech come back frustrated from the real (*yato vaco nivartate aprāpya manasā saha....*). Though the Upaniṣadic thinkers assert that the transcendent experience is unapproachable by thought and speech, yet they refer to it, on the strength of their deep intuition or concentration, that it is pure consciousness (*Ātman*) or pure existence (*Brahman*), not to indicate however that they are positively so. The expressions, *Ātman* and *Brahman*, are *not concepts* but *meditative* conditions to be accepted for understanding the apparent aspects or orders of experience. To illustrate, the term *Ātman*, as transcendent pure consciousness, is that meditative condition or unchanging persistent non-reflective background, which renders manifest the

distinctive features of the waking, dream and deep-sleep states. Similarly, the term *Brahman*, as transcendent pure existence, is that subtle meditative basis which controls and makes manifest the apparent processes—material, vital, mental, intellectual and blissful. The whole intention of the Upaniṣadic thinkers is to draw attention to a transcendent meditative condition by determining which, the apparent aspects and orders of experience become clear to the experiencer. The Upaniṣadic thinkers do not foster abstract analysis. The understanding of *ignorance* of deep-sleep, for example, as mentioned in different Upaniṣads, is just a direct experience, which is not dependent upon any reflective consciousness, nor can it be conceived as reproduced in the waking condition, because that condition of waking is not present in the deep-sleep condition; only the basic meditative condition is present in the deep-sleep condition; that meditative condition is neither a reflective consciousness of waking or dream state, nor is it an ignorance of deep-sleep, but it is a self-shining ever-present continuum of experience,—an uncontradicted and undifferentiated presence, untouched by the transient states.

Only one who is deeply meditative and conscious of the basic experience as transcendent pure existence (*Brahman*), can realise the operations of the subtler processes from the material to the vital, from the vital to the mental, from the mental to the intellectual, and from the intellectual to the blissful. Between the meditative processes of the *Ātman* and the *Brahman*, there is non-duality; this kind of meditative experience is developed by the Upaniṣadic thinkers in general. The entire training of the Upaniṣadic thinkers is in

the aspect of knowing by concentration or meditation, and not by mere conceptual analysis. It is knowing by continuous detachment. The Buddha continues this tradition of meditation and detachment further. The same detached meditative psychology is expressed by the Buddha to those who seemed to doubt the transcendent basis of experience. His statements are below : "There is something that is not born, not produced, not created, not compounded. Were there not, O disciples, this something not born.... there would be no possible existence for what is born." (*Udāna*, vii, 3). It must be noted however that, in the Buddha, the stress is always on the aspect of detachment from the intellectual modes of understanding. Only when his disciples or people in general were sceptical about the transcendent experience, that the Buddha indicated something in a positive way. To develop further the process of detachment from the intellectual proneness, he will say that he is aware of sixty-two modes of argument ranging from nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) to eternalism (*śāsvatavāda*)[3], but he will not continue that intellectualist tradition. He is deeply conscious of the limitations of the intellectual modes; he will choose the method of disciplined 'silence', or his triadic disciplines of conduct (*śīla*), meditation (*samādhi*) and insightful understanding (*prajñā*). The Buddha is aware of two orders of experience, viz., (i) the unconditioned or transcendent, and (ii) the conditioned or the apparent. Accepting that as a fundamental stand, he will like to suggest that the presented universe is an *aggregate* (psycho-physical process),

3. Rhys Davids : *The Dialogues of the Buddha*, Sacred Book of the Buddhists.

which cannot be traced to a simple conceptual basis as a *substance* or *subject*; the *aggregate* as presented has a complex basis, the *core* of which is *deeply psycho-moral*; it is a *basic ignorance*, on account of which the presented universe is a continuous transience (*anitya*), non-substantiality (*anātma*), and sorrow (*duḥkha*), a *ground-consequent relationship* (*pratītyasamutpāda*),—a process from a *basic ignorance* to *activity*, to *consciousness*, to *name and form*, to *six sense-organs*, to *contact*, to *sensation*, to *desire*, to *attachment*, to *existence* in the process of birth, old age, death, sorrow and rebirth;[4] the entire process of *ground-consequent relationship* may be described as the *twelvefold cyclic process* (*dvādaśabhāvacakra*). The process-aspect refers to the conditioned aspect of experience. It has to be admitted without any discussion, and then a separation from the 'conditioned aspect' can be achieved by the triadic disciplines noted above. In this context, one will clearly see how the Buddha differs from the Upaniṣadic thinkers, and yet how he continues the *meditative mode* of the determination of the transcendent experience.

The Vaibhāṣikas, like the Buddha, take for granted the presented universe as grounded on a complex psycho-moral process (which is a *basic ignorance*, a proneness to discuss or *bhāvana*, or a desire or *tanhā*); it is the sphere of the 'conditioned order' of experience; it can be contrasted with another condition, which is a freedom from this 'ground-consequent' relationship. The latter order of experience is *nirvāṇa*,—*the unconditioned experience* which can be realised by the Buddha's triadic process. To explain the two orders

4. *A Source Book in Indian Philosop'y*, ed. by Radhakrishnan and Moore, pp. 278-9.

of experience, however, the Vaibhāṣikas do not accept the Buddha's (i) mere admission, (ii) his refusal to discuss, and his (iii) method of silence. Here they deviate a little from the Buddha, but their main intention was for a clarification of the Buddha's psycho-moral attitude. They introduced discussion or argumentation only *tentatively* or *by way of a postulation.* The later Buddhist schools will scrutinise the relevance of the reintroduction of a discursive or logical method in Buddhist thought.

Before granting the presented order of ground-consequent relationship, the Vaibhāṣikas posit a sphere of transcendent flashes or particulars (*dharmas*), which, when associated with a causal process, accounts for the "conditioned order" of experience, and when dissociated from the "causal process", accounts for the "unconditioned experience". The *association* is due to the psycho-moral propensity, *bhāvanā* or *tanhā*; the *dissociation* is due to the triadic disciplines of *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*. Stcherbatsky, therefore, in conformity with the Vaibhāṣika-psycho-moral scheme, refers to the two orders of experience, as (i) an order of commotion (*duḥkha*), restlessness (*anitya*) or conjunction of forces (*saṁskāras* or *saṁghātas*), and as (ii) an order of extinction (*nirvāṇa*), suppression (*nirodha*) or calmness (*śānta*).[5] But both these conditions of the Vaibhāṣika school were questioned by the later Buddhist schools; they critically took note of the psycho-moral stand of the Vaibhāṣika school. The thinkers

5. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 32-4; Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 30.

Hiriyanna, in his *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958, p. 139), chooses to interpret the sensible presentations as *samghāta* or aggregates.

of the Vaibhāṣika school, in turn, were deeply conscious of meditative psychology of the Buddha and of the Upaniṣadic thinkers.[6]

If one accepts this dual scheme of the Vaibhāṣika school in the post-Upaniṣadic thought-process as extended by the Buddha, no one will be inclined to compare the transcendent intuitional flashes of the thinkers of the Vaibhāṣika school, with the *ideas* of Plato, the *universals* of the Christian-Scholastics, the *essences* of Santayana, the *generals* of Peirce, or the *eternal objects* of Whitehead, for, these intuitional flashes (*dharmas*) of the Vaibhāṣikas are only tentative assumptions to account for two orders of experience deciphered by the Buddha, from a psycho-moral meditative attitude, cancelling the tinge of theoretical element in the meditative-psychology of the Upaniṣadic thinkers. The Western thinkers in general were no doubt conscious of some kind of transcendent intuitions, but they did not develop in a detached way the psycho-moral process as indicated above. The Platonic *ideas*, for example, are actual entities which are taken for granted by an abstract contemplation and not by sensible experience; they alone are taken as real whereas the sensible experiences are declared as shadows or reflections. The *universals* of the Christian-Scholastics are postulated to account for the reality of the unity involved in the notion of trinity. The *essences* of Santayana are ideal intuitive flashes of a living psyche floating within a cosmic flux; the *essences* of Santayana, again

6. *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 25, 34-5, 50, 53; Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 24. "Nirvāṇa means extinction of life and death, extinction of worldly desire, and extinction of space and time conditions....*nirvāṇa*....positively is perfect freedom, quiescence."

are ideal glimpses continuously attracting the psyche and the flux to themselves, but they cannot be touched. The *generals* of Peirce are cosmic symbols directing the universe towards them. The *eternal objects* of Whitehead are the persistent features emerging alongside of the perishing occasions;* they are more descriptions than actual entities in the flowing universe. The Vaibhāṣikas, we know, have no direct motive to account for either the presented universe or the transcendent real experience, in any theoretical sense. Their main concern is psycho-moral discipline; their two orders of experience are to demonstrate alternatively the undisciplined and the disciplined conditions. Stcherbatsky brings out this motive of the Vaibhāṣikas more pointedly when he says explicitly that "the particulars (*dharmas*) of the Vaibhāṣikas are neither *substances*, nor *attributes*,—no intellectual categories are applicable to them."[7]

The thinkers of the second Buddhist school after the Vaibhāṣika school— the Sautrāntikas, extend the scheme of the Vaibhāṣikas in a different line, suggesting that the particulars or the elements (*dharmas*) are never intuited in any discrete way. Experience is always a *series*, a relational process. The Vaibhāṣikas unnecessarily bring in a notion of causal process besides their postulation of the discrete entities (*dharmas*), hence the Sautrāntikas think that the Vaibhāṣikas are plunged into another theoretical postulation of dissociating oneself from the causal

*Whitehead's view will be revised in later chapters.

7. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 28, and *Buddhist Logic*, vol. 1, pp. 479-501. Reference is mostly to the first edition of *Buddhist Logic*. The recent edition of *Buddhist Logic* (in two volumes) is out from the Dover Publications, New York, 1962.

process to realise the "unconditioned experience" (*nirvāṇa*). Instead of introducing such a long-drawn process of postulation of the *dharmas*, in association with or in dissociation from causal process, the Sautrāntikas prescribe a return to the original position of the Buddha, where there is simply an admission of a presented order of 'conditioned experience', and also an admission of an 'unconditioned experience' (*nirvāṇa*), which can be attained by the triadic disciplines mentioned by the Buddha. It may be noted further that when the Sautrāntikas admit directly the presented order of the "conditioned experience", which is a ground-consequent relationship, they do not want to sponsor a thesis that the universe is all-through relative, phenomenal or conditioned. Their position is not theoretic, they discourage all theories; they are neither relativists nor sceptics, nor again critics of the Vaibhāṣikas in any theoretic sense. They are only accounting for the psycho-moral discipline of the Buddha.[8] Hence the tendency to interpret the

8. According to Stcherbatsky the Buddhist schools were idealistic from the very beginning and they remained so throughout, for the whole system of elements is retained with slight variations in the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) of the Yogācāras (*The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 66). If one follows the trends developed in the case of the Vaibhāṣikas, one will find difficulty to accept without qualification Murti's statement of the Vaibhāṣikas as dogmatic and realistic, or the reactions of the subsequent school as absolutistic and idealistic. *Vide* Murti: "The Metaphysical Schools of Buddhism" in *History of Philosophy— Eastern and Western*, ed. by Radhakrishnan and others, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952-3, vol. 1, p. 191, pp. 195-200; also *vide* Raju: "The Development of Indian Thought" in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, October, 1952, pp. 534-6, for his views about the Buddhist schools. Compare also in this connection Saratchandra's interpretation of the perceptual experience according to the *Nikāyas* before the stage developed in the *Abhidharmas*. According to him the Buddhist psychology as developed in the *Nikāya* stage, is neither idealism nor realism, in any western sense; it is only a general introspective attitude—a

Sautrāntikas in comparison with Kantianism in Western philosophy, as expressing a relatively critical attitude in the background of Vaibhāṣika standpoint, as claimed by Murti,[9] is not appropriate, for Kantian discussion against the background of Western rationalist and empiricist thought, is not a *detached meditative* process. The Vaibhāṣikas exhibit a critical process in a meditative aspect after the detached critical attitude of the Buddha. So none of the thought-processes in the detached meditative line from the Buddha to the Sautrāntikas, can be taken as dogmatic, in any intellectual sense. They are all conscious of the limitations of mere theoretic analysis of experience. We may conveniently understand the process of psycho-moral disciplines progressively from one stage to the other. To hasten the process from the Sautrāntikas to the Mādhyamikas, who represent the third school of Buddhist thought, Das Gupta considers the standpoint of the Sautrāntikas as only "transitional". If the above argument between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas is accepted, I have no reason to differ from Das Gupta.[10]

Nāgārjuna, the exponent of the Mādhyamika

turning inwards of the external senses or a renunciation from the lay life (*prapancopaśamam*) : *Buddhist Psychology of Perception*, The University of Ceylon Press, 1958, specially p. 12. A completely different mode of reflection has been developed in this book.

For the Sautrāntikas, *vide* Das Gupta: *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 95-6; Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 62-79; Raju: *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 222-4; Stcherbatsky: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (Leningrad, 1927), p. 25; Murti : *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1955.

9. Murti: "The Metaphysical Schools of Buddhism" in *History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western*, ed. by Radhakrishnan and others, vol. 1, pp. 205-7; *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, ed. by Radhakrishnan and Moore, Princeton University Press, 1957, pp 340-2.

10. Das Gupta : *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 95-6.

standpoint, suggests an efficient dialectic scheme between the cultural processes from the Vaibhāṣikas to the Sautrāntikas, and he shows how the Sautrāntika-form of experience can be treated as a stage in the process of intellectuality. Nāgārjuna, therefore, is interested in a searching analysis of *intellectuality*, even in the sphere of meditative process. He draws attention to the four stages in the process of intellectuality or in any form of argument; they are (i) being (*ens*), (ii) non-being (*non-ens*), (iii) both being and non-being, and (iv) neither being nor non-being. In this four-fold scheme of intellectuality, Nāgārjuna thinks, all arguments can be placed. The Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas can be placed in the first two orders, but there are other stages; in the fourth or the final stage, which is the sphere of disjunctive negations, the alternatives are not chosen but dialectically rejected. Nāgārjuna's suggestion in the Buddhist thought-process, from the stage of the Vaibhāṣikas to the stage of the Sautrāntikas, or to even posterior stages, will be a total cancellation of all *intellectual forms* by a dialectic negation. He will not hesitate to develop intellectuality to its fullest form, and then reject it wholly, for according to him, the relationality which is the basis of all intellectual understanding is *vacuous* without a non-relational or an undifferentiated basis; this basis cancels all forms by its intrinsic fullness and quietude.

In this interpretation of the intellectual process, where there is a dissolution of *all views* or *restricted opinions*, one can clearly mark how Nāgārjuna would differ from Hegel's dialectical process that continuously lands one to a *synthesis*; Hegel's synthesis may be a

comprehensive view in a relatively higher stage, but it is a continuity of restricted views, and never a supra-rational meditative experience. Nāgārjuna suggests a detachment from the intellectual forms, dialectically, and perhaps solves the problem better than Bradley of the present century, who, in the background of Western intellectualist tradition, simply refers to the relativity of the intellectual categories, but cannot cancel them totally, though at heart he wishes a complete suicide of the intellectual process to realise a supra-intellectual experience, which is his *Absolute*. Nāgārjuna's position will be clarified in later two chapters of this book, but here it may be mentioned that though radical, his position is in the line of the Buddha's meditative psycho-moral aspect; his is not an abstract intellectual standpoint to be compared with any aspect of Western thought.

The Buddhist thought after Nāgārjuna was developed by Asaṅga, the exponent of the Yogācāra school of thought. The Yogācāra thought can however be traced back to Maitreyanātha, who lived shortly after Nāgārjuna. Asaṅga's brother, Vasubandhu, who was first an exponent of the Vaibhāṣika mode of thought, wrote a commentary on *Madhyāntavibhāṅga sutra* of Maitreyanātha, and a sub-commentary on this work of Vasubandhu was written by Sthiramati in the fifth century A.D. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, two learned brothers, developed a cooperative system which is known as Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, for their main principle is the same. They were dominant thinkers of the 4th

11. Sthiramati: *Madhyantavibhāngasūtrabāsyatīka*, part I, ed. by V. Bhattacharya and Tucci, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 24, 1932.

century A.D.; they directly influenced the development of thought of Dignāga, the exponent of Logical School of Buddhist thought (also known as Sātantra-Vijñānavāda) of the 5th century A.D. Dignāga's position will be clarified in the fifth chapter of this book, when the Buddhist schools take a different turn. This chapter is only interested in a general consideration of the four schools of Buddhism, but the complexity of the different schools will be brought out in the third chapter where Candrakīrti, a disciple of Nāgārjuna, in the 7th century A.D., will review the positions of the Buddhist schools from Nāgārjuna's standpoint, criticising the logical school of Dignāga and his followers. In the later history of Buddhist thought there will be two alternative modes of reflection around Nāgārjuna and Dignāga.

Asaṅga does not interpret the presented universe like the Vaibhāṣikas, tentatively postulating the transcendent particulars, nor does he think of the presented universe as relational and phenomenal like the Sautrāntikas, but he traces both aspects of experience to a transcendent ideational basis, which is not a *single propensity* as ideational or as desire, but is an abode of propensities or what he would choose to call an ideational process or abode of ideas, which is a field of efficiency, manifesting and perfuming not only the objective universe but also all individual consciousnesses. There is a further consciousness beyond this ideational consciousness which is the *non-dual experience*, the *tathatā* (thusness). Takakusu finds in this Yogācāra ideal a demonstration of a triadic causal process, one leading to the other, the posterior controlling the prior, and finally the supremely transcendent experience (*tathatā*) contro-

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lling and abolishing all preceding causal processes. These triadic series of causality can be expressed as (i) causality by action-influence (*pratītyasamutpāda*), (ii) causality by ideation (*ālayavijñāna*), and (iii) causality by thusness (*tathatā*).[12] There is also a downward process from *tathatā* to *pratītyasamutpāda*. It is an evolving process almost like the notion of a fall from a transcendent unitive experience of Plotinus (a mystic thinker of the West in the 2nd century A.D., perhaps a contemporary of Nāgārjuna) to the discrete experience through the stages of *nous*, *mind* and *matter*.[13] The two processes, viz., the descent from the non-duality to plurality and ascent from plurality to non-duality, in the schemes of the Yogācāras and Plotinus, are similar in many respects. Vasubandhu interprets *ālayavijñāna* as the first evolute (*vipāka*) or transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the pure consciousness (*Vijñānamātram*). Vasubandhu's scheme is therefore known as *Vijñānavāda* as distinguished from the *Yogācāravāda* of Asaṅga, but in principle they are substantially the same, hence in later Buddhist thought, they are used alternatively. In both these systems the emphasis is on *samādhi* or meditation, but none of them neglect the other disciplines, viz., *śīla* (conduct) and *prajñā* (insightful understanding). Like the earlier Buddhist schools, these alternative systems cannot be compared fully with any intellectual system of the West. One may find in Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda system a reference to an absolute experience, but it is not the *absolute* of the Hegelian

12. Takakusu: "Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness" in *Philosophy East and West*, ed. by Moore, Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. 79-82.

13. Zeller: *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, Meridian Books, 1962, pp. 314-23.

type, rather it is a supra-intellectual experience akin to Bradley's sentient experience, but realisable only by a yogic method in the Buddhist sense. Radhakrishnan thinks that the Yogācāra standpoint exhibits a middling ability[14] and is akin to the Hegelian idealism, but in this discourse, we have shown that the Yogācāra mode of reflection is in the psycho-moral line of the Buddhist schools in general. From the series of cultural aspects in the detached spheres of meditation in progress, the Yogācāra ideal is very much complicated.

Interpreting the thoughts of the four Buddhist schools in a psycho-moral line, this discourse suggests that in the dynamic process and progress of Indian thought, there is always an advance and never a return to the original position. They have gone beyond the Upaniṣadic tradition and also beyond the tradition of the Buddha. One may here feel like accepting the general trend of Whitehead, viz., "There is no return to the old position after the shock of a great philosopher."[15] The return is still more difficult if the cultural process is in deep meditative aspects.

The four Buddhist schools remained in force till the 4th century A.D., but their admission of intellectuality may not be merely a reflective attitude, it may not be also a public demand. The Vaibhāṣikas or the Sarvāstivādins, who admitted the intellectual mode of reflection tentatively, must have been directly or indirectly influenced by Aśvaghoṣa, the great personality of their age. In the next chapter,

14. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 703.

15. *Process and Reality*, Cambridge University Press, 1929, p. 14.

a special attention has been given to one of Aśvaghoṣa's works,—*Mahāyāna Śraddhotpādaśāstra.*

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CHAPTER II

AŚVAGHOṢA'S REALITY (TATHATĀ)* AND THE BUDDHIST THOUGHT IN GENERAL

Aśvaghoṣa, the author of *Mahāyāna Śraddhotpāda-śāstra*, was an eminent Buddhist thinker of the 1st century A.C.[1] Suzuki, one of the greatest contemporary Japanese thinkers, popularizes Aśvaghoṣa's thought in this century by translating the above work from its Chinese version. The original Sanskrit version of the work is lost.** Suzuki also develops Aśvaghoṣa's notion of *tathatā* (suchness) and other associated ideas in his *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*.[2] The notion of *tathatā* is not purely intellectual; it is something realised through deep intuition, which arises from a disciplined life, the tradition of which was set up by the Buddha.

To understand fully the discipline behind the reflection of Aśvaghoṣa's *tathatā*, one has not only to

* Published previously in *Philosophical Quarterly*, October, 1962, under the caption: 'Aśvaghoṣa's Tathatā (Suchness)'. Here some changes have been made to fulfill the requirements of this book.

1. *Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, translated for the first time from the Chinese version by D. T. Suzuki (The Open Court Publishing Co. 1900).

**Chao-Pa-chu, in his *Buddhism in China* (Buddhist Association of China, Peking, 1960, p. 28) states that the original version of Aśvaghoṣa's work was lost, but the Chinese pilgrim, Hsuan Tsang, who was taught by Śilabhadra of the Nālanda University, translated back Aśvaghoṣa's work in Chinese version to Sanskrit.

2. Luzac & Co., 1907.

know the discipline set up by the Buddha, but one has to know as well the thought-processes of the early Theravāda Buddhist school which immediately follows the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* (great demise). Aśvaghoṣa does not revive the *theoretic consciousness*, viz., the substance-mode of reflection of the Upaniṣads in his deliberations of the *tathatā*; and he is not also satisfied with the Buddha's total silence about the transcendent intuitional experience. Aśvaghoṣa's is not the Buddha's rejection of or dissociation from the intellectual consciousness. He is in search of a sustaining condition which is not a *substance* but a *process*, a process that is not transient but eternal and unrestricted. Aśvaghoṣa, in other words, raises the problem like the Mahāsaṅghikas, regarding the *personality* of the Buddha. The Mahāsaṅghikas (the members of the Great Council School), held a Council one hundred years after the First Council summoned by the Theravādins, the Buddha's immediate disciples. The Theravādins (also called *Sthaviras*) had claimed against the Mahāsaṅghikas that the Buddha was only a historical personage who through exertion attained *nirvāṇa* and finally *parinirvāṇa*, leaving behind him nothing but his "sayings" and "deeds". But Aśvaghoṣa is not satisfied with this type of Buddhism which would foster a repetitive or mechanical program. He wants to bring out a basis for dynamic Buddhism by interpreting the Buddha's *nirvāṇa* in relation to his *parinirvāṇa*; *nirvāṇa* and *parinirvāṇa* are not merely historical processes associated with the life of the Buddha, but they signify various moral, philosophic and religious notions with disciplines. Very prominently these historical events bring out the opyration of a dynamic meditative personality

which is not interested merely in the realization of its own self-perfection, but also in the perfection of every human being born or unborn; this personality is also interested in getting beyond the processes of birth, death and rebirth with the accompanying sorrows associated with the cosmic-psychic processes; it is interested in being with the processes as a sustaining and a rescuing character. Hence the personality, that is presupposed in all these varied situations—*historical*, *ideal* and *transcendent*, is a continuous, efficient and disciplined personality; it comes and goes (*tathāgatā*); it is suchness (*tathatā*); it is a sustaining character, historically a *nirmāṇakāya*, ideally a *sambhogakāya*, and pervasively and compassionately a *dharmakāya*. It is a *Bodhisattva*, operative through the historical and ideal processes, deferring its final goal (dispassionate condition or *nirvāṇa*) for the sake of others, born or unborn; hence it is a coming and going process, a compassionate heart in continuity, higher than the personalities of lower orders, viz., *śrāvakas* and *prithakjanās*, who have restricted minds and narrow hearts, comparatively speaking. It is also a process beyond the stage of the *Bodhisattvas* to the *Buddha*, where the goal is attained, but the discipline is not terminated; the stage of the Buddha is the stage of final perfection to be perpetually maintained by the triadic disciplines of *śīla* (conduct), *samādhi* (meditation) and *prajñā* (insightful understanding or evaluation).[3] Aśvaghoṣa's reflection is in the line of the Mahāsaṅghikas, though with a difference.

3. *The Bible of the World*, ed. by Robert O. Ballou (The Viking Press, N. Y., Fifth Printing, 1949), cf. on Buddhist Scripture, pp. 95-159.

To understand the notion of this complex personality associated with the life of the Buddha, one has to keep in mind the evolution and growth of personality-consciousness from the Buddha's birth to the stages of *nirvāṇa*[4] and *parinirvāṇa*, and the posterior stages suggested by the *parinirvāṇa*. From this broad perspective, the Buddha's birth is not a mere historical event, but its significance has to be associated with the possibilities of *nirvāṇa*, *parinirvāṇa*, and the posterior stages. The process from the birth to *parinirvāṇa* is a continuous discipline, a sustained discipline of a personality not to end up with extinction. A self-perfection is attained in the condition of *nirvāṇa*, which is a dispassionate condition; but unless this condition is recommended to others it has no value, and even if it is recommended to others, but if it is not realised by others, then also it is not an effective process; hence, the Buddha after announcing to the world the possibility of attaining self-perfection, tried by continuous discipline, to be completely detached from his body and from the triadic processes of birth, death and rebirth with the sorrows that accompany each of these processes.

The Buddha deferred his death till he had a perfect control over the bodily processes and the triadic processes; this he effected by a series of meditations involved in *parinirvāṇa*, before his disciple Ānanda. The meditations of *parinirvāṇa* refer to continuous disciplines and efficiencies over one's

4. Here one may examine Radhakrishnan's statement regarding the Buddha's *nirvāṇa* as thus: "The Buddha when he attained *nirvāṇa* is far from being dissolved into non-being. It is not he that became extinct, but his passions and desires." (Radhakrishnan's Foreword to 2500 *Years of Buddhism*, edited by Bapat: Government of India, 1956).

psychological perfections and control over the bodily processes. A personality in this disciplined psycho-moral situation, can enter into life-death-rebirth process and be out of it, helping others to attain perfection. This psycho-moral condition or exercise is not merely a perfect theoretical condition as signified by *tathatā* (suchness), but it is an extension towards a process of *Dharmakāya* or compassionate heart, which is a cosmic-psychic process. In accounting for this novel kind of evolution in a theoretical-practical aspect, Aśvaghoṣa thinks that there are two disciplines involved in this process. The first is a series of meditations to get rid of the normal particularising consciousness or restricted consciousness; the second is getting beyond the unrestricted theoretic consciousness towards *Dharmakāya* or Compassionate Heart.

In working out this novel scheme of a final and perfect personality in a theoretical-practical aspect in togetherness, Aśvaghoṣa thinks that theoretically it implies a freedom from particularising or restricted consciousness, but practically it implies an extension to a compassionate cosmic-psychic heart,—an elevation of the personalities of the different grades of restricted consciousness by progressive meditations. It, therefore, admits a place of a basic ignorance, sorrow and evil. The place of ignorance, sorrow and evil, lies in the restricted consciousness and in its cosmic-psychic basis. This is developed in Aśvaghoṣa's notion of *tathāgatagarbha* (the womb of the *tathāgata*), the original germ for the evolution of the universe in the form of the individual minds and objects. The *tathāgatagarbha* is also known as the *ālayavijñāna* or the psychic germ in its further state

of evolution. In Suzuki's words, Aśvaghoṣa's *tathāgatagarbha* is "the joint creation of the universal ignorance and suchness (*tathatā*), so is the *ālaya*, a product of desire (*kleśa*) and wisdom (*bodhi*)".[5] Again, Aśvaghoṣa's *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna* are each in itself innocent, and not responsible for the existing state of affairs. The so-called wickedness of the world is not deep-rooted in nature and life. It is merely superficial. It is the work of ignorance and desire. Aśvaghoṣa, therefore, strongly insists on the innate intrinsic goodness of the *ālaya* and the *garbha*.[6] It may be mentioned that Aśvaghoṣa's notion of the universe and the evolutionary process is not from the point of view of a theoretic consciousness, but from a deep psycho-moral process or cosmic-psychic compassionate heart. The theoretic consciousness (*tathatā*) is an expression from that background. The entire process is deeply meditative.

By associating *garbha* and *ālaya* by the side of *tathatā* (suchness) and considering *dharmakāya* as basic and beyond them, Aśvaghoṣa tries to give a place to *ignorance* or restricted particularising consciousness of different grades.[7] In a way it is an attempt to give a new interpretation to the Buddha's transcendent intuitive experience which is not merely a dispassionate condition (*nirvāṇa*), but also an operative

5. *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 128, italics mine. cf. Mencius' belief in the essential goodness of man in post-Confucian thought of China (*vide* Waley: *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China*, Double Day Anchor Books, Part II).

6. Compare the basic notions of *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna* with the Western doctrine of *matter* from Plato to Santayana.

7. *Mahāyāna Śraddhotpādaśāstra* (*Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayāna*), pp. 54-95.

personality in a cosmic-psychic disciplined sphere as one understands by *dharmakāya*. This unrestricted experience and compassionate heart of *dharmakāya* can be obtained by a deep concentration (*samādhi*) and purification (*śīla*). It is a separation of oneself from the particularising consciousness and subjective-objective propensity. The subjective-objective propensity is opposed to enlightened experience of the *dharmakāya*. From another standpoint, the restricted experience is the general cosmic-psychic character which can be traced to the *garbha* and *ālaya*. So Aśvaghoṣa expresses a triadic process from *garbha* and *ālaya* to *dharmakāya* through *tathatā*. The energetic basis of this process is *dharmakāya*, the infinite compassion, which corrects the limitations of the basic ignorance (*garbha* and *ālaya*) and of unrestricted theoretic consciousness (*tathatā*). All these reflections again form the basis of Aśvaghoṣa's notion of *Trikāya*. Aśvaghoṣa, here, not only accounts for the cosmic process in general, but also accounts for the activity of suchness (*tathatā*) from a basis of deep compassion (*karuṇā*). This deep basis, which is *dharmakāya*, is the sustaining and transcendent process operative behind the cosmic-psychic historical process of *nirmāṇakāya* and ideal process of *sambhogakāya*. According to Aśvaghoṣa, the Buddha, in his discourse, merely expressed the temporal-historical process, but the transcendent personality, *dharmakāya* was left unexplained by him.

The individual ideal as exhibited in the attainment of *nirvāṇa*, and the extinction of the individual (as a historical process having a body) in *parinirvāṇa*, suggesting further possibilities, are preparations of the ground for perfection of any creature born or

unborn. The *norm* in the individual sphere is for self-perfection; but self-perfection left to itself expresses a narrowness of heart and ideal (as in *Arhathood*); hence this has to be replaced by a broader ideal which is in the preparation of a ground for the perfection of all (as in *Bodhisattvahood*). The idea here is, therefore, not a development of a theoretical consciousness, but a continuation of a growing and progressive personality which can continue by discipline even after its apparent death; the continuation after death is only possible for one who has a control over the triadic processes of birth, death and rebirth; such a personality, at option, can enter into the triadic life-death-rebirth process, and can be out of it; its being with this process, is only functional to help others attain perfection.

The *Śrāvakas* and the *Pratyekabuddhas* form the lower orders of personalities, while the *Bodhisattvas* and the *Buddhas* form the higher orders of personalities. In all orders of personalities, the restricted consciousness of some form is operative, but the *Bodhisattvas* and the *Buddhas* overcome it by discipline; they can control the lower restricted consciousness by their unrestricted consciousness and compassionate heart. The *Bodhisattvas* are in the way of attaining *nirvāṇa* or rather *parinirvāṇa*; the *Buddhas* have attained both these processes; but both retain their respective positions by continuous discipline. The ideal of *Arhat* of the Hīnayāna Buddhism is the attainment of *nirvāṇa* for the individual, but the *Bodhisattva* ideal of Mahāyāna Buddhism is deferring one's realisation of *nirvāṇa* till others have realised it. It is conforming oneself to the doctrine of *parivarta* or turning over one's merits to

others for uplifting the suffering masses.[8] This self-sacrifice or unselfish devotion to the welfare of one's fellow-beings constitutes the essence of the *Bodhisattvahood* of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

According to Suzuki, Aśvaghoṣa's *Dharmakāya*, a combination of two concepts, *dharma* and *kāya*, stands for the organised totality of things; it is not a purely philosophic concept, but an object of religious consciousness.[9] The *Dharmakāya* is a continuous expression of *unrestricted* intelligence, will and love.[10] It shines in its august magnificence everywhere in life and in death,[11] in higher and lower orders of personalities. It is an enveloping process. We are all living in the midst of it, and yet do not know whence the power comes and where it leads to.[12] The *Dharmakāya* directs the course of the universe not blindly but rationally. We know that it is *love*, because it embraces all beings with fatherly tenderness.[13] Again, it is a *will*, because the *Dharmakāya* has firmly set down its aim of activity in a *good* which transcends the evils in the universe. Finally, *Dharmakāya* rescues all sentient beings from the sufferings of birth, death and rebirth.[14] In later Mahāyāna thought, the *Dharmakāya* is associated with the *Bodhicitta* or intelligence-heart which is present in all sentient beings, ordinary mortals and the Buddhas.[15] The processes

8. *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 282-4. (There is a recent edition published by Schocken Books, N. Y. 1963).
9. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 239.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 238-9.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 302-3.

that the Buddha exhibited before passing into *Parinirvāṇa*, are in the aspects of *Dharmakāya*.

The admission of the unrestricted function of the *Dharmakāya* in relation to the transcendent *Tathatā* (suchness) by Aśvaghoṣa, gives a new turn to the thought of the Buddha and the Buddhism of the Hīnayāna school. The two concepts of *Dharmakāya* and *Tathatā* stand for two different orders of experience completely unrelated to the restricted notions of God and the Absolute of Western idealistic philosophy in general.

Aśvaghoṣa's experience of *tathatā* (suchness) depends on a continuous discipline or purification (*śīla*) and concentration (*samādhi*). The process of purification and concentration is along the line of the Buddha's discipline. It is a process towards progressive quietude—a passage to deeper orders of meditation by a continuous separation from subjective-objective propensity. It is a series of meditations (*samādhis*), or a source of all meditations.[16] The discipline as implied in this meditation is as follows: "Those who practise cessation should dwell in solitude, and sitting cross-legged rectify the attitude and pacify the mind[17] . . . . all particularisation, imaginations and recollections should be excluded from consciousness, even the idea of exclusion being excluded."[18] After this discipline, Aśvaghoṣa suggests that one has to dissociate oneself from the ideas that arise from the external objects. By such a separation from subjective-objective proneness, one can enter into the *samādhi* (meditation) of suchness,

16. *Mahāyāna Śraddhotpādaśāstra*, p. 136.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-4.
18. *Ibid.*

which is the *ideal of the never-returning* (*avaivartikatva*).[19] It is indeed the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha elevated to a trans-philosophic condition by a series of meditations. Aśvaghoṣa thinks that those who are sceptical, sacrilegious, destitute of faith, encumbered with hindrances (*āvaraṇas*) of *karma*, arrogant or indolent, are not entitled to enter here.[20] It is a discipline, resting on faith. To Aśvaghoṣa, *faith* is a basis for concentration and final experience. This faith obviously is not the faith of the Scholastic Christians of the West, but it is a faith in the Buddha's line of discipline. It implies a *distrust* of abstract or restricted reason. Its detachment from subjective-objective propensity in the background of the past Indian thought, is an extension of a tradition of distrust of intellectuality. In an aspect it is more radical than the distrust of intellectuality of Kierkegaard. Aśvaghoṣa's distrust of subjective-objective propensity may be compared with some aspects of reflections of Marcel or Jaspers; but, whereas, to both Marcel and Jaspers, the psychological condition realised by a separation from the subjective-objective propensity, leads one to one's *presence* and *faith* in the presence of an other-than-me (Marcel), or to one's *silence* and an interpersonal situation or *communication* (Jaspers)[21]; to Aśvaghoṣa, it is not merely such a positive psychological condition. To Aśvaghoṣa it is an efficient level of cosmic-psychic condition with a series of meditations, which can even separate one from one's body or from one's cyclic existence of birth, death and rebirth as demons-

19. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Ussher: *Journey Through Dread*—A Study of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre (Darwen Finlayson Ltd., 1955). p. 69.

trated by the Buddha in his process of attainment of *Parinirvāṇa*. This discipline of Aśvaghoṣa is in the line of the Buddha's discipline, with a difference; this tradition is not present in the West, unless one goes into the deeper recesses of the Christian mystic like Eckhart of the post-Thomian period.[22] Aśvaghoṣa's discipline or concentration is not *contemplation* of the *ideas* as in Plato, it is a total abandonment of *ideas*, sensuous or non-sensuous, by *meditation*, and hence it is not a kind of auto-suggestion as some present-day psycho-analysts might be inclined to think. It is a training of the mind to be completely free from the subjective-objective propensity. In Aśvaghoṣa's words, it is eradicating the *roots* of that propensity. This discipline goes so far as even "effacing the idea of suchness."[23] The strain of this discipline is continued to the final extent where there is a negative test prescribed, viz.; in the supreme meditative condition, there can be no visionary images, no prejudices affecting one's mind, for, one has then totally destroyed the roots of illusion through the power of meditation (*samādhi*).[24] Hence this meditative process is not Husserl's phenomenological reflections but it is Gauḍapāda's resistence to entertain any ideal presentation by a discipline of mind. Gauḍapāda's position will be clarified in Chapter VII of this book.

In this mode of concentration, one realises that

22. Rudolf Otto: *Mysticism East and West* (Meridian Books, New York, 1957); also Suzuki: *Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist*, Collier Books, N. Y. 1962; and Coomaraswami: *Buddhism in Living Schools of Religion*, ed. by Vergilius Ferm & 28 authorities, A Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1965.

23. *Mahāyāna Śraddhotpādaśāstra*, p. 139.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

the *transient* is not real; and the highest truth is not *mental*, but a deep compassion* which inspires all modes and activities. Once being conscious of this deep feeling, we shall be able to *wake up* dauntless energies and make great vows as Aśvaghoṣa suggests : "May my mind be freed from all contradictions, may I abandon particularisation, may I personally attend to all the Buddhas and the Bodisattvas...."[25] After these vows (which are really meditations), Aśvaghoṣa urges that the practiser should at all times, so far as his energies permit, practise those deeds which are beneficial both to himself and to others.[26] To Aśvaghoṣa this discipline is a balanced attitude neither wholly theoretical nor wholly practical, but a continuous process in meditative aspects. It is indeed a revolution in both philosophic and religious traditions of mankind as a whole. Aśvaghoṣa stands for a novel philosophy of evolution which is a possibility for each individual.

Aśvaghoṣa's thought influenced the later thinkers of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India. Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the famous exponents of Mahāyāna Buddhism, reorganise with slight differences the thoughts of Aśvaghoṣa. Aśvaghoṣa's thought was carried to China possibly in the early years of the Christian era.[27] It forms the basis of the various types of Mahāyāna Buddhism in China, and of other Asian countries. Aśvaghoṣa's thought had a very

* The term *compassion* is understood here not as a mental experience but as a basic cosmic-psychic condition behind all restricted processes.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

27. Chao Pa-chu : *Buddhism in China*, The Buddhist Association of China, Peking, 1960.

great effect on Śaṅkara's Vedāntic analysis of transcendent experience as self-shining (*svayamprakāś*), in the 8th century A.D., and on Radhakrishnan's transcendent experience of the *Absolute* (or Spirit) as the experiential basis for infinite possibilities including God and the present World.[28] Truly, Aśvaghoṣa exhibits an advanced mode of reflection, the value of which can be assessed by the continuing reflective activities of the later centuries. Just as a contemporary Western thinker, Whitehead, in his mood of acknowledgement would like to declare that the whole of Western Philosophy is a "series of footnotes on Plato", so a sober contemporary Indian thinker of this day, would not hesitate to say in the same spirit that the Indian thought-process to this date is a series of footnotes on Aśvaghoṣa. By way of a further elaboration of Indian thought, one might as well say that Indian philosophy is a continuous march towards a philosophy of process and possibility,[29] but not from a restricted theoretical perspective.*

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28. Radhakrishnan: *An Idealist View of Life*, Barnes & Noble, N. Y. 1964. Bahm, A.J.: *The World's Living Religions* (Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1964), p. 200, also, cf. R. P. Singh: *Śaṅkara and Radhakrishnan* in *Dr. S. Radhakrishnan's Souvenir Volume* (published by Darsana International, Moradabad, 1964).

29. *Philosophers of Process*, ed. by Browning and Introduction by Hartshorne, Random House, N. Y., 1965.

* Das Gupta's Indian thought developed in varied mystic currents from the Vedas through Buddism to the most modern syncretic directions in his *Hindu Mysticism* (Frederic Ungar Publishing Co., N. Y., 3rd Printing 1967, first published 1927) can be utilized as a support of the reflections developed in his book.

CHAPTER III

NĀGĀRJUNA: ON CAUSALITY AND NIRVĀṆA*

Nāgārjuna, the great exponent of the Mādhyamika Buddhism in the 2nd century A.D., did not accept the causal interpretation of the presented universe (*pratītyasamutpādā*) as held by the Vaibhāṣikas of the Hīnayāna Buddhism; he also differed from the Vaibhāṣika-interpretation of *nirvāṇa* which is associated with a psycho-moral notion of *causality*. In this connection I want to examine Nāgārjuna's reflection on *causality* and *nirvāṇa* in his *Mādhyamika-Śāstra* (chs. I & XXV) and its commentary entitled *Prasannapadā*** (*The Clearworded*) by Candrakīrti, an eminent Buddhist thinker of the 7th century A.D.[1] In *Prasannapadā* Nāgārjuna's view on *causality* and *nirvāṇa* has been considered in the background of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas who preceded Nāgārjuna. In this chapter, Candrakīrti's commentary is examined chiefly in connection with Dignāga's new logical school of Buddhist thought following Nāgārjuna and the Yogācāras. It may be noted as a preliminary discipline that the transcendent experi-

* This chapter in part was published in Dr. Radhakrishnan's Souvenir Volume (*Darsana International*).

**Swami Vimuktananda : "Buddhism and the Philosophy of Nāgārjuna" in *Prabuddha Bharata*, April, 1939. For further details about Nāgārjuna's works besides Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā-Mādhyamika-Vritti.*, *vide* ch. v of this book.

1. Stcherbatsky : *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad, 1927, pp. 65-212.

ence (*nirvāṇa*) entertained by the Buddha, meant a total separation from all logico-metaphysical-empirical modes of reflection. If the transcendent experience realised by the Vedic and the Upaniṣadic thinkers is beyond the reach of thought and speech, then obviously discursive method entertained for either clarification or indication of that aspect, is not necessary according to the Buddha. Separating himself from any propensity to discuss, the Buddha indicates directly two orders of experience —the apparent and the transcendent; the apparent order is the non-substantial (*anātma*) and transient (*anitya*) twelve-fold process (*dvādaśabhāvacakra*) involving process from a *basic ignorance* to *birth, death and rebirth*, ending with suffering and sorrow (*duḥkha*). The transcendent experience (*nirvāṇa*) is the freedom from the apparent transient orders and *basic ignorance*, realised by following a triadic discipline of *śīla* (conduct), *samādhi* (concentration) and *prajñā* (insightful or evaluative experience). The entire process is a practical method of purification.

The Vaibhāṣikas strictly follow the tradition of the Theravādins, who flourished after the Buddha's great demise (*parinirvāṇa*).[2] They admitted the Buddha's two orders of experience but modified the understanding of the two orders by introducing a psycho-moral mode of reflection, which can to some extent dispense with the ordinary notion of *existence*. With regard to the two orders of experience, the Vaibhāṣikas postulated the *particulars* or discrete elements (*dharma*), not to suggest that they *exist*

2. Banerjee, A. C.: 'Principal Schools and Sects of Buddhism' in *2500 Years of Buddhism*, ed. by Bapat (Government of India, 1956), Ch. VI.

exhibiting a substance-attribute character, but to suggest that they form the background to account for experience in two orders—apparent and transcendent; the apparent order exhibits the manifesting characters of the elements in association with the causal process, the root of which can be discerned in the *basic ignorance*; this basic ignorance is a psycho-moral propensity expressed differently as ideation (*bhāvanā*), desire (*vāsanā*), will (*cetanā*) or forces (*saṁskāras*). The manifestation of the elements (*dharmas*) in union with the causal process is found in a *ground-consequent manner* or in the form of "*if*. . . . *then*", excluding all notion of actual production or existential relation. The transcendent order is rather a negative condition, viz., the dissociation of the elements from the causal process; this is effected by disciplining oneself in the Buddhist triadic manner. This condition is a *freedom* from process and basic psycho-moral propensity. Expressed differently, it is *nirvāṇa* (extinction), *nirodha* (suppression), or *śānta* (calmness). Stcherbatsky aptly describes the two orders as an order of *commotion* (defilement) and an order of *extinction* (purification), eliminating altogether any notion of *physical existentiality*. The entire process, as already noted, is psycho-moral as distinguished from the logico-metaphysical or empirical[3] thought of the West.

The Sautrāntikas, who carry forward the principle of the Mahāsaṅghikas,[4] the critics of the Theravādins in the second Buddhist Council one hundred years after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*, object to the basic

3. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (The Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), pp. 1-53; also *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Ch. VIII.

4. Banerjee, A. C.: 'Principal Schools and Sects of Buddhism' in *2500 Years of Buddhism*, Ch. VI.

postulates of the particulars (*dharmas*); they argue that if the presented universe is wholly relational, phenomenal and durational, then, how can one be justified in postulating the discrete entities or particulars ? In the interlinked universe only the temporal expression of the particulars can be discerned; that experience, again, is not in the form of discontinuities, i.e., in the form of "*if*. . . .*then*", but in the form of unbroken continuity. If the apparent universe is relational all through, how can *nirvāṇa* be conceived in total separation from the continuous temporal sequence ? The Sautrāntikas thus develop a phenomenal or sceptical attitude with regard to the particulars (*dharmas*).[5] *Nirvāṇa* is not a distinct experience to be placed in relation to a world of emergent process, expressed in terms of the *dharmas* (particulars). It is something beyond the relational sphere and cannot be treated on par with the entities (*dharmas*).

Nāgārjuna places himself into the current of the Sautrāntika-thought of the relational universe and protests against the postulation of the discrete entities (*dharmas*) in association with a causal process, in the sense of "*if*. . . .*then*" (*pratītyasamutpāda*) of the Vaibhāṣikas. He does not want to dispense with the notion of *nirvāṇa* as the Sautrāntikas suggested, but only reinterprets it as meaning *quiescence* of all process and plurality. To Nāgārjuna, the relative existence is not a mere "temporal existence", it has to be construed from a permanent basis, which does not exclude sequence but discerns meaning behind it.[6]

5. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, specially, Appendix 1, and also *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Ch. IX.

6. Stcherbatsky: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Ch. XI.

Nāgārjuna attacks the problem of the "discrete entities" and their "origination",—for, how can anything be discrete or how can anything emerge when everything is *interlinked* ? Originality or emergence rests on the notion of *causality* (a before and an after), if so, then is not the notion of causality infected with endless and self-contradictory speculations ? Causality is interlinked with the notions of *existence* and of *energetic relations*. In a relational situation, for example, such phenomena as *cause*, *energy*, *temporal sequence*, etc., cannot be treated apart from one another. Hence all such notions, if taken as distincts or exclusives, are to be abandoned.[7]

If there is no discrete entity in a relational and presented field of experience, Nāgārjuna argues that *nirvāṇa* (which is a transcendent experience), cannot be construed as a discrete entity. Moreover to consider *nirvāṇa* as discrete (*ens*), would be to subject it to a causal process, i.e., decay and death; in that case, *nirvāṇa* will lose all its transcendent significance which is usually attached to it in Buddhist thought. *Nirvāṇa* is always contrasted from causal process. If the view of *nirvāṇa* as a discrete entity is thus denounced, then obviously it cannot be a non-entity (*non-ens*). To treat *nirvāṇa* as a non-entity would be to subject it to an intellectual form; for the same reason, *nirvāṇa* cannot be placed in the order of other intellectual forms as *ens* and *non-ens* both, or neither. On the same ground Nāgārjuna discards the speculation in

7. Radhakrishnan & Moore, ed. by: *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 340-2; Swami Vimuktananda in his *Mulamādhyamika-Kārikā* (*Prabuddha Bharata*, May, 1939), p. 247, very aptly brings out the meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda* as 'cessation of phenomena' (*prapancopaśama*).

terms of *existence*, *non-existence*, *both or neither*, with regard to the supra-intellectual experience of *nirvāṇa*. If *nirvāṇa* and *the Buddha* are treated as transcendent experiences, then they cannot be understood in terms of any relational form of intellectuality or in terms of anything belonging to the sphere of causal process or existence.[8] Nāgārjuna's suggestion is that in the interlinked universe, there can be no place for discrete entities (*dharma-nairātmya*), or discrete intellectual forms; for, the interlinked universe, finally suggests "undifferentiated existence and experience" (*dharma-kāya*). To Nāgārjuna, the relative existence is borrowed existence, it is not a real existence, just as the borrowed money is not real money.[9] The world of relativity invariably suggests a transcendent "undifferentiated existence or experience." Since *nirvāṇa* is the foundational condition of the relative order of experience, it cannot be construed in relation to any so-called *entity* of the relational sphere, or in terms of any intellectual forms; it has to be treated in total separation from the discrete order of the entities or of the intellectual forms. It is a condition where the entities lose their separateness, and the intellectual forms, their discreteness. It is a cessation of all discrete causal process and of thought, but thereby it is not a *vacuity* or non-entity, it is only a "quiescence of all plurality". That order is not positively determinable, for the approach to it is

8. Radhakrishnan & Moore: *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 342-5; H. Sastri, in his *Advayavajrasamgraha* (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 1927, pp. xxiii-iv), refers to Nāgārjuna's four categorical forms as *existence* (*sat*), *non-existence* (*asat*), combination of *existence* and *non-existence* (*tadubhaya*) and negation of *existence* and *non-existence* (*anubhaya*).

9. Stcherbatsky: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 41.

never possible through discrete thought or speech; it is a meditative pursuit towards a realm of undifferentiated or continuous experience, not dissected or analysed into *thought-forms, language-forms or causal-forms.* As positive determination of this transcendent experience is not possible, Nāgārjuna suggests a scheme of guidance, in an eight-fold mode of disjunctive negative propositions; the modes offer only opportunities for excluding all positive ways of discussion, but they do not fail to suggest something in a mysterious evanescent manner. Their indications are: "There nothing disappears, nor anything appears, nothing has an end, nor is there anything eternal; nothing is identical with itself, nor is there anything differentiated, nothing moves neither hither nor thither."[10]

This mode of reflection about the transcendent ultimate experience, which is really a meditative process, can be compared in aspects, with the *affirmative way* supplemented by the *negative way* or *vice versa*, as adopted by Erigena in the 9th century A.D., in Scholastic-Christian thought of the West. Speaking of God, Erigena says, God is *being* and also *not-being*; *not-being* signifies that God is more than *being*. This method of supplementation is by meditation and not by analytic reasoning; it is adopted for showing that a single mode of intellectuality fails to account for the superintellectual character of God. Nāgārjuna's approach to the transcendent experience by a series of negative disjunctive judgments is a scheme for detaching oneself from all possible intellectual

10. Radhakrishnan & Moore: *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, p. 341 also H. Sastri: *Advayavajrasamgraha*, p. xxiv.

forms, it is an attempt to dissociate oneself from all positivistic tendencies. In principle it is akin to the discipline of Aśvaghoṣa's *tathatā*, where also there is a separation from all particularising consciousness or ideal constructions. In the case of Aśvaghoṣa, the transcendent experience is realised by a total elimination of the theoretic tendency; in the case of Nāgārjuna, it is a direction of entire intellectual process to a final condition, where there is a successive abandonment of all choices by placing all forms of argument to a disciplined condition. Here the alternatives are not for choice but for abandonment of all choices in dialectic disjunctive ways. The impossibility of all choices in an extreme way is shown in this form. It prescribes the suicide of intellectuality itself with all its forms, because it kills the root of intellectuality by contradictory negations in the dialectic sphere.

If Nāgārjuna is interpreted in this complex background, as distinguishing the discrete intellectual forms to the stage of dialectic disjunctive negations when they are eliminated by continuous meditative processes, then he cannot be related to the mystics like Plotinus or Eckhart, though Suzuki might claim such relations.[11] Unlike Plotinus and Eckhart, Nāgārjuna does not exclude the intellectual processes altogether; they have a relative place in the continuous meditative possibility. Nāgārjuna ends up by a reference to a transcendent "undifferentiated existence or experiential possibility." It is non-different from the relational (or intellectual) order, but it is not

11. D. T. Suzuki: *Mysticism (Christian and Buddhist)*, Collier Books, N. Y., 1962.

as the relational order; its understanding lies in the negation of all "particularising consciousness", viz., particulars (*dharmas*), self (*ātman*), causal process (*pratītyasamutpāda*), or any misconception of *nirvāṇa* or *Buddha* (where *nirvāṇa* and *Buddha* are falsely taken as discrete entities). The conclusion is the same as that of Aśvaghoṣa's, only the *meditative method* of Nāgārjuna would be somewhat different.

Thus interpreted, no one will choose to compare Nāgārjuna's critical standpoint with the empiricist-sceptic position of Hume or idealist-critical position of Kant. The reflections of Hume and Kant are not totally detached from the logico-metaphysical-empirical mode of the West. Even to compare Nāgārjuna with Bradley of the twentieth century, who tries to detach himself from the categorical or intellectual modes, would lead one to innumerable difficulties. Nāgārjuna's *undifferentiated whole* is not Bradley's *Absolute*, because it is neither supra-relational nor non-relational. Nāgārjuna's "undifferentiated basis" is one with the relational order of experience as its sustaining background. The apparentness or relativity without a basis, is a "vacuity" (*śūnya*). Because the transcendent basis is the full or complete meditative experience, its apparent or relational aspect, which is only an undisciplined experience, is also not different. The question of exclusion or inclusion of appearances does not arise in Nāgārjuna's "undifferentiated existence", where the intellectual propensity has been completely quietened by meditation. Nāgārjuna's meditative experience effects only a psychological change of mind from within, while Bradley is still haunted by a theoretical consciousness, and, therefore, he cannot dispense with the intellectual

categories that remain like "appearances" demanding a place in the non-sensuous order of experience which is his reality. Bradley should rather stick to his principle of "intellectual suicide" or "suicide of thought", and not crave for giving a place to the "appearances" *somehow* or by a *transmutation*.[12] Nāgārjuna's relativity is not for the *denial* of relativity, it is an admission of a normal untrained and undisciplined psychological condition, but with training in a meditative discipline one is able to understand its true significance. The relational sphere of experience is only a pointer to an undifferentiated process or an interlinked situation of the disciplined meditative condition. Therefore, Candrakīrti aptly declares that Nāgārjuna is a *relativist* and not a *negativist*.[13] Nāgārjuna abandons bare theoretical proneness for an understanding of the real psychological basis that is the disciplined condition. Candrakīrti, therefore, does not hesitate to defend Nāgārjuna in the background of the reflections of Dignāga, a master-mind who reshaped the thought-processes of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism. Dignāga in the 5th century A.D. gave a new shape to the early Vaibhāṣika interpretation of the elements (*dharmas*) by introducing a different meditative discipline. In the Yogācāra school there is no direct assumption of the discrete entities (*dharmas*) as postulates and their external association with a causal process (*pratītya-samutpāda* as interpreted by the Vaibhāṣikas); but, we have seen, there is an attempt to interpret the presented universe with the discrete entities and the

12. *Appearance and Reality*, Macmillan & Co., 1908.
13. Stcherbatsky: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 43.

causal-process (*pratītyasamutpāda*) by the efficient psycho-moral ideational store (*ālaya-vijñāna*), a cosmic-psychic *process*, having a reference to a non-dual undifferentiated experience, which is nothing but a *yogic* intuition (*advaya-jñāna*).[14] In the Yogācāra-thought one can discern a triadic causal process beginning with the causality of the presented universe and ending with a final causal basis, through an intermediate cosmic-psychic process of *ālayavijñāna*; Nāgārjuna, obviously, would like to cancel these entire causal schemes, and would choose to refer to the undifferentiated background at once and directly. Nāgārjuna perhaps fully understands the suggestions of Aśvaghoṣa[15] and his principle of a total dissociation from all theoretical proneness or particularising consciousness. Hence Nāgārjuna will not like to halt at an intermediate psychological consciousness even when it is taken as a transcendent process beyond the causal processes of the apparent situation. From Nāgārjuna's standpoint, the notion of *ālayavijñāna* is a fiction; he cannot tolerate any notion of causality, not even causality in a transcendent or final sense of a process or a series. His transcendent basis is only a support or a ground, a realm of insightful understanding, and not a distinct process or entity. It runs into the process indistinguishably.

In the Logical school of Buddhism sponsored by Dignāga,[16] the presented perceptual situation mani-

14. Takakusu : "Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness" in *Philosophy East and West*, ed. by Moore, Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. 79-82; for a short resumé of the four Buddhist schools, *vide*, H. Sastri : *Advayavajrasamgraha*, Introduction, pp. xxv-xxvi.

15. Suzuki : Discourse on the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* (*Mahāyānaśradhotpāda*) translated from the Chinese version, Chicago, 1930.

16. Stcherbatsky : *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. Leningrad, 1932.

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fests the efficient transcendent non-dual experience (as understood by the Yogācāras) in the *point* of pure sensation; it is untouched by the dichotomous intellectual activity, which introduces extraneous *images* into the transcendent *point* of pure sensation by thought and language; the perceptual experience has always a reference to the point of pure sensation directly or indirectly through a sign. Candrakīrti in the 7th century A.D., surveying the entire Buddhist tradition, objects to this dualistic theory of perceptual experience of Dignāga,[17] by pointing out that if the transcendent experience is presented in the *point* of pure sensation, then that point cannot be untouched by the intellectual activity. So, according to him, there cannot be any experience of the *point*, which is evidently something discrete, though looked upon by Dignāga as an efficient moment.[18] Referring to Dignāga's perceptual experience of a *jar*, Candrakīrti says that, if it is already presented, it has its efficiency to be what it is, there is no need to inquire into its efficient extraneous causal basis. The notion of causality conflicts with the notion of existence; it is a problem to decide which of these is prior or posterior to the other, but the real reason is not their priority or posteriority, but their *essential relativity*. From this relativist-meditative standpoint, which is nothing but Nāgārjuna's standpoint, Candrakīrti argues that it is difficult to establish a psychology of *discrete introspection*, *sensation* or *consciousness* in favor of Dignāga,[19] excluding one aspect of experience from another; this conclusion of Candrakīrti is almost the same as

17. Stcherbatsky: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, pp. 141-2.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 141-4.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-6, 157-8.

that of some of the contemporary Western psychologists, and it is also in accord with Whitehead's analysis of *experience as all-through relational* and hence without any bifurcation between apparent sensuous order and the causal non-sensuous order of experience. Candrakīrti's denouncement of discrete entities, etc., is not a repetition of Nāgārjuna's thought, but it is an understanding of Nāgārjuna in the background of Dignāga's efficient reflection.[20] In this context, Candrakīrti forcefully points out that Nāgārjuna did not want to establish a view, logic or a dialectic, in place of other views, logic or dialectic, but his main motive was to show that in an "interlinked presented universe", there can be no place for a specific view, logic, dialectic, causal efficiency or psychology; in the transcendent sphere also, there can be no place for any specific character, not even for a causal efficiency that Dignāga posits. If one observes Dignāga's psychology minutely, one will find that he too tries to draw attention to the transcendent aspect of experience, denouncing all intellectual activity of bifurcation or image-formation. Further details about Dignāga's position will be clarified in the fifth chapter of this book, in this chapter only an aspect of Dignāga's view has been criticised, no final decision has been made here.

Murti understands various aspects of Nāgārjuna's reflections, but still he presents Nāgārjuna's thought as exhibiting a "dialectic"; Murti interprets the dialectic in a special sense as a consciousness of a conflict in reason, and suggests that the aim of philosophic consciousness is to resolve this conflict by proceeding through the three moments of the

20. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

dialectic—dogmatism (*dṛṣti*), criticism (*śūnyatā* or *prasaṅga*) and intuition (*prajñā*).[21] Accordingly he shapes the entire Buddhist thought, from the Buddha to Nāgārjuna, and suggests that Nāgārjuna's is the culminating stage, realising the philosophic fruition of the *prajñā* beyond the two earlier stages. This discourse suggests that this novel dialectic has some significance in the development of philosophic consciousness in general, but it has not much value in the case of Nāgārjuna if one follows Candrakīrti's commentary. The whole purpose behind Candrakīrti's commentary is to bring forward the irrelevancy involved in the notion of *causality*, which cannot be true either in the apparent perceptual sphere or in the transcendent aspect because it fosters a discrete notion, falsifying the interconnectedness of the disciplined transcendent experience. *Nirvāṇa*, also, as an experience implying a total dissociation from the apparent-process aspect, cannot be an entity, nor can it be characterised by any of the alternative intellectual forms; when understood as a transcendent character, *nirvāṇa* is only a final basis, a final psychology, and not a causal efficiency; it is only a basic *quietude* or profound *peace* after the cessation of intellectual turmoil. Hence, in the understanding of the *nirvāṇa*, there is no *stage*, but a direct understanding or insight itself. It is nothing but continuous meditation.

From an aspect, Nāgārjuna's logic, if at all there is a logic, is indeed "fierce"[22] and might foster scepti-

21. Murti: *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955, pp. 141-2.

22. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1929, Vol. I., p. 655.

cism, but if his statements are examined within the shadow of, and with a special reference to the Buddhist views of the Vaibhāṣikas, it will be evident that his "interlinked or relative existence" can only support a *denial of* "discrete entities"—of self (*ātman*), of discrete particulars (*dharmas*), of causal or temporal processes (*pratītyasamutpāda*), of transcendent psycho-moral process (*ālayavijñāna*), of freedom as a transcendent causal efficiency (*nirvāṇa*, understood in that specific sense), or even of transcendent enlightenment (the *Buddha* as a theoretic consciousness or entity); his is an understanding of a transcendent-meditative experience as a *support* of the relative situation. The relative situation left as it is, is vacuous (*śūnya*), but meaningful, if it is understood as fundamentally *interlinked*. Hence Nāgārjuna and his commentator, Candrakīrti, are for giving a new interpretation to *nirvāṇa* detaching *nirvāṇa* from any theoretic consciousness of *existence*, *causality* or *efficiency*. *Nirvāṇa*, for them, is a dispassionate experience, a psychological basis, which cancels all theoretic proneness; it is a true enlightenment (an attainment of *Bodhi* or Buddhahood), an ascent into a proper understanding of Aśvaghoṣa's *tathatā* (suchness) in its extension to an enlarged heart, which is *Dharmakāya* or cosmic compassionate heart, where there is no discrimination, or dissection of experience into specific views, logic, dialectic, causal efficiency or a specific psychology. Here, in this condition, all *bifurcation* has ceased in one comprehensive experience, which is *peace* or non-duality, a total cessation of any propensity for emergence or egoity. In this rendering of Nāgārjuna's reflection, a continuity has been established between Nāgārjuna and Aśvaghoṣa,

though one can see the independence of these master minds, at the same time.

Radhakrishnan rightly thinks that Nāgārjuna's negative logic "prepares the ground for the Advaita Philosophy".[23] In another aspect, Nāgārjuna, in a novel way, can be compared to a realistic philosopher in the line of Whitehead, in a different cultural sphere, where also, the apparent perceptual situation has a meaning only by reference to its non-sensuous interlinked basis; this basis, if understood properly, is really not a specific causal situation but a general ground-consequent process sustaining and directing the presented perceptual sphere of experience.[24] In Whitehead's language, it is a denouncement of "simple location" or "bifurcation of nature." A development of this aspect of relationship between Nāgārjuna and Whitehead will be made in the next chapter in some details.

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23. *Ibid.* p. 669. According to Swami Vimuktananda (*Buddhism and the Philosophy of Nāgārjuna* in *Prabuddha Bharata*, April, 1939, p. 197), "....if one takes a detached view of Indian thought, one will find that *Śūnyavāda* and *Advaitavāda*, when grasped in all their bearings, are complementary rather than antagonistic."

24. cf. Whitehead : *Symbolism : Its Meaning and Effect*, Macmillan & Co., 1927.

CHAPTER IV

NĀGĀRJUNA AND WHITEHEAD*

Developing a comparative interest which is a major trend of philosophy today,[1] I want to suggest that Nāgārjuna's criticism of traditional Indian thought from the Upaniṣads to the first two Buddhist schools, is in the line of a philosophic spirit which may be fairly compared with an aspect of Whitehead's reflections in Western Philosophy. Whitehead's thought, it may be noted, is revolutionary in so far as it tries to discern the deeper recesses of experience by drawing attention to the non-sensuous aspects without neglecting the presented sensuous and perceptual orders of experience. In this novel investigation Whitehead is in accord with the traditional Indian thinkers specially Nāgārjuna. The main object of this chapter is to review Nāgārjuna's standpoint utilizing his thought-processes clarified in the earlier chapters, and then relate him directly to an aspect of Whitehead's thought.

Nāgārjuna's final non-intellectual attitude, as has been brought out in the previous chapters, cannot be taken as sophistic, sceptic, mystic, theistic, empirical or pragmatic in any Western sense. His negativist attitude expressed in the form of negative disjunctive

* Major portion of this chapter was published previously in the *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1953.

1. *History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western*, in two vols. ed. by Radhakrishnan and others, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952-3; *Philosophy, East and West*, ed. by Moore, Princeton University Press, 1944.

propositions, is more complex than the negativist attitudes of the Upaniṣads, of the Buddha, and of the Vaibhāṣikas. Nāgārjuna does not merely analyse intellectuality into four forms for the sake of demonstrating his intellectual skill, but he has a motive behind this analysis. He wants to place the different orders of reflection in his comprehensive scheme, not to demonstrate the specific efficiency of each of the forms, but to bring out by such demonstration their relativity and their final futility. He wants to suggest that the intellectual forms finally end up with disjunctive negations which present alternatives not for choice but for abandonment.[2] Hence Nāgārjuna chooses eight possible disjunctive negatives where the pairs of alternatives are mutually opposed, to show that the basic reality which is an undifferentiated experience, cannot be touched by these pairs, but they can be utilized to awaken one to the essential incapacity of the intellectual activity in its project towards determining the final reality. His pairs of negatives have only an indirect function. They are suggestive in a negative way.[3] If the efficiency of the disjunctive pairs is understood negatively, then one may feel like following the disciplines of Aśvaghoṣa who discouraged all positive modes of determining transcendent experience. Aśvaghoṣa's discipline is in the aspect of deep concentration, which is getting rid of any phenomenal appearance; it is an exclusion of all subjective and objective propensity, even of the thought of reality itself (i.e.,

2. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1929, Vol. I, pp. 644-45.

3. Murti: 'The Metaphysical Schools of Buddhism' in *History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western*, ed. by Radhakrishnan & others, Vol. I, pp. 295-7.

tathatā as *tathatā*).[4] It is a discipline or a series of disciplines, cancelling the roots of all intellectual propensity; the roots lie in the particularising consciousness, which is a dissecting agent and is contrasted from the reality (*tathatā*). Aśvaghoṣa's meditative process is an extreme distrust of the intellectualist propensity; till intellectuality is totally excluded, the basic transcendent reality, which is a self-shining experience, is not revealed. The elimination of intellectuality, is, therefore, not creating a 'vacuity', but, it is providing a ground for a full and continuous experience. To both Nāgārjuna and Aśvaghoṣa, the basic reality is a self-shining undifferentiated experience. The Western existentialists, Marcel, Jaspers and Sartre, for example, in the background of traditional Western thought, prepare a ground for continuous detachment from traditional speculative propensities, and they touch in many aspects the thought-process or rather the experiential centres of Nāgārjuna and Aśvaghoṣa. The details of the existentialist position will be found in the sixth chapter of this book.

Nāgārjuna, as already noted, develops intellectuality fully, and it is entirely in the Buddhist tradition. Here he exhibits his profound skill. Nāgārjuna had certainly a faith in intellectuality for all practical purposes, and for all possible intellectual discourses, but he does not accord it a final place. Here he follows strictly the Buddhist tradition, not dogmatically, but with an openness of mind and with experience. Hence, as already mentioned, he cannot

4. *Vide* Ch. II of this book; and also, Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 645-69.

be compared fully with any Western thinker who is not detached from the intellectual propensity. Nāgārjuna's thought-process, in some aspects, is in the line of the existentialists, and also of Bradley and Whitehead, to mention some of the prominent twentieth century thinkers of the West. Reserving the comparison between Nāgārjuna and Whitehead, for a later stage of this chapter, we may indicate in brief outline a comparison between Nāgārjuna's pairs of negatives and Bradley's pairs of intellectual categories in the background of Western thought. Bradley's pairs of intellectual categories express a relativity or a relational situation as described by the categories; they limit experience to that sphere alone, and cannot cross their boundaries; but the reality, which is a supra-sensuous and supra-intellectual experience, to Bradley, remains untouched; hence, Bradley demands a complete suicide of the intellectual propensity, as the pairs of intellectual categories by their very insistence on relativity and limitations, suggest repetition and discomfiture. The intellectual categories, according to Bradley, are finally riddled with contradictions. An insightful trans-intellectual experience is enforced on him. But Bradley with all his might cannot eliminate the intellectual categories, he thinks that still they "somehow" *are*. In Nāgārjuna's dialectic negation, the intellectual categories play efficiently the role of a scavenger, cleaning the space and then disappearing completely from the spot into the meditative basis. What is demanded finally by Nāgārjuna, is a restful condition, which has to be maintained with a discipline; hence the question of the world of *appearance*, existing or non-existing, does not arise. Nāgārjuna conforms to a

basic *meditative discipline*, but Bradley hangs on to an unsupported *reason*.

It is not suggested here that, in Indian thought-process, Nāgārjuna's efficiency is final. There were other posterior thinkers, Buddhists or non-Buddhists, trying to give a place to intellectuality and eliminating it finally with skill and efficiency in their respective background of thought. In the next chapter, there is a detailed consideration of Dignāga's interpretation of intellectuality in a new situation of transcendent experience, and a re-evaluation of Nāgārjuna's position as clarified by his disciple and follower, Candrakīrti, in the 7th century A.D. In this posterior reflective situation, Nāgārjuna's role is beyond the phase of Buddhist thought of India. Both Dignāga and Nāgārjuna are utilized for preparing a ground for a novel interpretation of the intellectual process by the great Vedāntic thinker Śaṅkara* of the 8th century A.D. In that stage there is not only a new logic, but also a new psychology; both logic and psychology, in the stage of the Buddhist schools, and in the posterior stages of Indian thought, are based on a transcendent sphere of experience; there is no gulf between the two orders of experience; the transcendent order of experience is a disciplined sphere of experience, whereas the *apparent* order of experience (if admitted merely), is in the undisciplined sphere. This distinction between the two orders of experience is present from the days of the Upaniṣads, and it holds a firm ground through the stage of Nāgārjuna to this date.

*For details about Śaṅkara vide chapter VII of this book.

Nāgārjuna effected the evolution of posterior Buddhist thought in a variety of ways, and influenced the Vedāntic thought of Gauḍapāda in the 6th century; his influence is marked in Śaṅkara and later Vedāntic and neo-Vedāntic thought-processes leading to the contemporaries like K. C. Bhattacharya and S. Radhakrishnan.

Nāgārjuna's influence in Bhattacharya is patent when Bhattacharya, unlike Śaṅkara, tries to determine the transcendent experience, the *Subject* or the self-shining experience inherited from the Upaniṣads, as the *indefinite*. The *indefinite*, as Bhattacharya opines, enters into all definite thought-processes, but it is never lost. This search for the indefinite is found in the Western idealistic, mystic and theistic reflections throughout the ages, and it is specifically present in the Buddhist thought, before and after Nāgārjuna. Bhattacharya's contention moves round a supposition which characterises his thought-process; according to him, the transcendent Subject,—the *indefinite* has been sought by almost all thinkers of the world from the past to the present, but all have failed to realize it for their categorising or definitive tendencies. He argues further by way of clarification of his position that : "Though they have failed to determine the *indefinite*, the *indefinite* has always broke forth into the *definite*, and has taken different forms in their consciousness."[5] This mode of reflection of Bhattacharya is very much encouraging, but who does not feel here the influence of Nāgārjuna ? Nāgārjuna's undifferentiated basis,—the *In-*

5. 'Concept of Philosophy' in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. by Radhakrishnan & Muirhead, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936.

definite,—the peaceful disciplined condition—for ever eliminates the limitations of the relative situations, and removes the one-sided views about the *saṁsāra* (transient universe) and the transcendent *nirvāṇa* (the disciplined situation).

Again, looking at the great interest that Radhakrishnan takes in his *Indian Philosophy* to interpret Nāgārjuna as providing the basis for the Vedānta philosophy of Śaṅkara, one is convinced that Radhakrishnan was not less influenced by him.[6] Indeed Radhakrishnan's *notion of the Absolute* (as the basis for *God* which is one of the innumerable possibilities operative in relation to the *World* as presented in waking consciousness, till there is a realisation of the final ideal, when there is a *lapse* of the present possibility into the eternal habitat of the *Absolute*) is a skilful utilization of the fundamentals of the entire thought-process from the stage of the Upaniṣads to the stage of Nāgārjuna's Indefinite or Undifferentiated Absolute, not excluding, however, other processes after Nāgārjuna.[7]

All these struggles in the aspect of the *definite* and the *indefinite* with regard to some kind of transcendent experience, and the reality of the presented universe with flux and possibility, peeping through the waking perceptual consciousness, can be found without any break in the masterly philosophical deliberations of Whitehead.[8] Whitehead's background of reflection

6. Radhakrishnan: 'The Spirit in Man' in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, pp. 279-80, 285.

7. Datta: *The Chief Currents in Contemporary Philosophy* (Calcutta University, 1950), p. 449; also writer's general observations on Whitehead's philosophy in *Western Philosophy and Śaṅkara* in University of Ceylon Review, Nov., 1945, pp. 57-71, and also his, *An Outlines of Whitehead's Philosophy*, Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd., London, 1940.

8. White, M: *The Age of Analysis*, A Mentor Book, 1964, Ch. 11.

lies however in the entire past Western thought from Thales through Hegel to the twentieth century philosophers and scientists*. Therefore, in this chapter, a comparison between Nāgārjuna (in his influence to this age) and Whitehead,—though separated by time, culture and country—will not be inappropriate. Both Nāgārjuna and Whitehead are interested in the apparent universe as revealed to one's waking consciousness, which is through and through relative. To both, there is a reference to a transcendent sphere of experience beyond the sensuous, apparent and intellectual; both refuse to intellectualise beyond a reasonable point. Nāgārjuna's analysis of intellect is in a relational, or apparent aspect but it may not be divorced from the intellectual process as interpreted in the Buddhist psychology. Whitehead's intellectual process is in relation to the cosmic process and possibility; it is an emergent phenomenon, though a continuous feeling-process, which is a dual cosmic-psychic process. Nāgārjuna analyses the intellectual process and the experiential process suggested by it, (i) positively, (ii) negatively, (iii) and in togetherness; but (iv) finally, he dispenses with all these categorical forms by a series of dialectic negations, and draws attention to a transcendent cosmic-psychic experiential background, which is undifferentiated non-dual experience. This basic non-dual experience is something like the *relatedness*, *connectedness* or the *concern* of Whitehead.[9]

Whitehead, too, analyses different aspects and

* For details on Whitehead's philosophy, *vide* writer's : Whitehead's Four Principles—from *An Oriental Perspective* (Bharati Bhawan, Patna, India), soon to be published.

9. *Process and Reality*, Cambridge University Press, 1929 & *Adventures of*

orders of experience from the perceptual situation, but he is not convinced by the mere discrete presentations or mere flux-character of the universe; he observes behind the perishing occasions, transcendent and continuous characters of different orders, and then finally tries to fall back on the non-sensuous, transcendent feeling-processes,—the great aesthetic surges, which become manifest through such series of processes as (i) the *Spatio-Temporal processes*, *Eternal Objects*, *God* and *Creativity*, when viewed from the cosmic aspect, and (ii) as *truth*, *beauty*, *art*, *adventure* and *peace*, when viewed psychically, unrestricted by abstract intellectual processes. Whitehead takes note of the intellectual process in its cosmic-psychic emergence, (i) in the perceptual experience of a living psyche, or (ii) in the flux of the universe, in a cosmic sphere. The intellectual process arises and vanishes in both cosmic and psychic spheres; it is a process and a possibility; but it is not a fundamental ever-present basis of experience; what lies behind and beyond everything is a basic *connectedness* or a *feeling* or a *prehension* with possibilities. This mode of reflection of Whitehead is similar to the thought of the Buddhist schools and Buddhist thinkers.[10]

With a great discipline (arguing against the discrete ideas of the Western thought-process in general), Whitehead tries to interpret the experiential process from the *perceptual situation* to *deep experience in one's solitude*, in terms of such *general ideas* as *Spatio-Tem-*

Ideas, Pelican, 1942, "The Universe is dual because in the fullest sense, it is both transient and eternal. The Universe is dual because each final actuality is both physical and mental." p. 185.

10. Stcherbatsky : *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I and Radhakrishnan : *An Idealist View of Life*, Barnes & Nobles, N. Y. 1964.

poral processes, *Eternal Objects*, *God* and *Creativity*. These processes and possibilities, as realised in all orders of cosmic-psychic experience, are not the transcendental *ideas* of Plato cut off from the sensible universe; since these ideas are understood in relation and prospect, the *God* of Whitehead is not the God of the Christian-Scholastic thinkers, totally separate from the *World*; Whitehead's *Creativity*, the final process and possibility of the Universe beyond *God* and other characters, is not the *Absolute* of Hegel, having no concern with the temporal flux of the Universe. In togetherness, these *general ideas* or *general characters* are persistent and transcendent features, *touched* but not *eliminated* by the flux of the universe; they are operative in togetherness in their persistence, but such persistences are not fixed intellectual categories or ideas; they are insightful glimpses, fully *psychic*, yet not less *cosmic*; their ways of operations can be conveniently distinguished as *spatio-temporal*, though not excluding other features; they have both definiteness and indefiniteness. They are not checked by any metaphysical, theological, mystical or scientific laws in a restricted sense, but they do not ignore any aspect of experience. In a summary form, they are unified general features, where the unification is a feeling, or a pervasive process. In the unified process, there is often "restlessness", which is perhaps got over in the situation of *God*, beyond the discrete ideals of the *eternal objects* and *intellectual processes*; there is a further prospect from the unified prospects or forms, to the formless in *Creativity*. In the whole of cosmic process and possibility, there are operations of the psychic characters as *truth*, *beauty*, *art*, *adventure* and *peace*, which are not

psychic or cultural in any restricted sense; they are joined with the cosmic process and possibility from the *spatio-temporality* to *creativity*. In this comprehensive milieu of cosmic-psychic experience in process and prospect, Whitehead sees a continuous emergent aspect of experience, where there is no *bifurcation*, as usually discerned by intellectual conscious methods; the intellectual method restricts experience to an aspect and excludes the pervasive and persistent elements; it loses the basic continuity, which Whitehead calls the *feeling core*—the *immediate past* that suffuses the present and the future with life and possibility. That peaceful ever-present background of Whitehead's basic feeling, or cosmic-psychic core, is the personality in its offing towards a cosmic-psychic process which is "peace". Nāgārjuna, in a different cultural background, seems to refer to the same basic cosmic-psychic condition of experience of *peace* or *quietude*. His aim is, however, not positive, but it is wholly negative[11] and suggestive, and hence he misses nothing which is fundamental, only he is interested in the removal of intellectual restrictions dialectically. Whitehead's cosmic-psychic process of Creativity in the aspect of the "formless beyond all *forms*" (or basic orders from the spatio-temporality to God, or from the basic Truth to the meditative process of Peace) is a similar kind of project involving considerable

11. *History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western*, ed. by Radhakrishnan and others, Vol. II., p. 439; cf. also: Malkani: 'Philosophical Significance of Negation' in *The Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1948, Part I, pp. 9-10. "Negation is thus more important than affirmation as a method of knowledge and supersedes it. Affirmation involves us in error. Negation liberates us from it. It is the way from error to truth."

detachment from restrictive modes or orders.

The study of Nāgārjuna and Whitehead, as suggested in this chapter, prepares the ground for further research in the area of comparative philosophy, which is really a universal philosophy, not severed by countries, cultures or times. Radhakrishnan, in this present century, in almost all his works, considers the western and eastern philosophical reflections of thinkers like Nāgārjuna and Whitehead, in a spirit of absolute detachment. It is for this reason that he could say with emphasis, "All thought is a dialogue with circumstances. It is not absolute or final." Continuing the same trend he could also say, "This age is an age of increasing interdependence." There cannot be any prospect for philosophy or religion, if the drive is not towards a universal philosophy and universal religion, with absolute detachment, working for the interest of mankind as a whole. Viewed from this attitude of comparative philosophy, the attempted comparison between Nāgārjuna and Whitehead, is certainly not a "misplaced comparison". Both stand for a *process-philosophy* in relation to their respective backgrounds. In both there is a meditative attitude in their deliberate efforts against any restrictive formalist modes of reflection.

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CHAPTER V

DIGNĀGA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PERCEPTUAL UNIVERSE*

The purpose of this chapter is not a detailed study of Dignāga, the leader of the Buddhist logical school of the fifth century A.D. In this chapter an attempt has been made to clarify Dignāga's attitude as reflected in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, a compilation of aphorisms on *pramāṇa* or valid knowledge; the above book is a criticism and also a continuation of the principle of the four schools of Buddhism. Later thinkers in the line of Buddhist logical school who primarily commented on Dignāga's works were Dharmakīrti, Jinendrabuddhi, Dharmottora, Vinitadeva, Śaṅtarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, all preceding the great Vedāntic thinker Śaṅkara (788-820 A.D.)[1] No thorough study of the four Buddhist schools or of the thinkers before Śaṅkara is possible unless Dignāga's position is properly determined. This discourse attempts to elucidate that aspect of Dignāga's thought.

* To be published under the title: 'Dignāga and the Four Buddhist Schools' in *World Perspectives in Philosophy, Religion and Culture* (Dr. D. M. Datta Commemoration Volume), Bharati Bhawan, Patna, India.

1. If one studies Tucci's works: *On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya (nātha) and Asaṅga* (University of Calcutta, 1930), *Buddhist Logic Before Dignāga* (Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, July, 1929) and *Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic* (Gackwad's Oriental Series, 1929), one will readily accept the view that Dignāga was not the initiator of the Buddhist logic, but one will not have any hesitation to admit that a complete shape of a developed Buddhist logic can be traced to Dignāga alone, and not to his predecessors.

The thinkers of the four Buddhist schools[2]—Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras,—mentioned earlier, were interested in the intellectual analysis of the presented perceptual universe, but only tentatively. Their final aim was to prove the vacuity (*śūnyatā*) of all intellectual modes—the *roots* of the presented universe—by drawing attention to the real experience, which is transcendent (*atīndriya*). The transcendent experience, being neither intellectual nor sensuous, is realized only by the Buddhist triadic discipline, viz., conduct (*śīla*), meditation (*samādhi*), and insight (*prajñā*).[3] From this standpoint, it is obvious that the Buddhist transcendent experience is a disciplined experience in a psycho-moral aspect and is not akin to a method of understanding of experience of the idealists and the mystics of the West. If one bears in mind this difference between the Buddhist discipline and Western thought, no one will be inclined to interpret the Vaibhāṣikas as realists, the Sautrāntikas as relativists, the Mādhyamikas as nihilists, and the Yogācāras as the absolutists in the Western sense, even when the great scholars like Sinha[4] and Murti[5] have given some reasons to compare the standpoints of the thinkers of the above schools with some aspects of Western thought. In the previous chapters sufficient

2. The four Buddhist schools flourished from the 1st century to the 4th century A.D. For details *vide*: 2500 *Years of Buddhism* (Government of India, 1956), Foreword by Radhakrishnan, Ch. VI.

3. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 25-53; also Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, University of Hawaii, 1949.

4. *Indian Realism*, Kegan Paul, 1938, specially for the Yogācāras and the Sautrāntikas, Chs. 1-3.

5. 'The Metaphysical Schools of Buddhism' in *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, ed. by Radhakrishnan & others, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952-3, Vol. I., pp. 191-200, and *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955, Parts 2 & 3.

hints against any Western mode of interpretation have been given. In this chapter, Stcherbatsky's volumes on *Buddhist Logic*[6] have been utilized to clarify the transcendentalist attitude[7] of the Buddhist schools as interpreted by Dignāga, who is specially interested in a recast of the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Yogācāras. The present chapter, therefore, is not a repetition of the previous chapters on the four Buddhist schools.

The Vaibhāṣikas on account of their intellectual stand, posit the *particulars* or *elements* (*dharmas*), just to depart from the monistic and substantivist stand of the Upaniṣadic thinkers; they maintain that these *particulars* presented in perceptual experiences are non-empiricals, untouched by any intellectual or sensuous characters. These elements, to them, are independent flashes of intuitions either in association with the law of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination) or in dissociation from it.[8] Their main basis is in a transcendent background. The Sautrāntikas, like the Vaibhāṣikas, admit the disciplined transcendent experience as basic, but they do not admit that this experience can be expressed as *discrete flashes* or *particulars*; they think that the intellectual understanding of transcendent experience is essentially *relational* or *phenomenal*; hence they are critical of the Vaibhāṣikas; but this standpoint of the Sautrāntikas is only from a transcendent aspect. The Mādhyamikas (chiefly Nāgārjuna) accept that the transcendent experience is *basic* and can be de-

6 & 7. Leningrad, 1932 & 1930, specially Vol. I.
8. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism.*

termined by the triadic Buddhist discipline, but they discourage all intellectual determination of the transcendent experience in terms of an *assertion* as held by the Vaibhāṣikas or *negation* of the assertions as suggested by the Sautrāntikas; they hold that the moment the intellectual mode is admitted, the entire process beginning with the assertion and denial and ending with the disjunctive assertions and denials, has to be examined to understand the essential *voidness* of the entire intellectual process; in the final disjunctive form, the alternatives are not for choice but for abandonment of all choices. The suggestion of the final intellectual process is a hint at its own cancellation or it is a cancellation of any restricted mode of reflection; when the intellectual process has thus cancelled its restricted attitude, it then prepares the ground for the transcendent experience which is a discarding of all restricted views (*dṛiṣṭi*) and a revelation of an insightful experience (*prajñā*) or *quietude.* The Yogācāras, like the previous thinkers of the Buddhist schools, admit a transcendent experience and declare that it is a final *efficient principle* or the *causal background* beyond the less efficient processes of causality by (i) dependent-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), and (ii) causality by ideation (*alayavijñāna*) which includes the *voidness* of Nāgārjuna in its aspect of wrong ideation (*abhutaparikalpita*).[9] The transcendent efficient principle of the Yogācāras is a *non-dual experience* (*advaya-jñāna*), or it can be explained as *consciousness only* (*vijñānamātram*), or *thusness* (*tathatā*). Takakusu thinks that the Yogācāra-causality implies

9. Tucci: *On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya (nātha) and Asaṅga,* Ch. II., specially, pp. 34-5.

a triadic series, viz., (i) causality by action-influence (*pratītyasamutpāda*), (ii) causality by ideation (*ālaya-vijñāna*), and (iii) causality by thusness (*tathatā*).[10] The first two causal principles are dependent on the third which is the supreme psycho-moral principle of causality. The evolution of the thought of the Buddhist schools, therefore, is towards a transcendent experience; the empirical experiences of the sensuous and the intellectual orders are explained through the transcendental. The empirical experiences of the sensuous and the intellectual orders have a relative place having relative efficiency. The *voidness* of Nāgārjuna also has a relative place according to the Yogācāras. What is fundamental, therefore, is the transcendent experience which is realised by the Buddhist triadic discipline, or by the series of meditations (*yoga*). Examining the position of the four schools in this aspect, which was not stressed so much in the earlier chapters, this chapter brings out the speciality of the transcendent aspects of experience in each of the schools. In this special background of the transcendent experience of the four Buddhist schools, Dignāga shows the efficiency of what he would call the Logical School of Buddhism.

If one pursues the trend of Dignāga's discourse one will find in Dignāga a return to the Vaibhāṣika

10. 'Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness' in *Philosophy East and West*, ed. by Moore, (Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 79-82; for the mystical interpretation of final experience, *vide* : Sthiramati's *Madhyantavibhaṅgasūtra-bhāṣyaṭīka*—a subcommentary on Vasubandhu's Bhasya on the *Madhyantavi-bhangasutra* of Maitreyanātha, Part I. ed. by V. Bhattacharya and Tucci, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 24, 1932, and Friedmann : Sthiramati's *Madhy-antavibhangaṭīka*, Utrecht—UTR. TYP. ASS.—MCMXXXVII., chiefly intro-duction.

mode of reflection, in one aspect, and an upholding of the Yogācāra standpoint, on the other. Dignāga happened to be a disciple of Vasubāndhu. The main purpose of Dignāga is to give a correct analysis of the transcendent experience, removing all possible confusions. According to Dignāga, the reality in empirical aspect, is a *point* of experience revealed in *pure sensation.* It can be contrasted with the Upaniṣadic notion of reality which is a pure self-shining experience as pure consciousness. Dignāga's attitude is *objective* though this objectivism has to be understood with a discipline. It is an attempt to understand the *flash of reality* in pure sensation by a total detachment from all intellectual propensities. Thus it is neither idealism nor realism from a restricted point of view. In the words of Dignāga,—positively, the real in its empirical sphere, is *efficient* (*arthakāriyākārin*), and, negatively, it is non-ideal (*nirvikalpaka*). It is a process or efficiency but this efficiency is not intellectual. It corresponds to pure sensation alone (*sātta mātram*) as distinguished from pure reason (*śūddha kalpaṇā*) or imagination. The Vaibhāṣikas did not distinguish between the psychological processes of *pure sensation* and *pure ideation.* In a sense, the pure sensation precedes pure ideation, though it may be involved in any concrete experience. Dignāga's position is in some sense phenomenological in the line of Peirce, if the Vaibhāṣika standpoint is interpreted as phenomenological in the sense of Husserl. Dignāga (like Peirce, in the background of empiricist thought) emphasises the sensuous-perceptual aspects of life in a purely phenomenological sense in relation to past Buddhist thought. The speciality of Dignāga's psychology is in separating the pure sensation from

the ideational process which is phenomenal and dual. The Vaibhāṣikas, in not distinguishing the pure sensation from the ideation-process, opened themselves to the criticism of the Sautrāntikas; and Nāgārjuna, in turn, got the opportunity of carrying the entire intellectual process to its vacuous end. But if Dignāga can prove his case by dissociating the pure sensation from the ideational process, he can fairly claim for a new mode of reflection not detected by the four schools of Buddhism considered in the earlier chapters.

From Dignāga's detached standpoint, one can describe the transcendent experience of pure sensation as unique, absolutely dissimilar; it has no extension in space, no duration in time; it is a point-instant (*kṣaṇa* or *svalakṣaṇa*); it is infinitesimal time, the differential in the running existence of a thing—indivisible, ultimately simple, pure existence (*sattā-mātram*), pure reality (*vastumātram*), the own essence (*svalakṣanam*), particular (*vyakti*) and efficient (*artha-kāriyakārin*). It stimulates the understanding to construct images and ideas (*vikalpa-utpatti-śaktimat*), but by itself it is transcendental (*atyantaparokṣa* or *nirvikalpaka*) and unutterable (*anirvacanīya*).[11] When compared with the empirical order of experience it is nothing, but really it is the basis of all empirical experience. It is difficult however to form any definite idea of the empirical experience from this disciplined standpoint.[12] The experience as referred to, is *transcendent* and is opposed to all *ideality*, *generality*

11. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I., Part I-II, specially pp.181-3 and pp. 195-205 (A Dover Edition, paperback, New York, 1962 in 2 vols.) The rest of the references are from the early edition.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-90.

or *ideational constructions* (*parikalpita*). The pure reality of the moment is unutterable—a *reflex* whose scope is strictly limited to the objective reality of *one moment*, hence susceptible neither of conceptual determination nor of linguistic expression; it is not a *vacuity*, but a *productive experience* in so far as it *produces a sensation* which is followed by a *vivid image* (*sputa pratibhāsa*) as distinguished from the vague image (*asputa pratibhāsa*), which is produced in memory by the thought-process of an object or by the name in speech.[13] The vivid image as referred to in the case of momentary experience is before the operation of conceptual thought or productive imagination. According to Dharmakīrti, the vivid image is only an *impression* of the moment of experience—the cause stimulating the intellect; it is not really an image because *image* is not *efficiency*. When expressed in concrete terms, say of the experience of *fire*, what is implied is not the *flaming object* of a definite shape or extension, but merely *a moment of caloric energy or efficiency* (*auṣnyaṁ eva agniḥ*), the rest is imagination. Similarly, the *jar* is not the extended body having a definite shape or colour, but the *efficient moment* represented in the fact of pouring water, the rest is imagination.[14] The external reality is the *force* which stimulates imagination, but not the extended body,— stuff or matter; it is *energy* alone; our *image* is only the *effect* of the *efficient reality*. Thus the reality is *dynamic* (*sattaiva vyāpṛtiḥ*).[15] All elements of the world are *forces*; the forces are the unique points of efficiency— the *particulars*; the reality refers only to a "pure sensation"

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-90.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 189-90.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

stimulating the intellect *to construct* an image but it is not that *constructed image*. This affirmed reality is only *existentiality itself*, it cannot be expressed *as it is*, for that would be *repetition*, nor can it be expressed as *as it is not*, for that would be contradiction.[16] Thus Dignāga would not accept the plurality of the elements as such of the Vaibhāṣikas, nor would he accept the denial of them as suggested by the Sautrāntikas. The *existence* of each in itself, is a *self-sufficiency* and not a process or becoming; it is *plenitude* itself. In this judgment there is a reference to a *sensible point*, it is not a purely imaginary experience of a *sky flower*; it is also distinguished from the illusory and hallucinatory experiences; the sky flower is a fiction, a pure imaginary construction; the illusory and hallucinatory experiences have reference to the factual world as one finds in one's day to day experience. But Dignāga, in his clarification of the experience of the *real as such*, refers to a *transcendent experience* which is a *sensibility* (efficiency) without sensation or without ideation. In other words, a judgment of reality on the basis of a transcendent sensibility, is not a deduction from a sensuous experience or from a concept; it is *prior to a formed sensation or ideation*; it is the *core* of sensuous experience, and has *existence* before there is any *shaping of* a sensation or *glimmering* of an intellectual activity. It is an *external object* in the sense of *efficiency* only; it is the *first flash of sensation* and the *point* where the subject and the object coalesce, hence it is the absolute experience—the transcendent situation.[17] If the Upa-

16. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

niṣads had referred to a transcendent self-shining experience, which is *seeing* before it is *seen*, then Dignāga's experience is a *transcendent objectivity as a sensibility* (efficiency) before it is a *sensation*. In a sense his position is of a Hume only when he would accept an *impression* as a sensibility, disallowing any ideal analysis in terms of imagination, expectation or memory. Dignāga's impressions are transcendent non-sensuous experiences and not post-intellectual constructions.

When summarised, Dignāga's transcendent experience is a disciplined condition of a pure efficiency of sensation, which is the *bare particular*, *the point*, *the unique*, *unrelated*, *dynamic*, *non-extended*, *non-enduring experience yet stimulating the intellect* for the production of a corresponding image or imparting vividness to an image, and constituting an *assertive force* of a judgment.[18] Even when the intellect is stimulated, the suggestion is not for construction. The immediate sensation is detached and unemployed.[19] It suggests an *externality*, which can be contrasted with the Upaniṣadic standpoint of reality as an inner self-shining non-reflective transcendent experience or the *self*. Dignāga's emphasis is on the transcendent disciplined *core* of experience; it cannot be *empirically* cognised; it is not a *predicate* or a *category*, but a *common subject of all predication*,—a disciplined sensibility. In Dharmakīrti's words, "it is the external thing as it is strictly in itself, *shorn of all relations*." In other words, it is a *disciplined condition*. The corresponding internal thing is pure sensation, shorn of all constructions (*nirvikal-*

18. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-9

paka).[20] The pure object (own essence) and the pure sensation of Dignāga are not two things existing on equal terms of reality; they refer to the ultimate basis of reality—the transcendent situation, dichotomised into 'object' and 'subject' by the faculty of constructive imagination which is the architect of the whole empirical world and which works always by dichotomising. There is a relation between the *pure sensation* and the *intellect* at a *point* where the pure sensation stimulates the intellect and not where its dichotomising process ensues. The reality of the dichotomising intellect has, therefore, to be determined always in the *point of stimulation*. Dignāga tries to maintain this element of truth throughout his discussion of the relation between the pure sensation and the dichotomising intellect. His is not a discussion in the exclusive aspect of dichotomisation which fosters either false idealism or false realism. The forms—idealism and realism—are mental constructions and hence they are to be discouraged in all genuine modes of logical reflections.

Dignāga is against the realistic logic of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and also against the idealistic and evolutionary standpoint of the Sāṁkhyas prevalent during his time. In the Sāṁkhya thought of India, one

20. *Ibid.*, p. 202; according to Tucci (On Some Aspects....and Asaṅga, p. 61-2), '.....it was somewhat difficult to insert the *pratyakṣa* doctrine in a system like Buddhism in which the reality of external things is not admitted, but in which we have, at least as it appears,.....a series of internal and external moments running parallel, so that the perception of a thing is nothing else than the particular internal *vijñāna* corresponding to a single *rupa-āyatana*.' Hence, this position of Dignāga and his followers can be contrasted with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position of the presented and real universe which can be granted by means of seven categories from the *substance* to *non-existence*, one in relation to the other.

may find realism combined with evolutionism. In both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṁkhya doctrines, there is a belief in the transcendent aspect of experience, but in their process of reflection, they cannot successfully connect the transcendent with the empirical or apparent aspects of experience.[21]

Dignāga is critical of the realist notion of the *atoms* as one of the substances, as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, because such a conception lacks the understanding of a transcendent basis behind all experiential processes. According to Dignāga, the intellectual analysis without a recognition of its transcendent basis, is a display of mere imaginative construction. Hence, to Dignāga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika notion of atoms is like a construction of a second moon. Dignāga is similarly critical of the Sāṁkhya notion of *Prakṛti* as the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas* or qualitative principles in operation; Dignāga thinks that the three *guṇas* cannot be operative without a transcendent basis even when the Sāṁkhya thinkers posit that the pure transcendent consciousness (*puuṣa*) is totally detached from the cosmic flux and activity. Dignāga believes in the pervasiveness of a transcendent principle, though its determination is in a *moment* or *point* of pure sensation—which is a coalescent situation of sensibility and intellectuality; but, in this situation, the intellectuality has to be dissociated from its restrictive imaginative construction. To interpret the transcendent sensibility in its objective efficiency of a *point*, detached from the conceptual function of

21. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I., pp. 19-20, 24-5, 48-52, 79-83, 96-8, 261-7. For details about the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, *vide*, *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, ed. by Radhakrishnan and Moore.

intellectuality, Dignāga draws attention to a complex dynamic universe, which can be understood in terms of three or more judgments in relation. These judgments are *perceptual judgments*, *inferential judgments* and *negative judgments* (excluding other judgments which are derivatives from these).[22] The position of Dignāga can be compared in many aspects with the advanced thought-processes of Santayana, Peirce, Lewis and Whitehead of the contemporary West, specially when their philosophical reflections are contrasted from the ideal phenomenological subjectivity of Husserl. In all these Western realists, pragmatists, phenomenologists and evolutionists, there is a reference to some kind of discipline in a transcendent aspect of experience before they draw attention to the presented sensible order of experience*.

Turning back to Indian thought to extend Dignāga's position further, we may say, that Dignāga is critical of the formal or static view of the universe, which might follow from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the classification of the universe from seven possible aspects, *as substances*, *qualities*, *activities*, *universals*, *particulars*, *relations of inherence*, and the *absence*

22. *Ibid.*, p. 221; Sharma in his *Dialectic in Buddhism and Vedānta* (Nand Kisore & Bros., 1952, pp. 80-116, 155-170), misrepresents Dignāga's experience of the *point* in pure sensation as an experience of momentariness. His view that Dignāga advocates a doctrine of momentariness is mistaken, for Dignāga openly denies all thought-construction. Again, Sharma swiftly passes from Dignāga's analysis of perceptual experience to Dignāga's notion of inference (p. 80); consequently he misses the link between the perceptual and inferential judgments, which we have clarified in this chapter. Thus in spite of Sharma's lucid exposition of Dignāga's criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other standpoints, one will not get the strength of realism which is in the *point* of pure sensation of Dignāga. The point of pure sensation, according to Dignāga, is a transcendent experience untouched by the constructive and bifurcating activity of the intellect.

* The reference is to their major works in general.

of these positive categories. He will put forth his fivefold dynamic modes—*proper names* (*ditthi*), *classes* (*jāti*), *qualities* (*guṇa*), *motions* (*kriyā*) and *substances* (*dravya*), not as *things*, but as *names* only (*svasiddhaiva kevala kalpaṇā nama vikalpa*),[23] indicating *spheres of efficiency having a transcendent basis*. Dignāga's perceptual judgments, or rather, statements, have to be related to the transcendent basis of experience, which is broadly *existential* though not intellectually presented. This restraint in understanding the perceptual situation, can be explained by the example of a *jar*. The jar, for example, in perceptual situation, as the *point* of pure sensation, is only an *efficient moment* from a transcendent basis, representing the fact of pouring water; and, in the aspect of its *image* (which is its intellectual aspect), it is variously interpreted as having a *shape*, *colour*, etc. In this complex perceptual situation, which is a sphere of *judging*, a dual process is involved, viz., (i) a process of analysis or differentiation, and (ii) a process of synthesis. In the first aspect, the movement of thought is from the *point* of pure sensation to the *images*; here the passage is from unity to plurality; it is a kind of dispersion of rays from the *focal point*. In the second aspect, the movement of thought is in a reverse direction, viz., from the *images* to the *point* of pure sensation—a return to the rays back to their sources—*the focal point*. *Judgment*, in these dual aspects, is a continuous process of establishing *identity* or *similarity* between the apparently dissimilar aspects.[24] It is a process of projection and a return to the *original position* or *transcendent con-*

23. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I., pp. 217-8.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

dition. Hence the whole emphasis of the intellectual process should be on the *transcendent basis* and not on the *apparent sphere* of experience. Both Indian realism and evolutionism miss this perspective of Dignāga. Dignāga's followers repeatedly draw attention to this aspect of Dignāga's thought. Dharmottara, a later commentator of Dignāga, says, that *to judge* means to deal with one's *internal reflex* (which is virtually the disciplined condition); it is not dealing with an *external object.* This identification with a disciplined condition is neither grasping of the *external object* by its *image*, nor a converting of an *image* into an *external object*; it is not a real uniting of things, nor a real imputation, nor placing one thing in the place of another one. It is our *illusion*, a wrong *imputation*—when one becomes detached from the disciplined condition.[25] This stress on some form of a disciplined idealist stand, in one aspect of Dignāga's thought (which lies in his adherence to the stimulating point of reality), can be contrasted with a thoroughly objectivistic attitude of Śaṅkara and his followers. The objectivistic attitude of the Śaṅkarite Vedāntins is found in their admission of a regular function of *antaḥkaraṇa*, an inner organ, which is something more than the admission of the *intellectual function* of Dignāga. This *inner organ* or *reflex* from a transcendent background, is also the *restful condition* of the *deep-sleep state* when the intellectual function of the subjective mode of *dream* and the subjective-objective mode of *waking*, ceases.[26] In the waking state, the *antaḥkaraṇa* is said to have varied functions:[27] (i) it *grasps* the

25. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

26. & 27. Datta, in his *Six Ways of Knowing* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932), clarifies the notion and function of *antaḥkaraṇa*, according to the *Advaita*

external objects, or (ii) it *assumes* the shape of the external object and in this function it severs the *veil* that is between the subject and the object, and it shows their oneness. This second function of *antaḥkaraṇa* is possible because of its *continuous identity* with the disciplined situation and the apparent empirical universe. These are all realistic ways of interpreting perceptual experience without clashing with the ever-shining principle,—the *transcendent condition*—the pure consciousness of the Śaṅkarite non-dualist (*advaita*) Vedāntins.[28] Datta defends the Vedāntic standpoint, in his *The Six Ways of Knowing*,[29] in the background of the past and present Indian and Western thought, without imposing any of his views, revealing his pristine humility which is so characteristic of his nature. If one goes deep into Dignāga's thought one will not fail to mark a kind of realism or objectivism behind his final idealistic or transcendent stand. The chief emphasis of Dignāga and thinkers before and after him, is on a disciplined understanding and not

school of Vedānta, thus : ".....*antaḥkaraṇa*.....is but a mode of *ajñāna*, and *ajñāna* is directly revealed to the self in dreamless sleep and even in waking life in our experience of general ignorance. Besides, pleasure and pains which are but the modes of *antaḥkaraṇa*, are directly known by the self." (p. 52). Further, regarding *antaḥkaraṇa*, Datta thinks, that it is 'the subject in its objective attitude —the lapse of the *ātman* from undifferentiated experience into the sinful duality seeking an 'other'. It marks, therefore, the transition of consciousness from pure subjectivity towards objectivity. It serves as a *mediating principle* through which the subject knows the object.' (p. 69). Datta concludes by saying that 'the *antaḥkaraṇa* can thus be regarded only as a factor in the modification of already existing consciousness, and not as an instrument in the generation of knowledge.....' (p. 58). If all these modes of reflection in connection with *antaḥkaraṇa* are taken note of, then is not Dignāga's concrete dynamic intellect, in its basis in the *point* of pure sensation, the same mediating principle of *antaḥkaraṇa* of the Advaita Vedāntins ?

28. *The Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 69, 88-9.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

on any restricted intellectualism.

The realistic (or rather objectivistic) element in Dignāga's reflection becomes patent when he tries to show that the *perceptual judgment* is a *link* between the reality reflected in pure sensation and the images constructed by the intellect.[30] Perceptual judgment is really an *actual intellectualising process* (akin to one of the functions of *antaḥkaraṇa* of Śaṅkara) and not a *mere glimmering of intellection* due to the stimulation of the *point* of pure sensation. Dignāga says: · "As soon as our intellectual eye begins to glimmer, our thought is already beset with contradiction."* In other words, the whole process *has become a judgment*. The moment our thought has stopped running and has fixed upon an external point so as to be able internally to produce the *judgment*, say, this is blue, we have separated the universe of discourse into two equal halves, the limited part of the *blue* and the less limited part of the *not-blue*. The definite thought (or judgment) of the *blue* is nothing more than the definite thought of the *not-blue*. There is nothing intermediate.[31] Thus, to Dignāga, to think actively is to think *dichotomisingly* and phenomenologically, but at the same time not losing the transcendent basis. The terms, construction (*kalpaṇā* or *ekikaraṇa*) and dichotomising (*vikalpa* or *daidhikaraṇa*), in their application to thought, are synonymous; they embrace every act of consciousness. To Dignāga, the terms—conception, representation, presentation and judgment—express constructive imagination and also

30. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I., pp. 225, 238 (early edition).

*According to Dignāga, contradiction is not a confusion but a direct and positive experience.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 400.

dichotomisation,[32] though not losing the transcendent basis. So what is fundamental to thinking is not *forming ideas* by observing similarity or identity, but a *process* of dividing or separating (*sarvam pṛthak*) from a transcendent basis.[33] What is true in intellection is *division* and not pointed observation. Dignāga wants to stop the apparentness of intellectual process by drawing attention to transcendent basis. Dharmakīrti says, "Everything when imagined or intellectualised, presents itself in couples of two parts, of which one is a complete negation of the other."[34] His statement has to be understood in relation to the transcendent basis. Śāntarakṣita[35] expresses the same thing in a different language, viz., there is on the one part not the slightest bit of what is in the other part. The bifurcation is complete in two halves. Therefore, what is operative in any intellectual activity, is the law of contradiction, which excludes the middle or the third part (*tṛtya-prakāra abhāva*); it is also the law of double negation of the other part just in the same degree in which the latter is the negation of the former. In other words, the relation of negation is reciprocal. The perceptual judgment, therefore, is not a *pure intellection* but a positive outspeaking—*a decision* to express experience in an aspect, separating it from its opposite, and, in this function, it is a complete process of experience and deeply phenomenological, having a transcendent basis. Its apparent dissection of reality into halves, giving equal importance to both the aspects, shows that it is a kind

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 400-1.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 402.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 403.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 403-4.

of evaluative process of selection and elimination for some practical purposes and not an actual dissection to destroy its *inner core*, its transcendent basis, as a twentieth century Western thinker Bergson sometimes supposes. An intellectual function, therefore, can be fostered and developed in this aspect, when the division is associated with the entire aspect of reality. The initial observation made with regard to perceptual judgment as (i) *the analysis* (differentiation of the process from the *point* to the *image*) or as (ii) *synthesis* (the return from the *image* to the *point*), has to be related to its selective-eliminative-purposive function from a transcendent basis just now brought out. This gives the judgment-process, not a continuous serial or linear movement, but a complex activity of selection and elimination from an evaluative basis—a positive division of experiential field in various interconnected orders[36]. The positive assertion in perceptual judgment seems to involve the operation of *division* or *general negation* of a concrete experiential situation.[37] But in essence it is not so. Judgment, therefore, is not a mechanical, regular or spontaneous process, as can be found in the formal reflections of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the eminent Greek philosopher who dominated Western thought till Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel, in turn, introduced an ideal dialectic or the operation of negation, but it has no concern with the concrete presented sensible

36. This novel mode of Dignāga, reducing *substance-mode* to *function-mode* in every judgment of a perceptual situation, may be compared in many aspects with Whitehead's interpretation of perceptual judgment that there is no nature at an instant. Cf. Collingwood's interpretation of Whitehead's perceptual judgment in: *The Idea of Nature* (A Galaxy Book. N. Y, 1960, pp. 22-27).

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 409-9. *Konvitz and Kennedy: *The American Pragmatists*, Meridian Books, New York, 1964, pp. 360-79.

situation, and so Hegel missed the stimulating basis or the *point* of pure sensation of Dignāga. Kant, previous to Hegel, experienced the analytic and intuitive aspect of a judgment which formed the basis of his reflection on the *apriori* synthetic judgments, but he also missed the basic transcendent *point* of pure sensation (of Dignāga) which stimulates *intellect* and sets up its bifurcating process, in a phenomenological-pragmatist-evaluative aspect.

The realism (or objectivism) of Dignāga does not lie in a formal analysis of a perceptual situation, but in a practical *facing* of a presented sensible universe in terms of a transcendent basis meditatively determined. It is a *dealing with* the presented universe for the realisation of some practical goal in such activity as success or failure in life. This notion of success or failure has a reference to those who have some interest in a transcendent psychology. Thus, to Dignāga, the intellectual function as expressed in perceptual judgment, is not accepting a presentation (*sense-datum*) merely, but *selecting* it from its opposite or from other aspects which oppose it in some ways. Here Dignāga refers to the character of general negation and also to such characters which are in some way opposed to the presented perceptual experience. The character of *otherness* as implied in all perceptual situation, in contrast to what is positively presented, can be illustrated in the case of perceptual experience between the *blue* and the *yellow*; the yellow is opposed to the *blue* not exactly as its opposite *not-blue*, but it is an opposite indirectly, in the sense that it is a kind of *not-blue*; it cannot escape from being *not-blue* or it is one of such other characters which must be placed in the aspect of the *not-blue*. The

experience of yellow as a variety of *not-blue* has to be distinguished from the experience of *not-blue*, which is a general negative or opposed character associated with all perceptual experience. Drawing attention to a general character of negation and also of such characters *implying otherness* involved in all perceptual activity, Dignāga directs a special attention to the *negative judgments* and *judgments implying otherness* as quite independent kind of judgments standing on par with the actual perceptual judgments.[38] Here, in the case of such *negative judgments* and *judgments implying otherness*, the reference is not to the basic general character of negation or otherness operative behind the perceptual judgment, but to such concrete situations where the judgments themselves are definitely of a negative sort or of the types implying judgments of otherness. This is illustrated in a sort of a parallel way by examples as follows : "Just as we arrive at the negative judgment, viz., *there is no jar on this place* after hypothetically imagining its presence on this place and after having repudiated that suggestion, just so do we decide that the *blue* is not *yellow*, after having hypothetically assumed the presence of *blue* on the yellow patch and having repelled that imagined presence."[39]

In brief, the function of a judgment is a positive effort to utter, to decide, to infer and to see whether some suggestions, in terms of negation or by way of otherness, fit in with the *point* of pure sensation. The negative judgments or judgments implying otherness,

38. Stcherbatsky : *Buddhist Logic*, pp. 365-84, 408-413.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 409, vide, in this connection, Datta's analysis of the Advaita notion of non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) in his, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, specially pp. 180-94.

are the baffled suggestions which cannot be fitted into the *point* of pure sensation. This position of Dignāga expresses his deep psychological insight which touches in many aspects the varieties of psychological experience (with pragmatic touches) in the reflections of James, Dewey, Bergson, and Whitehead, yet Dignāga has a speciality. This complex mode of reflection follows from his novel transcendental attitude in the background of such attitudes of the Upaniṣads and the Vaibhāṣikas. Perceptual judgment has a transcendental psychological and logical basis, which a philosopher of any country or culture cannot ignore. This trend in some aspect of transcendent phenomenological pragmatist mode of reflection is characteristic of American thought from Peirce to Lewis.[40] But none have pointed out the meditative aspect behind their reflective activity as indicated here.

The perceptual judgment is directly referred to the point of pure sensation, and it has to be distinguished from the inferential judgment, which is a cognition of a *point* of reality in pure sensation, by a *mark* or *symbol*. If, in the *perceptual judgment*, one grasps the particular (fire, for example), and constructs the symbol, then in the *inferential judgment*, one marks the symbol (viz., smoke) and grasps the particular (viz., fire). In the *inferential judgment*, the *fire* is imagined by the perception of the *smoke*. Hence inferential judgment is not an argument from a proposition, or a deduction of a conclusion from two propositions taken together, but a direct inquiry into a *point* of reality and a determination of that reality

40. Konvitz & Kennedy: Edited by, *The American Pragmatists*, Meridian Books, N. Y., Third Printing, 1964, pp. 305-315.

by way of *identity* or *causality*.[41]

If all these complex thought-processes from the *perceptual judgments* and *judgments implying otherness* are observed, it will be seen that Dignāga is trying to establish a realistic logic (in a fully objectivist sense) on the basis of a stimulating *point* of pure sensation, refuting the view of voidness of logic as sponsored by the four schools of Buddhism. This realistic (or pragmatist-objectivist) logic with a background in a *translogical experience*, is a complete ousting of the so-called realistic logic of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. It is a preparation of a ground for a realistic logic with a *translogical basis* of the *Advaita-Vedānta* of Śaṅkara and his followers, and of the neo-Vedāntic thinkers of India today. From Śaṅkara to the neo-Vedāntins, however, there is a change in the determination of translogical aspect of experience;[42] hence during this long period one finds varied notions of logic, all however with a *translogical basis*; these different notions of logic can be contrasted with the traditional logic of Western philosophy from Aristotle to Hegel, and can be compared with the empirical logics of the Western contemporaries who generally struggle to dissociate themselves from a translogical position with futile results. I do not want to mention the would-be possible effects of Dignāga's logic on the Western symbolic logic from the stage of Leibniz, Frege and Peano to Russell and Tarski, in contemporary

41. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I., Chs. II-III. In the case of the inference of the tree from the mark, *simsapa*, the identity between *simsapa* and *tree*, is determined, and in the case of the inference of the fire and the mark, *smoke*, the causal basis of *smoke* in the *fire*, is determined.

42. For details *vide*, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. by Radhakrishnan and others.

European and American thought.[43]

Along with Dignāga's realistic logic or realistic interpretation of intellectual activity, one can find in Dignāga, a novel theory of *language*, *names* and *sounds*. From the above discourse we know that the intellectual activity is a kind of *outspeaking*, an effort to utter, while its stimulating background is unutterable. The intellectual activity and utterability are inextricably bound together. The intellectual activity and language, therefore, are on the same line;[44] they are stimulated by the *point* of pure sensation, but they cannot touch the *point* or *reality* which is only *existential* and *non-predicable*; both *echo* the reality.[45] This novel *existentialist standpoint* perhaps has no parallel in Western thought, and yet it is not a mystic notion in the sense of a vague experience.

From this standpoint of Dignāga, if one examines Ayer's linguistic analysis of perceptual situation, one will find that the immediate sensible situation which Ayer refers to, is not the sensible situation as it is *given*, but it should always refer to a *translogical basis in a point of pure sensation*, which is unutterable but which impels one to speak; it is an exhibition of an exertion in terms of *intellectual activity* or *through language* but it cannot be actually intellectualised or expressed through language as Ayer claims by his linguistic recommendations. If Ayer severs himself

43. On Symbolic Logic, from *Readings on Logic*, ed. by Copi & Gould, Macmillan & Co., N. Y. 1964, Part Four.

44 & 45. Stcherbatsky : *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. 1., pp. 458-9. Stcherbatsky thinks that the Buddhist logic of Dignāga and Dharmakirti is an "adaptatory work of the realistic and formal Nyāya-logic to the requirement of an idealistic system....." (Vol. I., p. 35, New Dover edition).

from the *translogical* basis of sensible experience, then he loses the very ground (the energetic basis) for verification, and if still he continues to imagine as having intellectualised or expressed through language his experience of the sensible situation, then he must know as well that he has bifurcated the presented situation from the basic *point* of pure sensation. So, in either aspect, from Dignāga's point of view, Ayer will fail to verify his experience of the sensible situation by linguistic recommendations only. He will be dislodged from the transcendent basis of sensibility.*

Thus there should be no illusion about the place and function of either conceptualisation or its expression in terms of language, according to Dignāga. Dignāga not only influenced the *Advaita-Vedāntic* logic but also influenced the theory of *names*, *language* and *sounds*. It was the *Advaita-Vedānta*, that in subsequent Indian thought, revolted against the Mīmāṁsā theory of *names* and *sounds* as ultimate characters. One may study in this connection Datta's analysis of the *Advaita-Vedānta*-theory of language,[46] and can see how far its revolt against the Mīmāṁsa theory of language, is a carrying forward of the truly objectivist theory of language initiated by Dignāga and developed by his illustrious disciples, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila. It may be noted that the theory of language can be traced back to the Upaniṣadic doctrine of *Oṁ* or the transcendent sound, which is associated with the

* Ayer : *Language, Truth and Logic* (Dover Publications Inc., N. Y.) Ayer's *Introduction* to Second Edition, 1946.

46. *The Six Ways of Knowing*, Book VI, specially pp. 296-307, 323-7, 334-41, for the Advaita interpretation of language.

triadic orders of presented experience and yet beyond them—it is the soundless. If one studies Dignāga's view of the concepts and language in the context of his objectivist-pragmatist logic in the background of traditional Upaniṣadic doctrine, one can understand his contribution to Indian thought as a whole and the superficiality of some of the contemporary Western linguistic philosophers who find sole reality in some kind of linguistic expressions, totally missing their *translogical experiential background.*[47] This chapter, therefore, is a challenge to that aspect of Western contemporary linguistic and analyst tendency in philosophy which ignores *translogical basis of experience* of sensible situation. In a way it tries to study deeply Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological logic, and Lewis' new notion of *apriori* experience in modern pragmatist-American thought to realise the flashes of truth in the line of Dignāga.

With sufficient restraint and discipline, one can understand Dignāga's nominalism (*vastu-śūnya-prajñāpti-vāda*), conceptualism (*vikalpa-vāsanā-vāda*), his theory of conformity (*sārupya-vāda*), his dynamical theory (*śakti-vāda*), and his dialectical theory (*apoha-vāda*);[48] they cannot be associated with the idealistic standpoint of any Western variety. They are so complex and yet so realistic. Sharma's[49] suggestion to interpret Dignāga from an idealist standpoint of the West, is denounced in this chapter. Here Dignāga and

47. Carnap: *The Unity of Science* (Kegan Paul, 1934) and also Ayer: *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1947) and *The Problems of Knowledge* (Pelican Book Ltd., 1956).

48. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol., I., p. 445.

49. *Dialectic in Buddhism and Vedanta*, pp. 159-70.

his Yogācāra masters are interpreted as transcendentalists. They continue the Indian tradition of transcendent experience which begins with the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. The speciality of Dignāga lies in introducing a realistic-*cum*-objectivist-pragmatist logic in a transcendent background. From Dignāga's standpoint, there is no longer any force in the formalistic logic of Aristotle and the ideal dialectic of Hegel. Dignāga has a special theory of *judgment* as a disciplined process. He can be placed on par with such realistic thinkers of the present-day West, as Peirce, Whitehead and Price (1899-), who have detached themselves not only from the idealistic thought, but also from the positivistic mode of realistic reflections of the West. But whereas Dignāga admits a meditative background, the contemporary Western thinkers use it, but do not expressly admit its use. Only a casual reference to the analysis of perceptual situation by perceptual judgments can be made to show how close Dignāga is to these contemporary thinkers of the West. According to Price, perceptual consciousness is more *negative* than positive. The very statement involves an insight and understanding. The initial stage of perceptual acceptance is, to Price, "not an intuitive apprehension, nor inference, nor belief, its object does necessarily *exist*, it is undoubting and unquestioning and inattentive to the difference between the sense-datum and material thing ...."[50] The subsequent stage of perceptual consciousness, according to Price, is a series of perceptual acts to be progressively confirmed. It is a stage of

50. *Perception* (Methuen & Co., Ltd., Second Edition, 1950), p. 170.

settled conviction, above the level of doubting and questioning.[51] Who does not find here an echo of Dignāga ? Though Price does not refer to any transcendent basis of perceptual consciousness, he is in search for a transcendent or trans-empirical physical occupation of the sensible experience.

To Peirce, the perceptual experience does not refer to a positive *sensum*, but to a series of *general characters* (*generals*) with urges in different orders. Whitehead almost agrees with Dignāga when he draws attention to such general characters as *Eternal Objects*, *God*, and *Creativity*, behind the perishing and changing features of the universe. The intellectual activity, left to itself, according to Whitehead, is a selective-restrictive process; it is a process of abridgment and even of distortion; its apparent clarity is a setting aside of the pervasive and transcendent aspects of experience that envelop it and operate upon it. Whitehead, like Dignāga, often draws attention to the deep non-sensuous feeling-core of experience (the *causal efficacy*) which stimulates and controls the presented universe. Only by penetrative understanding—*wisdom* or *peace*, and, not by an emergent restricted intellectual activity, can one understand the varying orders of the changing universe.[52] Whitehead, as mentioned earlier, is in search of prospective transcendent characters which are ever-present possibilities raising the basic processes to higher *contrasts*. In a previous chapter, Whitehead's similarity with Nāgārjuna has been indicated, in this chapter, his similarity

51. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

52. For general ideas on Whitehead's philosophy, *vide* his *Process and Reality* (Cambridge University Press, 1929) and *Adventures of Ideas* (Cambridge University Press, 1933).

with Dignāga, in an aspect, is shown. Both Nāgārjuna and Dignāga prepare the ground for prospective Indian thought-processes. Whitehead with his Western background can be fitted in an aspect of Nāgārjuna-Dignāga tradition and contemporary Indian neo-Vedāntic current set up differently by S. Radhakrishnan and K. C. Bhattacharyya.

If philosophy is a disciplined reflection, one should not ignore Dignāga merely because he is a past thinker, but must utilize the fundamentals of his reflections in interpreting not only the posterior thought-process of India, but also the dominant reflective activities of the contemporary West. In these days of research and scholarship, when more and more of Dignāga's works are being discovered from the Tibetan and Chinese sources, one should patiently wait to determine the exact position of Dignāga in the background of contemporary Indian and Far Eastern thought. Rahul Sankrityayana, in his preface to his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtikam*, considers Dharmakīrti as the "central figure round whom all the creative minds of India revolved,"[53] but one must bear in mind that the germs of his reflections can be traced back to his master—Dignāga.

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53. Kitab Mahal, 1943, Preface, p. 11.
Hiriyanna in his *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), Ch. IX, considers the standpoints of the four Buddhist schools, from the standpoint of Dignāga. This is specially true of his interpretation of the Vaibhāṣika school.

CHAPTER VI

EXISTENTIALISM* AND ITS AFFINITY WITH SOME ASPECTS OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT

Western philosophical reflection upto Hegel, has a continuous conceptual-empirical tradition; the empirical trend is usually reactionary following the conceptual. The reactionary trends after Hegel, whether idealistic, pragmatistic, phenomenological, positivistic, evolutionistic or realistic, expressed by such able thinkers as Bradley (1846-1924), Peirce (1839-1914), Husserl (1859-1938), Russell (1872-), Ayer (1910-), Bergson (1859-1941), or Alexander (1859-1938), draw attention to various aspects of experience, both sensuous and non-sensuous, revolting against any specific conceptual or empirical tradition.[1] Unlike the aforesaid and other post-Hegelian reactionary trends,[2] existentialism does not break itself away totally from the traditional philosophy, as it keeps alive the age-old distinction between *essence* and *existence*, though from their distinct perspectives. According to existentialism, the past philosophy of idealism, with its stress on *essence* or *pure thought*,

* Previously published under the caption: 'Existentialism: A Historical Assessment' in *The Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1956; some changes have been made here.

1. Thilly : *A History of Philosophy*, revised by Wood (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), Chs. XVI, XVII, XIX, XX.

2. There is no reference to Whitehead's philosophy, as Whitehead's post-Hegelian realistic trend is not reactionary in any specific sense.

belongs to the first order of the historical process, while its own trend in contrast to traditional idealism, belongs to the second phase, stressing vital *human existences* by psychological attitudes. It is a *depth* philosophy interpreting transcendent and prospective psychological experience, continuously negating the conceptual-empirical-phenomenological dispositions as restricted or one-sided. It is not a rootless philosophy, its vibrations can be felt as far back as Augustine (353-430), Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and Socrates (469-399 B.C.).[3] In Leibniz (1646-1716), one finds a clear distinction between *essence* and *existence* in his two philosophic principles of *identity* and *sufficient reason.*[4] But the distinction between *essence* and *existence* becomes pronounced in Kierkegaard (1813-1855) from a deep personalist aspect. From Kierkegaard to *existentialism of today* one can claim a hundred-year-old tradition of existentialism. Therefore, it is the oldest of the contemporary trends, and at the same time it reflects the most dominant psychological state of the post-war conditions. Blackham rightly observes, "It is a contemporary renewal of one of the necessary phases of human experience in a conflict of ideals which history has not yet resolved."[5] According to Ruggiero, existentialism in

3. Wahl: *A Short History of Existentialism* (Translated from the French by Williams and Maron, Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 8-9; also Sartre: *Existentialism and Humanism,* translated & introduced by Mairet (Methuen & Co., Ltd., reprinted, 1952), p. 5; and K. Walker: *Diagnosis of Man* (Penguine Books, 1962), Ch. 8.

4. Ruggiero: *Existentialism,* edited and introduced by Heppenstall (Secker & Warburg, 1946), p. 45, also Harper: *Existentialism* (Harvard University Press, 1949), Preface, p. vii.

5. *Six Existentialist Thinkers* (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1925), Preface, p.iv; also, Troisfontaines: *Existentialism and Christian Thought,* Introduction by Kerr (Adam & Charles Black, 1949), p. 5.

its different forms, is a *lively appeal against the conceptual abstractions of idealism* and it brings a *healthy ferment* into philosophical thought by bringing in the problem of human existence.[6]

Existentialism affirms that every truth and every action implies both an environment and a subjectivity.[7] It interprets emergent human subjectivity or consciousness from a concrete relational socio-cultural background without trying to speculate upon it from an abstract subjective or objective basis as in traditional idealism, which gives prominence to the eye only, and interprets everything as *presented*.[8] Existentialism presents consciousness as an experiential phenomenon from a deep psychological attitude; it is not a simple conceptual-empirical-phenomenological point of view prevailing from Plato to Husserl, nor is it a passing psychological mood[9] from Kierkegaard to Nietzsche. Existentialism as it is today from Jaspers and Marcel to Heidegger and Sartre, tends to go beyond the realm of the *given* though not denying the *given* for any abstract reason. In its primary phase of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, existentialism suggests a *despair* of reason through its emergent consciousness, and this serves as a precondition for the negation of *essence* or *permanence*

6. *Existentialism*, p. 44.

7. Sartre: *Existentialism and Humanism*, p. 24.

8. Ussher: *Journey Through Dread*—A Study of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre (Darwen Finlayson Ltd., 1955). p. 69., "Above all, Idealism is a visual philosophy: it is concerned with the world that I clearly perceive. It knows nothing of that other side of reality.....".

9. Das, R: *Is Existentialism Philosophy ?* (*Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1951 p. 68), ...'existentialism, in general, may be described as a revolt of life against thought, of passion and feeling against reflective contemplation.'

associated with the traditional notion of consciousness as in idealism. In its posterior phase, existentialism considers consciousness as a *concrescence* or a *focal point* with a basic instability and restlessness, making itself a *possibility* for action or decision in relation to a changing socio-cultural environment. As a *possibility* it cancels its basic apparent theoretic experience of the immediate situation (the realm of the given) and projects itself to a posterior psychological situation by an ever-emergent will[10] that has totally freed itself from the *serfdom of the instincts* and from the *norms and values of reason* exhibited in the various periods of the history of philosophy for more than two thousand five hundred years of a great tradition which begins with Thales (624-554 B. C.). Existentialism is a psychological attitude with a quest for *values* beyond the past cultural processes. It does not neglect or ignore values but it revalues values by a criticism of apparent aspects of experiences as granted in traditional idealism or empiricism.

In this process of continuous de-conceptualisation (or separation from conceptual-empirical proneness) and a leap into concrete decision (or projection) to decipher a new sphere of socio-cultural experience, the emergent psychological consciousness as discovered may appear as an ugly duckling, but it is soon to come up as a protean swan exhibiting its

10. According to Ussher (*Journey Through Dread*), an existentialist 'finds himself thrown into an unfriendly world and confronted with a Demon, his naked will.....' (p. 15); it is interesting to observe that Ussher gets 'a hint of an older, perhaps more gracious philosophy'—'the wandering in the Great Void' of the Buddhist...., and confidently suggests that the 'Existential Will', when it learns to know itself and trust itself, may make men well adjusted, and therefore free.... p. 9; also Blackham: *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, p. 163, 'It is a hard doctrine, a challenge to everybody and everything, a call to heroism.'

everfresh subjectivity with firm attitude by a return to its own freedom from complex environmental processes or pressures to extract the significance of its own being.[11] It extricates itself from the defects of the traditional bourgeois temperament and mode. In its progress it faces other concrete trends as Marxism or Freudianism but saves itself from falling a prey to either materialism or psychologism, its aim being always to abandon the realm of the *given*,—*outer* or *inner*,[12] but yet not ignoring the *given* in all its apparentness.

Existentialism does not boast of a clear-cut system or philosophy in any traditional sense;[13] it sets up a series of psychological stands with depth, persistence and comprehensiveness but does not prescribe a code of abstract analysis. It travels light, picks up categories and drops them whenever necessary not failing to give expression to a stable attitude in terms of the needs and demands of the situation.[14] It

11. Troisfontaines: *Existentialism and Christian Thought*, p. 25; Heinemann: *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament* (Adam & Charles Black, Second Edition, 1953), p. 80; Radhakrishnan (*Presidential Address, The Indian Philosophical Congress* 1950, Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume, 11, p. 17) interprets existentialism as expressing a deep moral and intellectual need for *Being* or *Absolute* in this present age of crisis; here he inclines more to Kierkegaard than to Heidegger for the development of existentialist thought. This discourse, however, lays more stress on Heidegger as expressing a later and efficient phase of existentialist philosophy, from a historical standpoint.

12. Ussher: *Journey Through Dread*, '....with existentialism—at least in its later phases—we are in the climate of Einstein, Picasso and Freud', p. 10. also, p. 14 'this is pragmatism and materialism—but with a difference, for Self is again the centre', also pp. 70, 93.

13. Blackham: *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, pp. 151-3, 160-3; Wahl: *A Short History of Existentialism*, p. 4 '....I (Kierkegaard) refuse to be a paragraph in a system'; p. 32 '....there are views of reality which cannot be completely reduced to scientific formulas'; p. 34 '....a new mode of philosophising.'

14. Ussher: *Journey Through Dread*, pp. 9, 14, 20; Blackham: *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, p. 21.

revolts against all dogmatic propensities and over-systematisation of experience and lies under a double negation—the no-more of the gods that have fled and not-yet of the god that is coming,[15] but not ceasing to be meaningful and truly philosophic. Existentialism is a combined philosophic and psychological attitude choosing *life* and *revolt* rather than *doctrine* or *grace*.[16]

Its very choice of apparent pessimism is its redeeming feature.[17] It feels that time has changed and with it human mentality. In this aspect one can find its general affinity with Buddhism. To fit into the changing circumstances man has to decide every moment and constantly *separate* himself from the dream-life of conceptualism or exalted fantasy.[18] Philosophic reflection from this perspective, as a step to decision in relation to concrete situation, amounts to a kind of *pragmatism*; but existentialists'

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 163-4; Mahadevan: *Presidential Address, Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1955, p. 15. Mahadevan's criticism of existentialism is from a Vedāntic standpoint, which can be accepted as an alternative stand, but existentialism, in its historical emergence and development, has its speciality and efficiency; it is not a mere post-phenomenological mood after Husserl.

16. Troisfontaines: *Existentialism and Christian Thought*, p. 24. This statement has to be understood in connection with Camus, another outstanding French existentialist like Sartre. Also Heinemann: *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, p. 73.

17. Ussher: *Journey Through Dread*, 'That pessimism is not of the passive Schopenhauerian kind, but is rather a bracing sense of the menace and challenge of existence', p. 9, 'Existentialism in fact is not uncontaminated by the idealism ....against which it arose as a protest. As an idealism the Self or Subject really exists in a Void, a masquerade of appearances, so in Existentialism the Void....has, so to say, been made flesh and became the Self. Both the two philosophies, apparently opposite, can easily be expanded into complete nihilism'. In this chapter the notion of the void has been extended from Nietzsche to Heidegger and Sartre, and related to the void of the Buddhist schools, in an aspect, in a broad cultural sense.

18. Blackham: *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, pp. 21, 152-6.

novel psychological orientation for continuous alertness and activity has nothing to do with the American pragmatism and its shaping process from Peirce to Lewis.[19] It encounters almost all contemporary realistic, linguistic and idealistic currents beyond Husserlian phenomenalism but skilfully separates itself from all such trends. Here one can examine its standpoint in relation to the Buddha and the Buddhist schools, on the one hand, and the other non-Vedic and Vedic systems, on the other. Between this existential current of the West and the Indian Buddhist current, there is a temperamental affinity, though there may not be any affinity in the details of their speculative currents.

In this chapter a consideration has been made of the existentialist philosophy in its two well-marked post-Hegelian and post-Husserlian phases, choosing for its study only such thinkers as Keirkegaard, Nietzsche (1844-1900), Jaspers (1883-), Marcel (1889), Heidegger (1889) and Sartre (1905), excluding others equally great, as Russian Berdyaev (1875-1948) and American Niebuhr.[20] Existentialism is not merely one of the contemporary reactionary stands, if sympathetically viewed, it may be shown that it has a lasting character which goes deep into the

19. Wood: 'Recent Philosophical Schools' in *A History of Philosophical Systems*, ed. by Ferm (Rider and Co., 1950). Wood's development of contemporary pragmatism in a post-Husserlian direction has a special significance for this discourse, as existentialist thought, also, in an aspect, is post-Husserlian.

20. Ussher: *Journey Through Dread*, p. 10; Heinemann : *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, p. 2, for Berdyaev, Ch. IX., Wahl: *A History of Existentialism*, p. 1, for a general reference to contemporary existentialist. For a short review of Berdyaev's existentialist standpoint, *vide* Clarke : *Introduction to Berdyaev* (Geoffrey Blex, 1950). For Niebuhr's final existentialist standpoint, vide his *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, in 2 Vols. (Nisbet & Co. Ltd., reprinted, 1946 and 1948).

currents of philosophic reflections in general[21], crossing its own cultural milieu. It is for this reason its similarity with Buddhist thought in many important aspects has been shown in this book.

Kierkegaard, the father of existentialist thought, though nurtured in the Hegelian tradition, deviates from Hegelianism.[22] Being conscious of a deep psychological condition, Kierkegaard is sceptical about reason and hence he *despairs* reason and entertains some consequent psychological experiences which invade one's mind in the forms of *anxiety*, *anguish* and *even sickness unto death* till concrete *decision* is made.[23] Kierkegaard's despair is not a return to such defined intellectual stands as Pyrrho's (365-270 B.C.) *suspension of judgment*, or Descartes' (1596-1650) *philosophic doubt*; nor are his psychological experiences momentary moods. Life-process, to Kierkegaard,

21. Das, R.: 'Is Existentialism Philosophy ?' (*Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1951, p. 72) defends existentialism even though 'it does not evidence logical thought throughout its whole procedure....' Heinemann (*Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, p. 4) defends existentialism from Ayer's criticism of it as dead and nonsensical. Sartre (*Existentialism and Humanism*, pp. 23-6) challenges all arguments against existentialism as quietism, pessimism etc., and claims that it is a philosophy of activism and optimism in a posterior cultural process. Ussher (*Journey Through Dread*, p. 14), retorting Marxist contention that 'existentialism is the last phase of *bourgeois* capitalism', says that existentialism 'is the last phase of something rather more important than capitalism, namely, the Western belief in words, concepts and objectified values'.

22. *Ibid.*, Ch. 1. According to Ussher, Keirkegaard cannot be understood without Hegel, but '....Hegelianism is wrong without the corrective of Kierkegaardianism', *Ibid.*, 54. According to Thilly (*A History of Philosophy*, pp. 480-6), Hegel's *will* becomes free from impulses in its rational self-determination, but the existentialist's *will* is a freedom from both *impulses* and *reason*, in a cultural-historical sense. Blackham: *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, Ch. 1. chiefly, pp. 7, 8, 17, 23; Wahl: *A Short History of Existentialism*, pp. 2-5; Heinemann: *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, pp. 31-4.

23. Ussher: *Journey Through Dread*, pp. 18, 21-2, 43, 47, 55-8; Sartre: *Existentialism and Humanism*, pp. 6-7.

is not within the boundaries of one's intellectual castle; intellectual life is a continuous self-confinement to one's concepts or moods,—a romantic aestheticism, —and not a concrete facing of life with its possibilities for ever-fresh *decisions* according to situation.[24] Kierkegaard's *decision* is a search for a new category or mode of activity which may be termed as *repetition* of such transcendent decisions in spheres which are ethical or social. According to Ussher and Collins,[25] however, Kierkegaard lived mostly in the aesthetic or intellectual phases, and missed totally the concrete ethical or social aspects, but this is a criticism of Kierkegaard by an earlier tradition. He, with an alert mind, projected himself by a leap to a saintly or religious life which is beyond the first order of abstract intellectual or religious process; he faced specifically the transcendental-psychological experience of *dread*, *fear* or *trembling* before God, construed in the post-theological sense. This order of psychological stand as Kierkegaard chose for himself to live, expresses a faith, a broad religious experience following a preliminary psychological life of *decision* or *repetition*. The expressions—*decision* and *repetition*—have been used in the Kierkegaardian sense, and not in any normal sense nor again in the sense of earlier traditions before Hegel. The religious experience of Kierkegaard has a very wide significance in the mystic traditions of the world. This mystic tradition can be developed in relation to an earlier German

24. *Vide* Kierkegaard's *Repetition* and *The Point of View* (Translated by Lowrie, Oxford University Press) and also *Either/Or*, in 2 Vols. Vol. I, translated by Swenson, and Vol. II. translated by Lowrie, for details.

25. Ussher: *Journey Through Dread*, pp. 42-3, 55, 57-8; Collins: *The Mind of Kierkegaard* (Secker and Warburg, 1954), Ch. II.

mystic, Eckhart of the thirteenth century, or in relation to Indian traditions from the Upaniṣadic thinkers to Rāmakrishna of the 19th century.[26]

In Nietzsche[27] also there is a similar revolt against the Platonic-Hegelian tradition when he comes out from his new awakening that man has no *nature* or *essence* as such, but he has a *human condition* or *historicity*. It is not an expression of sceptical attitude of a Hume in the order of a pure intellectual reflection, it is a total departure from that tradition —a *despair*; the expression, *despair*, has been used in a special sense; it obviously favours a negation and it is a stand on an ever-emergent *will*. Nietzsche's is a choice for a novel psychological project in the aspect of a dominant will undeterred by such preliminary mental experiences of restlessness, dizziness and nausea; his goal is a revolting attitude, hence it is Dionysian in a symbolical sense to express a choice for a new mode of *reflection* and *action* and also to establish a new order of men and society, proving oneself either a superman or a neurotic, losing oneself totally.[28]

This post-conceptual and post-theological-psychological attitude of Nietzsche is utilized in a post-

26. Blackham: *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, pp. 14-5; Ruggiero: *Existentialism*, p. 29 '....in faith we are not given a purely intellectual relation....'; *vide* also Datta's detailed analysis of Kierkegaard's *subjectivity* in the background of Western reflections since Socrates, in *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy*, Calcutta University, Second Edition, 1961, pp. 515-24; also Radhakrishnan: *An Idealist View of Life*, Barnes & Nobles, N. Y. 1964, and S. N. Dasgupta: *Indian Idealism*, Cambridge University Press, N. Y., 1962

27. Blackham: *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, Ch. II. 'Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are as divided as poles and as close as twins', p. 23; also p. 38, 'Nietzsche had no knowledge of Kierkegaard'; Sartre: *Existentialism and Humanism*, p. 9.

28. Lavrin: *Nietzsche* (Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1948) for Nietzsche's psychology and type of mind.

phenomenological direction by Heidegger and Sartre* developing the existentialist notion of *negation* and *separation* further.

Jaspers and Marcel, who are deeply influenced by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, not only deviate from the past conceptual-empirical tradition but also separate themselves from the major contemporary trends of Husserl, Bergson and others. From this stand they declare that the *human condition* has still a place in the complex scientific socio-cultural process, which determines its broad historicity and gauges its future psychological projects along various orders of comprehensive experience.[29] Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche suffer from persistent psychological experiences as *anxiety*, *dread*, *dizziness*, *nausea* etc., till the resolute decision (*repetition* or eternal recurrence of decision) is arrived at. To both Jaspers and Marcel, there is no such experience of *suffering*. They are well-placed in their deep psychological explorations or discoveries, and they can claim an efficiency which their predecessors lacked. Jaspers and Marcel admit human condition in all separation —it is a *being-there* or *being-for-all* for Jaspers, and it

*Jean Paul Sartre explains refusal of the 1964 Nobel Prize for Literature to remain free in his effort to bring the cultures of communism and capitalism together, *Vide* the *Christian Science Monitor*, Saturday, October 29, 1964.

29. For a detailed historical survey of German existentialists, Jaspers and Heidegger specially, *vide*, Brock: *An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1935). According to Brock, Jaspers goes beyond Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Husserl, pp. 97-108; for Jaspers' main philosophical standpoint, see his *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, translated by Manheim (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950); for details about Marcel, the French existentialist, *vide* his *The Mystery of Being* in 2 Vols :—Vol. I., (*Reflection and Mystery*), Vol. II. (*Faith and Reality*)—Havell Press Ltd., 1950 & 1951. For a general summary of Marcel's standpoint, *vide* his *The Philosophy of Existence*, translated by Harari (Philosophical Library, 1949); for his criticism of Bradley and Bergson, *vide* ibid., pp. 91-5.

is, for Marcel, a *bare individual* with a theoretic proneness which sets up problems. This undeniable cosmic socio-cultural situation has to be abandoned for the further possibility of the human condition in a transcendent order of *being-for-self* (*Existenz*), *liberty*, *freedom*, *intuition*, *silence or voice*, for Jaspers, or *presence*, *information of oneself to oneself*, or *mystery*, for Marcel. There is a further transcendence from this order to interpersonal situation, which is *being-in-itself* or *communication*, to Jaspers, and *fidelity* or *faith in the presence of an other-than-me*, to Marcel;[30] this final order suggests that individual by himself is not self-sufficient.[31]

To both Jaspers and Marcel, the discovery of different orders of experience is a discontinuous process—a shift from the past and contemporary objectivist-subjectivist propensity; it is somewhat similar to a series of meditations (*samādhis*) of Aśvaghoṣa, if construed from a different cultural background, where there is an attempt to purify theoretic consciousness of *tathatā* (suchness), from all particularising or restricted consciousness. Marcel claims that the similarity of his thought with Jaspers' was discovered later by his study of Jaspers and hence

30. For Jaspers' experience of *liberty* and *communication*, *vide*, Blackham: *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, pp. 57-60. For Marcel's *presence* and *fidelity*, *Ibid.*, pp. 68-76.

31. Leighton: 'Jaspers' Existential Philosophy' in *Perspectives in Philosophy* (Essays by members of the department of Philosophy: The Ohio State University, 1953), pp. 3-8, 12. For Jaspers' *transcendent* experience *vide* Troisfontaines: *Existentialism and Christian Thought*, pp. 13-5, and for Marcel's *Criticism of Hegel and the Neo-Hegelians*, *Ibid.*, p. 16. Heinemann criticises Jaspers as a 'gliding philosopher' with no stable logic or metaphysics; also Ruggiero: *Existentialism*, pp. 35, 36, 39, for a criticism and appreciation of Jaspers in relation to Heidegger. For a criticism of Marcel's *mystical empiricism*, *Ibid.*, pp. 43-4.

the coincidence is purely accidental.[32] In this chapter it is shown that the coincidence between Jaspers and Marcel is purely psychological and it cannot be analysed by any specific traditional or contemporary scheme of reflection. By indicating some kind of affinity between Jaspers and Marcel and also of both with Aśvaghoṣa in this discourse, the scope of philosophic deliberation has been extended in an intercultural sphere. One will find in this chapter an exhibition of intercultural significance of existentialism indicating that the existentialists are *solitaries* not for their whims or eccentricities, but for their touching the deeper recesses of psychological processes which flow from culture to culture and from individual to individual when there is a sincere attempt to separate oneself from restricted theoretic consciousness. Stcherbatsky, while clarifying the position of Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) specially in the context of Dignāga and his followers, indicates that the Buddhist doctrine is not only a simple psychological choice, but also a facing in a rational and critical manner the entire past Indian tendencies developed from the stage of the Upaniṣads towards a detached psychological attitude. Dignāga's stand is in favour of a basic objectivism, which is a transcendental sensibility of a concrete moment as involving the triadic characters in simultaneity,—the characters of creation, preservation and destruction. It also indicates the continuous cancellation of all factors except the *moment*, which remains to account for *existence with efficiency*. This detached psychological

32. Marcel: *The Philosophy of Existence*, Introductory note, p. vii.

stand in favour of a transcendental sensibility of an objective *moment* in a broad phenomenological-pragmatist sense, is in continuity with the Hindu discovery of a differential calculus regarding *mind* having the capacity to reach a basic condition; a condition thus discovered, is not antagonistic to modern mathematical research, and the credit of such a discovery, according to Stcherbatsky, goes perhaps to another Indian savant of this century, Sir Brajendranath Seal, the author of *The Positive Sciences of Ancient Hindus*.*

The awareness of the human condition, according to the above existentialists, implies a possibility of concrete psychological projects in a universe which is basically spatio-temporal, interpersonal and socio-cultural. The psychological projects of the existentialists positively expressed or negatively implied, have a deep phenomenological implication. In Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel, there is a leap from one order of psychological experience to another by continuous *decision* or *exploration* beyond all conceptual-empirical-theological-phenomenological aspects. In this there is a claim of a psychological condition to go beyond the apparent spatio-temporal order to a non-temporal world, where a personal relationship with an *other*, *God* or *other persons* is possible. Is it not the same sort of process that was indicated in a previous chapter when Aśvaghoṣa tried to extend his theoretic consciousness of *tathatā* (suchness) to the cosmic-psychic process of *Dharmakāya* ? Aśvaghoṣa's *Dharmakāya*, which is an intercultural process in the

* Vide, Stcherbatsky : *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, New Dover edition, pp. 106-7 and footnote of p. 107.

then Indian background of experience, in one aspect, is like the *new God* as expressed by Kierkegaard, Jaspers or Marcel, beyond the Western traditional theological process. Is it not then a merging of the individual personality with a cosmic interpersonal heart (or *Dharmakāya*) that passes through every personality and arises in different ages in different cultural situations ? In all cultural processes, the process of *Dharmakāya* is taking varied shapes in the aspects of co-existence and cooperation.

Nietzsche's psychological condition implies a continuous cancellation of conceptual-empirical-theological projects and placing of man to an order of *superject will* whereby a total detachment from this order and value is possible. His stand is all human (or superhuman) and in no way theistic or supra-temporal. Trained under the phenomenological reflections of Husserl[33] and awakened to the psychological conditions of the existentialists in general, in both temporal and non-temporal aspects, Heidegger tries to set up a new psychological condition or possibility. He extends Husserl's abstract phenomenological reflections to the spatio-temporal world, *to other persons and to death.*[34] Death, the final principle of negation, according to Heidegger, cancels the human mode—its spatio-temporal habitat and its psychological projects.[35] He refrains from placing the human condition and psychological project to

33. Ussher : *Journey Through Dread*, pp. 70-1.

34. Wahl : (*A Short History of Existentialism*, pp. 11-27) explains very elaborately Heidegger's five notions of transcendence with reference to temporal and death-ridden man.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 20. 'From this point of view, the philosophy of Heidegger is an expansion, and in a sense, negation of Kierkegaardian individualism.'

a non-temporal world—*God*, *comprehensive experience*, or *interpersonal experience*. According to him, the human condition and human project, as awakened from the existentialist stand and phenomenological training, do not provide grounds for reflection away from the spatio-temporal world and socio-cultural process. His is not, therefore, a philosophic project towards a continuous temporality with a profound vital-intuitive experience of a Bergson, quitting the spatial-intellectual propensity. Heidegger's motive is not for any construction either in the past existentialist or in the Bergsonian way,[36] though Bergson's psychological stand may be associated in certain aspects with the existentialist and phenomenological temperament in general.

The psychological stand of Heidegger in relation to the post-conceptual-empirical-theological-evolutionary projects of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Marcel, Husserl and Bergson, does not imply a fresh ontology. It is an advanced existentialist-phenomenological-intuitional stand without any specific commitment or proneness. It tries to discern a sober psychological awareness which is expressed by *dread*—a general concern for an event, a capital event (death) which is sure to happen though it is *not yet*;[37] by its very presence (though ideal), *death* can confer a right valuation on one's psychological projects. So long as one is living, one has to stand

36. To Ussher (*Journey Through Dread*, p. 65), Heidegger 'is indeed the last of the great explorers in the history of thought....' In him, Husserl's intentionality became transcendence and project; and these concepts were identified with *Time*, almost in the sense of Bergson's *Duree* (*Ibid.*, p. 71).

37. To Radhakrishnan (*Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1950, Silver Jubilee Commemoration Vol. II., p. 15), Heidegger's sense of nothingness is not so much a metaphysical concept as a psychological state.

by a sense of values and be responsible for one's day to day occupation, but with death one should know that all values or interests are devalued or nullified. It is a complex psychological stand with responsibility (*care*) and detachment, so that there is no pessimism or recklessness that comes to one who is subject to the pure conceptual-empirical mode of thought. It can transcend the distressing psychological experience that meets Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in their pre-decision stages, for, here the choice is not immediate but rests on a final determination; it is not a psychological veiling as one may find in the non-temporal projects of Jaspers and Marcel. It is a deep awakening of one's human condition *as it is*, having its finality in death; there is no hide and seek. It is an open facing of life in all its nakedness and culmination.[38] Though Ruggiero is sceptical about Heidegger's final philosophic attitude, he nevertheless admits Heidegger's boldness and says, "....never in the history of thought has such a radical nihilism been expressed, and what is more, with such impassivity and detachment."[39] This statement has certainly a great force in Western cultural background, but the notion of death though interpreted differently, is a recurrent feature of reflection throughout the Indian culture.

38. Wahl: *A Short History of Existentialism*, p. 22.

39. *Existentialism*, p.p. 31-2; This expression of Ruggiero needs a modification, for, Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) had an ingenious argument against death: cf., Zeller: *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, (Meridian Books, N. Y. 1962), Ch. III.

Wahl: *A Short History of Existentialism*, pp. 27-38; Ussher says 'No philosopher ever aimed higher or ventured further in his thought than Heidegger; no philosopher, in his public attitudes, has at certain moments sunk so low.' (*Journey Through Dread*, p. 84).

It may be noted here that Nāgārjuna, in the background of Indian thought before him, was against all discrete ideas (or particularising consciousness), whether as a *notion* or as an *event*. He conceived all undisciplined experience as *relative* and *phenomenal*. Even such ultimate notions as *Ātman*, in the Upaniṣadic thought,—or *Dharmas*, *Nirvāṇa*, *Buddha*, in the Buddhist tradition, are relative theoretic propensities, if understood from a disciplined background. This disciplined background is an undifferentiated experience—a freedom from relativist propensity. Viewed from this aspect of Nāgārjuna's deliberation, Heidegger's notion of death as a capital event to happen, is not a statement from a truly detached standpoint. Heidegger's radical nihilism is not a complete detachment but rather an attachment to a specific event of death, by introducing it first in Western tradition, and then falling into its clutches. The real detachment from Nāgārjuna's point of view, lies from a total detachment from any intellectual propensity whether in the entertainment of an *idea* or in the entertainment of an *event*, for, an *idea* or an *event*, is a discrete notion or event; it has a place in the sphere of relative and phenomenal experience, but, the disciplined experience, which is a meditative experience, is an interlinked sphere, where nothing occurs and nothing disappears; it is a condition of disciplined quietude; it is *peace* and not *death*. A disciplined person may die, but is not subject to death in the sense of total extinction.

Viewed from this aspect, Nāgārjuna is more radical than Heidegger, and hence, it is Nāgārjuna who revolutionised the then Upaniṣadic-Buddhistic thought of India. If his thoughts are stretched to

the contemporary existentialist thought of Heidegger, one will have to admit, that he will revolutionise the thought-process of the West as well. From Nāgārjuna's standpoint, Heidegger has not much efficiency, insofar as he is not detached from the discrete event of death. Death, from the Indian standpoint, is nothing unnatural, it is associated with the life and rebirth process; it is an event in a cycle of events, not merely associated with the present life, but also associated with the life to come; it is associated with a psycho-moral propensity to intellectualise. The Buddhist discipline lies not in falling into the stream of events in which 'death' is one of the events, but detaching oneself from that cycle. Nāgārjuna's is a freedom from all speculative propensities, but Heidegger lays down a basis for a new speculation on the inevitability of *death*, and ending up all deliberations with that event.

The existentialist thought has an evolution towards a further radical direction in Sartre, Heidegger's outstanding French disciple, who was also influenced by Husserl's phenomenology.

According to Sartre, the existentialists mentioned above, are concerned with separating human condition from the traditional conceptual-empirical-theological consciousness, projecting it either, *non-temporally*,—to God (Kierkegaard), Being (Jaspers), Mystery (Marcel),—or, *temporally*, to Death (Heidegger); but they are not completely free from some form of reference to the *other* or the *given*, hence they are locked to a kind of reflection (or theoretic consciousness) which is objective. Even Husserl's reflection, being abstractly phenomenological, is objective, and has no concern with the deep transcendent sub-

jectivity which Sartre has in view. Sartre aims at *separateness* to a region of a total voidness so that he can declare that the emergent human consciousness with which he is concerned after his awakening in the line of existentialist thought, is a total *not*, a *nothing*, beyond all objective propensities.[40-41] Consciousness, to Sartre, is a situation of contrast in relation to the objective universe of facts and events.

Sartre tries to revive and reinforce the transcendent subjectivity of Kierkegaard in the post-phenomenological context of Western thought. Like other existentialists he has a sense of the human condition as a mode or possibility, but he does not like to direct it beyond one's deep subjectivity, though there is an awareness of all possible projects in a full historical sense. Sartre, therefore, does not interpret Jaspers' *liberty* or Marcel's *presence* in the direction of *communication* or *fidelity*.[42] In the psychological projects of Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel,—Sartre finds some form of theological tendency, and in the case of Heidegger, a fall into the nihilistic process of death, for, they cannot fully separate themselves from the theoretic consciousness of some kind of the past traditions. From Sartre's advanced existentialist stand, the very admission of death as nihilating human condition is to subject oneself to objective propensity. From

40. Ussher: *Journey Through Dread,* Ch.II; and Blackham: *Six Existentialist Thinkers.* Ch. VI.

41. Blackham (*Ibid.*, p. 111) points out that Sartre's '....consciousness and its objects, the *pour soi* and the *en soi* are not merely in contrast....', they are 'related by an unbridgeable separation.' The ideal project of Sartre, '....is the nisus towards some form of unity of the *pour soi* with the *en soi* in a totality which saves both. That is in principle impossible. Man aspires to be God, but God is a self-contradiction. Nevertheless, this absolute value is the lure which governs our lives.' (p. 113).

42. Wahl: *A Short History of Existentialism*, p. 11.

a complete freedom of human consciousness pursuing this standpoint, the petrifying look of some people in human situation (specially at the time of German invasion of France during the Second World War), is more troublesome (nay, suspicious) than the final stroke of death. He suggests that one can be free from the *dread* of both (death or evil eyes), if one dissociates oneself from the objective attitude, and places oneself to a further order of transcendent psychological attitude, elevating all individuals to the status of *subjects*[43] freed from the touches of objective process and subjective fear (dread). A reflective person can see here clearly how Sartre is transforming the significance of the expression *dread* which was used in varied senses from the stage of Kierkegaard to Heidegger.

In this advanced stand beyond the usual philosophic propensities, and cultural processes, Sartre is very critical of Alexander's reflection of an ideal *deity* emerging beyond human mentality in the scheme of Spatio-Temporal Matrix. The transcendent *subjectivity* of Sartre is not emergent from a basic cosmic process, nor is it a process to a transcendent situation, perpetuating itself in an objective manner beyond the present condition.[44] Sartre's *subjectivity* is a disciplined attitude beyond all objectivist attitude expressed in different stages of existentialism from Jaspers to Heidegger. Separating human condition from non-temporal and temporal projects of the existentialists under consideration, Sartre presents the human condition in all its nakedness. His

43. Ussher : *Journey Through Dread*, pp. 111, 120.
44. Blackham : *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, p. 113.

standpoint of *separation* is not rejection; it, therefore, does not fall into the reflective modes of pessimism, scepticism or nihilism, already traversed aspects in Western culture. His is not a disposition before *decision*, hence it is not *despair*, *anxiety*, *nausea* or *dizziness*, in the earlier sense of existentialist thought. It is not also a relative *decision* of *liberty* or *presence* for a posterior psychological project of *communication* or *fidelity*; nor is it finally a general disposition of *dread* to await a final destiny of death.[45]

With the discovery of an inner *not* of one's transcendent subjectivity, Sartre can stay balanced before the notion of God or no God, before culture or no culture, for what is to be faced always is one's naked *self*, which abhors all superimpositions (hence different from the phenomenological reflections of Husserl which always face phenomenological presentations), and enjoys itself by negating all projects (hence similar in an aspect to Nāgārjuna's reflection in terms of continuous negative disjunctive judgments); before its nullifying modes even death cannot stand.[46] Expressed in classical terms, Sartre's attitude is that of an *eternal solitary* Orestes[47] who chooses his deep

45. Sartre: *Existentialism and Humanism*, pp. 55-6.

46. Wahl: *A Short History of Existentialism*, p. 39, *vide* discussion: Gurvitch thinks that 'in no philosophy is existence found to be more impoverished or diluted than precisely in *existentialism*'....'in Sartre it becomes a psychological isolation which nullifies itself....As the traditional empiricism amounted to a total destruction or transformation of experience into a chaos of sensation, so existentialism applies itself to the task of reducing existence to Zero.'

47. Walker, K.: *Diagnosis of Man*, pp. 108-9, for Sartre's novel subjectivism. For Buber's criticism of Sartre's atheism, silence or eclipse of God, *vide*, *The Great Ideas To-day*, ed. by Hutchins and Adler, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., U. S. A., 1967, pp. 340-346. It may be noted here that Buber, the most outstanding of the Jewish thinkers of this century, has influenced a number of American protestant theologians as Niebuhr, Brunner, Reinhold, Tillich and Barth.

subjectivity and remains a king without subjects or kingdom. Sartre's stand in the present European condition of scientific and technological projects dehumanising man, is a necessity, to give a new turn to civilization and values; his attitude of resistance to conceptualise or objectify is a redeeming feature unveiling man as man. In a different cultural background he expresses the same balanced attitude as of the Buddha's reluctance to discuss even when he was aware of all theories from eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*) to nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) ; the Buddha was convinced that the transcendent experience, being a dispassionate condition, cannot be determined by any theoretic standpoint, subjective or objective ; his is, therefore, a transcendent subjectivity beyond all subjective and objective proneness, with this difference, that whereas Sartre is silent after his choice of the transcendent subjectivity, the Buddha tries to purify himself by a triadic method of conduct, meditation and insightful experience. Sartre has no such tradition to fall back upon. Hence, there is a constant tendency on the part of the Western interpreters of Sartre, like Wahl, Ussher or Marcel,[48] to interpret Sartre as repeating some aspects of Hegelianism ; but we know that the difference between Hegel and Sartre lies in Sartre's elimination of *synthesis* beyond Hegel's *being* and *not-being* (nothing). Sartre chooses only vacuity or a bare subjectivity and not Hegel's continuous synthesis dialectically. Again, Sartre's subjectivity cannot be

48. Wahl : *A Short History of Existentialism*, pp. 28-9, Ussher : *Journey Through Dread*, pp. 53-4, Marcel : *Philosophy of Existence*, pp. 57-66. Marcel admits the intellectual efficiency of Sartre, but apprehends that by rejecting superior psychological projects and revolting against objectivism, Sartre might fall into some primitive rationalistic atheism, materialism or extravagant negativism of Heidegger.

interpreted in a psycho-analytic sense, expressing a regressive attitude to counteract the pressures of the Germans during the occupation of France in the last World War as Heinemann suggests.[49] Sartre's is a conscious return to a transcendent psychological attitude or mode by a separation from the past conceptual-empirical-theological-phenomenological projects and also the projects of objective attitudes expressed differently from Jaspers to Heidegger. This conclusion is in accord with Blackham's[50] serious study of Sartre's voluminous philosophical-psychological work, *L'Etre et le Neant.*

Understood from the broad background and the development of the philosophic ideas from Thales to Hegel and from Kierkegaard to Heidegger, Sartre's transcendent psychological *separation* plays the same role as the psychological *separation* of the last of the Buddhist schools,—the Yogācāras, in the background of the Upaniṣads and the other early Buddhist schools. The Yogācāra separation of the *transcendent subjectivity*, understood with all cultural speciality of Indian thought-process, is a revolt against the specific psychological stands of pre-logical objectivism of the Vaibhāṣikas, post-logical phenomenalism of the Sautrāntikas and the prospective critical attitude beyond the objectivism of the Vaibhāṣikas (as in Dignāgā), to post-logical phenomenalism of the Mādhyamikas (as in Candrakīrti),—all of whom revolted against the conceptual-empirical modes of

49. Heinemann (*Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, pp. 111-7, 121-2) points out that Sartre 'transfers nothingness from the realm of the object to that of the subject, and grafting it on a philosophy of consciousness, he maintains that we (i.e., our consciousness) bring negation and destruction into this world'. (p. 122).

50. *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, p. 110.

interpretation of the transcendent experience of the Upaniṣads. The Yogācāra stand, though a yogic stand, and very much different from Sartre's normal human stand, is comparable in an aspect with Sartre's *transcendent not*; for the Yogācāra-stand nullifies all psychological projects—objective or subjective, viz., the empirical-phenomenological-psychological process of birth-death-rebirth, and its foundational trans-empirical psychological construct of an abode of consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). The Yogācāra-stand as it is, is more radical than that of Sartre, when compared with the intercultural processes of India and the West.

There is no attempt here to suggest that Sartre and the Yogācāras share the same notion of subjectivity or voidness in any strict logico-metaphysical sense. Through the observation of history of philosophy in general, one may find that in their advanced stages of philosophical reflections, both Western and Eastern philosophies tend to be psychological, and as such, there can be no hard and fast strictness in the matter of comparison as was expected in an age when the thought-process was bound to a strict abstract consciousness,—metaphysical, theological, empirical or phenomenological. The comparison between Sartre and the Yogācāras has been brought out to show their psychological affinities, though separated by age, culture and temperament. There is no motive here to elevate or disparage any one culture or person. There is no aim to show that the psychologies of different cultures would be or ought to be the same; differences in psychology and culture are admitted facts. The history of different cultures has also made it clear that in almost all

cultures, the final prospect is in a line of total detachment from the basic cultural processes.

The existentialist movement, in Western culture, expresses a tendency of detachment from the basic traditional modes of reflections. The entire existentialist movement to the stage of Sartre, is a total deconceptualisation of experience. Sartre exhibits the same sort of detachment from the past modes of deliberations in the Western culture, as Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna and Dignāga show in the background of Indian thought-processes; the spirit of detachment as developed in the case of Buddhist thinkers was transmitted to later Indian thought-processes,[51] and to different parts of the Asian countries wherever Buddhism went. In Indian thought, the process of detachment is a continuous phenomenon from the stage of the Vedas, but, when Buddhism was carried to China in its Mahāyāna form of Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Dignāga, and lastly in the form of one Bodhidharma, who travelled to China, around 520 A.D., there was a tremendous effect on Chinese consciousness. Bodhidharma's Chinese disciple Huik'o (487-593 A.D.),[52] developed a radical form of *Ch'an* Buddhism, which denied any specific principle, method or meditative way, but admitted the possibility of realising the transcendent illumination all of a sudden. When this new movement travelled through Korea to Japan within a few years, it had a tremendous

51. Radhakrishnan: 'The Spirit of Man' in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. by Radhakrishnan & Muirhead (George Allen & Unwin, Second Edition, 1952), pp. 483-502; also *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan* ed. by Schilpp (Tudor Publishing Co., 1952), pp. 791-9.

52. *Buddhism*, ed by Richard A. Gard (Washington Square Press, Inc., New York, 1963); also Mitra, Sisirkumar: *The Vision of India*, Jaico Publishing Co., New York, 1949.

effect in Japanese mode of life. The *Zen* Buddhism of Japan is not a transmitted *Ch'an*, but it is a living spirit which revolutionised Japanese life with its indigenous tradition of Shintoism and its inherited traditions of Taoism and Confucianism of China and Korea. Suzuki's representation of *Zen* Buddhism of Japan in relation to the Chinese *Ch'an* masters or Japanese *Zen* masters, is a challenge to the conceptual-ridden modes of early Western thought. The Western philosophy, in its aspect of existentialism, however, can touch the subtlety of experience of *Zen* masters, who are supremely *solitaries*, flouting all conventional modes.[53]

Existentialism, in its development, and not in its commitments, is an awakening not only for the Western but also for the Eastern peoples. The emergent subjectivity as awakened in all cultural processes, refers to a depth psychology, which is a meditative process and is realisable by a continuous detachment from the conceptual, empirical or phenomenological modes. It severs all cultural barriers, and renders possible a meeting of all cultural processes in their depths. The first stage of cultural progress as pointed out by the Indian Vedic tradition is a detachment from all conceptual modes of reflection; this mode was continued by the Upaniṣadic, Buddhistic and the Vedāntic thinkers throughout the centuries. When Buddhism was carried to the Asian countries like China, Korea and Japan, de-

53. For details, *vide* Suzuki: *Studies in Lankavatara Sutra* (George Routledge & Sons Ltd., 1930) and *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, Second Series, (Luzac & Co., 1933), pp. 23-6; also Dumoulin : *A History of Zen Buddhism* (Mc Graw-Hill Book Co.; N. Y., 1965), for a development of Indian, Chinese and Japanese Buddhism along several mystic phases.

conceptualising process took various characters in the aspects of depth psychology. Existentialism, in the Western background, is a similar cultural emergence. The cultural processes of the world are stepping towards the sphere of co-existence abandoning all ideologies, and one can also expect a stage beyond these stages, which will be co-operation in a fully human spirit.[54] Though the processes of de-conceptualisation, co-existence and co-operation are universal cultural processes, yet, a reshuffling of the philosophic backgrounds of each cultural centre is often a necessity. The deliberations of this present chapter should be construed in this light.

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54. *Weekly Indian News*, December 18, 1964. p. 1 (Embassy of India, Washington, 8, D. C.), also Nakamura, H: *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples : India-China-Tibet-Japan*, ed. by Wiener, East-West Center Press, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1964.

CHAPTER VII

WAS BUDDHISM EXPELLED FROM INDIA?

In the history of Indian thought, one is aware of the emergence, development and the final disappearance of Buddhism. But behind these triadic phases associated with Buddhism, what is important, is not a bare concatenation of facts and events, but an understanding of a deeper current of Indian thought in its evolution and development. Hence the problem needs not only a historical but also a philosophical assessment. No one denies the fact that Buddhism emerged in the background of the Upaniṣads, that it is associated with the life of the Buddha, the attainment of his *nirvāṇa*, his refusal to discuss the nature of the transcendent experience, and his direct reference to the triadic discipline of *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā* for the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. All these constitute the message of the Buddha to his disciples before he attained the final silence and peace of the transcendent experience and discipline in *parinirvāṇa*, which is a quitting of the body and a release from the past *karma* and future rebirth (*punarjanma*). *Parinirvāṇa* establishes not merely a ground for ideal self-perfection (as in *nirvāṇa*), but it is a transcendent meditative basis for helping all to a liberate condition from the past *karmas* (having bodies), and from *punarjanma* (future births). *Karma* and *punarjanma* refer to a functional deficiency from the standpoint of ultimate transcendent meditative efficiency. *Parinirvāṇa*, therefore, is a continuation of one's liberate

condition in a transcendent aspect, and is a deliberate deferring of the final attainment (Buddhahood), though not excluding the final possibility.[1] In this disciplined condition, there is a functioning of the *Bodhisattva* attitude, which is a development of a compassionate heart, till others have attained liberation. *Parinirvāṇa*, from another point of view, is the disciplined condition for raising all to a cosmic-psychic process and condition of *Dharmakāya*, a body of supremely compassionate heart (*mahākaruṇa*), and can be distinguished from the Buddhahood or identifiable with it in aspects. From Aśvaghoṣa's point of view, it is an extension of the transcendent condition of Suchness (*tathatā*), beyond its theoretic restrictions. The Suchness (*tathatā*) is cancelled in the *Dharmakāya*. The Buddhist scholars do not distinguish these transcendent conditions of *Dharmakāya*, *Buddhahood*, *Tathatā*, and *Bodhisattva* very frequently, but in this book we have found enough reasons for distinguishing these transcendent aspects in different contexts. From the standpoint of *Dharmakāya*, the historical process of being born and attaining the stage of *nirvāṇa*, is, in an aspect, associated with a *body*, with *personality in formation* (*nirmaṇakāya*), leading to the condition of *parinirvāṇa*, through a stage of the *body with an ideal enjoying personality* (*sambhogakāya*) ; the *Dharmakāya* is the transcendent *body* beyond the *historical* (*nirmaṇakāya*) and the ideal (*sambhogakāya*) *bodies*. This triadic continuity can also be conceived as an eternal condition already operative before the birth of the historical Buddha ; the Buddha is the expression of this triadic

1. *The Bible of the World* : ed. by Ballou in collaboration with Spiegelberg and with the assistance and advice of Horace L. Friess (The Viking Press, N. Y., 1949) pp. 235-41.

cycle. The doctrine of *Trikāya*, according to *Mahāyāna* Buddhism is based on this triadic continiuty. The *Hīnayāna* Buddhism, on the other hand, considers the *Buddha* as a historical figure ; his birth, his *nirvāṇa* and his *parinirvāṇa*, are taken as only great incidents ; what is fundamental in the life of *the Buddha*, is *what he said* ; his *sayings* are recorded in the three Baskets (*Pitakas*)—the treasures of Buddhism. The Buddha's immediate disciples, Kāśyapa, Upāli and Ānanda—persons of extra-ordinary memory and discipline[2]—exactly reproduced them in the First Council, immediately after the *parinirvāṇa* of *the Buddha*. Since they are the oral expressions of these great disciples (*Theras*), the *early Buddhism*, as continued by the subsequent disciples of these great *Theras*, is known as *Theravāda* or *Hīnayāna* Buddhism. These great disciples and their followers were concerned with the three collections (*Pitakas*), known as the *Vinaya* (rules of conduct), *Sutta* (sermons) and *Abhidhamma* (philosophic discourses from a psycho-moral standpoint).

If *Hīnayāna* Buddhism is not interpreted from the above historical standpoint, but if it is accepted only pragmatically as a possible choice of the moment, then one might as well give importance to another incident associated with the great *Thera* Kāśyapa (possibly the chief of this group), who, on one occasion, received from the Buddha a lotus with a *silent smile*, when the Buddha, it may be mentioned, chose to hold the *session*, not by a *discourse* (as was customary), but by a *silence*.* The *Zen* Buddhists of Japan, very

2. 2500 *Years of Buddhism* : ed. by Bapat (Government of India, 1956) Chs. IV, VI.

* Spiegelberg : *Living Religions of the World*, Prentice Hall, 1962, p. 329.

advantageously, refer to this incident to indicate that *Zen* Buddhism with its principle of *communication by silence*, is also a genuine Buddhism which can be traced to the Buddha and to the Buddha's foremost disciple, Kāśyapa.[3] If it is not a superfluous statement, one must note that *Zen* Buddhism is a living expression of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism of Japan in this century. Buddhism from its early stage is functional and meditative in intent or purpose. It is not fully expressed through what the Buddha said.

The dissentient members of the Second Council, the *Mahāsaṅghikas*, observing the various behaviours of *the Buddha*, in the matter of determining final experience, could not be satisfied with the mere oral reproductions (or the sayings) of the Buddha ; they started interpreting the life of the Buddha as a whole, and found out that the importance in the life of the Buddha, lies more in the development of his *personality* from the stage of *nirvāṇa* to the stage of *parinirvāṇa* than in his *sayings* which are only incidental phenomena, though worthy of respect. As described above, the life of the Buddha is the expression of a transcendent disciplined meditative condition of *Dharmakāya* in the immanent aspects of *nirmāṇakāya* and *sambhogakāya*. Buddhism stands for an eternal religious process, an expression of a compassionate heart, raising mankind with narrow minds and hearts, to the profound cosmic-psychic process of the *Dharmakāya*. Buddhism is a continuous meditative function —a religion and philosophy in co-operation, for realisation of a final goal.

3. 2500 *Years of Buddhism*, pp. 35-50. Spiegelberg, F : *Living Religions of the World*, Chs. 12-13.

The chief impetus towards the Mahāyāna Buddhism begins with the Fourth Council in the first century A.C. during the reign of King Kaniṣka. The Sarvāstivādins, who were the chief members of the Fourth Council, translated the three Pali *Pitakas* in Sanskrit, and wrote elaborate *commentaries* on all the three *Pitakas*. Besides this huge corpus of new *Pitakas* in Sanskrit, during this period, as mentioned very specially in the second chapter of this book, Aśvaghoṣa, the great Buddhist savant, wrote many books, interpreting the *life* and the *philosophy* of the Buddha, from a meditative perspective. According to Aśvaghoṣa, the transcendent condition—the *Suchness* (*tathatā*), is not merely the theoretic condition in contrast to the restricted consciousness of particularising process governing narrow minds, but it is also a stage towards a further disciplined condition of *Dharmakāya* (Compassionate Heart); it was Aśvaghoṣa, who philosophically interpreted the *process* from *tathatā* to *dharmakāya*, and it was Aśvaghoṣa who mentioned about the *trikāya* (the functional-meditative process), for he valued the Buddha's *personality* (behaviour or attitude) more than his *sayings*. Aśvaghoṣa, we know, influenced the later development of the reflections of the Buddhist schools and of the Buddhist thinkers. We also know the contributions of Nāgārjuna, Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti, from the preceding chapters, *viz.*, how they interpreted in different ways the *logic* and *philosophy* of the Mahāyāna Buddhism from a meditative standpoint, indicating a detachment from conceptual proneness. The whole thesis of the evolution of *Mahāyāna Buddhism* finally centred around the limita-

tions of the intellectual process or intellectuality, which has to be cancelled or has to be extended to a further disciplined condition, from *tathatā* to *dharmakāya*, from *pratītyasamutpāda* to *śāntam*, from *ālayavijñāna* to *adyaya* or *vijñānamātram*, or finally from the *vikalpa* to *arthakāriyakārin* (the efficient), when viewed positively, and to *nirvikalpaka* (the non-ideal), when viewed negatively. These are nothing but continuous *meditative* functions of detachments from conceptual proneness as emerging in various stages of cultural-historical process.

If so much *discipline* is necessary for the understanding of the real attitude of *the Buddha* from his attainment of *nirvāṇa* to *parinirvāṇa*, then an analysis of the mere *function* of intellectuality is not enough. Hence, a Vedāntic thinker, Gauḍapāda of the sixth century, who was fully efficient in the thought and language of the Buddhist masters from Aśvaghoṣa to Dignāga, found reasons to revive in a novel way, the *Upaniṣadic tradition of the transcendent meditative experience* lying at the base of the triadic orders of waking, dream and deep-sleep. The Buddha had deviated from the theoretic consideration of intellectuality because of its incapacity to touch the transcendent-meditative experience, but Dignāga openly locates the theoretic activity to a *point* of pure sensation, though transcendent, and Aśvaghoṣa, by a series of meditations, leads one first to a comprehensive theoretic situation (*tathatā*), and then cancels it for a prospective experience of a comprehensive heart (*Dharmakāya*); it remains for Gauḍapāda to suggest that what is necessary is not any intellectual stand but only a *control* of the mind in a four-fold manner so that, in that controlled state the *transcendent-meditative*

experience will become manifest as *what it is*, viz., "birthless", "deathless", as the Upaniṣadic thinkers suggested before. These four-fold meditatively oriented *controls* of the mind are attitudinal approaches to real experience ; they are as follows: "When the mind is torpid, arouse it (*sambodhoyet*), when it is distracted, bring it back to calmness (*śamayet*), when it becomes attached, beware of it (*vijānīyat*), and when it is controlled, do not distract it any more (*no-chālayet*).[4] Gauḍapāda thinks that it is due to the *lack of control* of mind from the meditative perspective that one experiences the *inner* and *outer* worlds, which are nothing but mental creations, hence, actually, there are no such worlds.[5] As a *firebrand*, when set in motion, appears as straight or crooked, so also consciousness, in its transcendent sphere, when *uncontrolled*, appears as *perceiver*, *perceived* and *the like*.[6] This position of Gauḍapāda with regard to transcendent conscious *experience-continuum* is obviously a basic meditative process controlling the mental modifications or functions, hence it is not Berkeley's idealism. Gauḍapāda will not allow any place to the *perceiver* (which is so important for Berkeley) to perceive something *distinct* from the perceiver. Gauḍapāda's is a disciplined condition which will not give any chance to the *transcendent consciousness* to split into the particularising consciousness (Aśvaghoṣa) or falling into imaginations (Dig-

4. Swami Nikhilānanda: *The Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's Kārika and Śaṅkara's Commentary* (Sri Rāmakrishna Ashrama, 1955), Ch. III, verses 44-5; and *Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda*: by Swami Nikhilānanda (Advaita Ashrama, 1941), verse 215.

5. The *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, Ch. IV, verses 28, 31, 45-6.

6. *Ibid.*, Ch. IV., 47-52.

nāga). Gauḍapāda, in his analysis of transcendent experience, agrees more with Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna, when he considers it as a *support* of the apparent order of experience, than with Dignāga, who thinks that the transcendent experience is *an efficient principle stimulating intellect at a point of pure sensation.* The transcendent experience, to Gauḍapāda, is the *detached condition*, a *discipline as it is*, and not an 'efficiency' causing the intellect to be operative objectively in pure sensation. His four-fold mental control[7] is for creating a condition for understanding the transcendent experience, and not for the control of the mind as such ; *mind as such* is already a lapsed condition.

It remained for Śaṅkara, who followed Gauḍapāda's transcendent-meditative condition as basic, to review the positions of the Buddhist thinkers and comment on Gauḍapāda. Śaṅkara admits with Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda, that the transcendent experience is the *non-causal basis* of the presented orders of experience, and differs from Dignāga, who thinks that the basis of intellectuality is in the transcendent efficient *point* of pure sensation. To Śaṅkara, the transcendent experience is *pure subjectivity* (but not a state or a mental modification), and hence it cannot be *objectified* in a *point* ; it is a *continuum* of disciplined meditative experience—a *continuous recognition*, and *not an objectification*, which is a *split* consciousness, a fall to a *point*, an *obliviscence* or a *lapsed condition*. The lapsed condition is a fall from the transcendent-disciplined situation. The lapsed condition is a *possibility*, but it is not the *original*

7. Swami Nikhilānanda : *Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda*, stanzas 148-227.

disciplined condition.

Śaṅkara distinguishes between the transcendent continuum and lapsed possibility. The transcendent experience is never a lost condition, or a discontinuous process; it is a continuous experiential process, it is *self*; it is never a *cessation of experience*—i.e., not-self. It is continuous *seeing*, and it is never a *seen*,[8] which is a *process* towards an immediate gloom, a *veiling process*, followed by a consequent process of *superimposition* or *projection*, either in a subjective way (which is dream), or in a subjective-objective way (which is waking). The process of superimposition is a projection upon the veiled ground, which is a lapsed condition (*ignorance*) of deep-sleep. Hence what is superimposed upon the lapsed condition is an *unreal process*; it is like the superimposition of a *snake* on the *rope*. Śaṅkara admits the basic lapsed condition of deep-sleep, and the superimposed processes of dream and waking without any question, and suggests that *by a triadic discipline—śravaṇ* (hearing), *manan* (reasoning) and *nidhidhyāsana* (meditation), one can go back to the *original transcendent condition*. He suggests further a logical method of cancelling the process of superimposition by a process of refutation (*apavāda*); when the refutation is effected he declares that there is a *process of awakening* by meditating on the great sayings (*mahāvākyas*) of the Upaniṣads; these sayings are: "That thou art" (*Tattvamasi*), "Thou art the tenth" (*Daśamtvamasi*), etc. An understanding of these sayings rends the veil of *ignorance* (*ajñāna* or *māyā*) or

8. Swami Nikhilananda: *Dṛg-Dṛśya-Viveka* (Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1955), verse 1.

the lapsed condition, and *releases* the *continuum* of self-manifesting consciousness (*svayamprakāś*).[9-11] To Śaṅkara the transcendent condition is the *subject*, that can never *become*, nor can it be *objectified*, and then separated from the ideas and images, as Dignāga thinks, by a discipline. The reality to Śaṅkara, is the *support* and not the *cause*. There is a difference between the notions of *support* and *cause*. Nothing is produced or caused. The admission of *objectified experience* is a *psychological mistake*, a lack of discipline; and the presented order of experience is a *cosmic-psychic illusion* (Māyā) ; but so long as one is under the clutches of that *lapsed condition*, what is presented to him is real. If there were actual *production*, Śaṅkara argues, no return to the original condition would be possible ; but since a return to the original condition is experientially possible, Śaṅkara suggests reasonably that the apparent order of experience, cannot be construed as actually *produced*. There is therefore *no causal process* in the sense of production, according to Śaṅkara, and also according to Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, and Gauḍapāda. Aśvaghoṣa admits a return to *tathatā* by continuous meditation ; Nāgārjuna believes in a return to *undifferentiated experience* (*advaya-jñāna* or *śāntam*), Gauḍapāda also believes in "*no-origination*" (*ajāti*) and Śaṅkara finally believes in the *self-shining experience* (*svayamprakāś*) as the real and basic condition.

9. Swami Madhavananda (with a foreword by S. N. Dasgupta) : *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra* (Ramakrishna Mission Sarada Pitha, Howrah, India).

10. *Ibid.*, Chs. I-VI deal with the different sources of knowledge from the non-dualist standpoint of the Vedānta, and Ch. VII is concerned with the subject-matter of the Vedānta.

11. *Vedāntasāra*, verses 169-227.

But Dignāga believes in *transcendent pure sensation* as having an *efficiency* in a *point*, with a *negation of ideation*. The presented universe from Aśvaghoṣa to Śaṅkara, is *apparent*, and the apparentness *is not an actual change*, it is an expression of *lack of discipline* in varied senses—a fall from the transcendent-meditative condition. To Dignāga, the presented order of experience, in terms of ideas and images, is a lack of discipline, a confusion of pure efficient sensation in *points*, with the discrete *ideas* and *images*. He also indirectly admits *appearance*, but he admits an initial *objectification*, which Śaṅkara and others will reject. Śaṅkara, therefore, advocates what is known as *vivartavāda* (*change in appearance*) as distinguished from *pariṇāmavāda* (*actual transformation*), prevalent among the dualists like the Sāṁkhyas, and the pluralists like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas; he is also against some kind of ideal *pariṇāmavāda* of Dignāga and his followers. Philosophy as stated above is deeply meditative and functional.

Śaṅkara admits that the transcendent experience is something *positive* but its positiveness is neither *subjective* nor *objective* (which are mental modifications); it is an experience without any *change* or *bifurcation* (as in Dignāga to some extent). It is a discipline and an experiential condition which is deeply *psychological*, a *continuum* of *seeing* or *uncontradicted experience*, and not an *objectified* experience..a *seen*; the *seen* is a *lapse*....a forgetfulness of the original condition. The disciplined condition is the *continuum* itself; it is a *pervasiveness* with a *recognition*, and not an *objectification* with a sense of individuality. It is a *non-contradicted experience* (*avādha*) : it is *self-shiningness* (*svayam-*

prakāś) *..a controlled mind or experience-continuum with enjoyment and fulness.* Actually it is very difficult to distinguish the positions of Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda, on the one hand, and of Śaṅkara, on the other. Śaṅkara only describes two orders of experience : viz., (i) a disciplined order (*self-shining process*), and (ii) an undisciplined process (the *lapsed order*). His stand is deeply psychological—a *depth-psychology* of discipline or meditation. The disciplined order supports the undisciplined order, and both are experiential orders. The understanding of both the orders is psychological ; but if the question of the ultimateness of the experiential condition is raised, then, what is primary and original, is the disciplined order——the *continuum*, which supports both the mental modifications and the presented universe of day-to-day experience ; the universe of day-to-day experience has to be accepted pragmatically and logically; it belongs to the *lapsed condition* and in fact, is a process of superimposition. One has to cancel the *logic of superimposition* by the counter *logic of refutation* ; the *basic lapsed condition* can be cancelled by the triadic method of hearing, reasoning and meditation on the great sayings of the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads play the role of reminding the original disciplined psychological condition. Śaṅkara, in the background of the logic of the Buddhists, gives reason for his acceptance of a lapsed condition and the function of superimposition, and after this empirical admission, he refutes the positions of the Buddhists, and also the positions of the other Vedic systems and non-Vedic systems, and confirms his final psychological stand, which is a *disciplined meditative* condition. In a sense, Śaṅkara always

stands for the *normal* but *disciplined* man, just as G. E. Moore, in contemporary Western thought, draws attention to all Western philosophical, religious and moral disciplines, and accepts finally a broad, sober commonsense.[12] Moore, however, prefers to keep himself open to possible experiences, but Śaṅkara wants to check the speculative propensity by transcendent disciplined psychological consciousness. Śaṅkara sticks to a *basic*, already discovered, transcendent consciousness; Moore does not claim any such discovery. In Śaṅkara, therefore, there is a *basic discipline* and a complete *detachment* from all apparent orders of *lapsed* experience. In Moore there is a *detachment* from the present modes, but no commitment to a *possible future attitude* or meditative functional process. His is an *empirical attitude with a doubt* as a principle. Śankara has an initial admission and a final doubt of the apparent experiential situation. Both are, however, meditative and disciplined in some ways or in some levels, but one may have reasons to choose Śaṅkara for his deep psychological efficiency or his transcendent-meditative stand.

It may be noted here that the Indian thought in its main current from the Upaniṣads to the Vedānta of Śaṅkara and to the neo-Vedānta of the Indian contemporaries, through the critical periods of Buddhism and Jainism, is a continuous process of extension of the lapsed conditions (of waking, dream and deep-sleep experiences) to a *basic undisciplined core*, which not only accounts for those orders of experience in this present life-period, but

12. M. White : *The Age of Analysis* (A Mentor Book, ninth print, 1964), Ch. II.

also is connected with a series of preceding 'life-periods', and a possible future 'life-period'. Thinkers of the above orders have different interpretations for the 'basic undisciplined core' which is positively experienced in deep-sleep state. We have drawn attention to the different interpretations of this undisciplined 'basic core' as the 'seat of some kind of ignorance'. Śaṅkara by his judicious reflections suggests that the undisciplined aspect has a continuity with the disciplined transcendent aspect, and hence by the side of the transcendent disciplined continuum, there is always the *undisciplined continuum*; the undisciplined continuum not only accounts for the presented day-to-day experiences from the deep-sleep to waking, but it also accounts for the cycle of birth-death-rebirth process by a further extension of experience. The final transcendent condition is a *freedom* from the undisciplined condition from deep-sleep to waking, and from birth to rebirth. In Indian thought, therefore, generally, (excluding the materialist thought of the Cārvākas) there is a belief in empirical experience from deep-sleep to waking and from birth to rebirth; there is also a belief in a series of meditations of different orders, and finally in an ascent to a transcendent psychological condition; when a person has attained that final transcendent condition, he may, by practical discipline, descend to the birth-death-rebirth cycle and yet stay with detachment. This *descent* is purposive, and it is for the benefit of the people who are in the undisciplined condition, i.e., in a state of suffering or ignorance. Moreover, we can say that this extended view of experience, viz., as a (i) series of meditations, (ii) final psychological condition, or (iii)

the willing descent, is scattered through the Western thought among its mystics and deeply religious peoples, but it is not continuously developed in philosophic thinking in general as in Indian thought. The scientific consciousness of the West, in its emphasis on *naturalism*, may exclude the psychical basis or possibility in the process of nature, but those who are conversant with Whitehead's interpretation of *process*, will not be disposed to bifurcate mind from nature or nature from mind, for behind any emergent process, there is a basic *continuous past*. Whitehead's admission of a "pastness" or a" non-sensuous" persistence behind the apparent perceptual experiential situation is an admission of a meditative process obviously ignored by the Western traditional empiricists. If one evaluates the course of Indian philosophy in relation to Whitehead's interpretation of the perceptual situation, then one will find that the inquiry into natural phenomena has revealed a deep *psychological* and *meditative consciousness* which is a *continuum* behind all emergent or apparent orders of experience. The tradition of the Greeks also begins with *naturalism*, but proceeds to metaphysics leading to various reactionary tendencies to this date, but there is also a move towards a psychological aspect, and none at present would deny the value of *concentration* as a medium of knowing. If freedom is given to the methods and investigations of the cultural processes of the Western thought and of the Indian thought-process, which greatly influences the Asian thought, then it can be indicated that experience has to be studied in all conceivable and experienciable aspects, and should not be restricted to waking consciousness alone, or to this *present birth*

of ours. Experience is a *process* and a *possibility*, any restriction to an immediate perspective may be pragmatic or judicious, but it is not *real*. Viewed from this aspect, the contention of the contemporary Indians may be treated as a reasonable supposition.

Most of the neo-Vedāntic thinkers of India are conversant with the Western philosophy and Asian thought-processes of China, Japan, Tibet and Mongolia or of the South-east Asian countries from Ceylon to the Philippines; experience, according to them, is a many-sided process and, in an aspect, non-sensuous and transcendent, hence, it has to be understood from a meditative transcendent disciplined condition; consequently, they think that it cannot be restricted to *waking* or to *this birth*, or to mere sensuous, intellectual, or phenomenological orders of experience.[13] *Concentration* or *meditation*, according to certain approved methods, may be treated as ways of understanding, and should not be excluded from the normal knowing process as something *mystic* or *dogmatic*. Experience in the non-sensuous transcendent meditative aspect is equally important as the sensuous or intellectual orders of experience of the perceptual situation. This attitudinal change of mind is a helpful process for extension of knowledge in intercultural spheres; from this perspective, the prospects of Western scientific knowledge can also be widened. Indeed such changes are visible in some persons of the West who are interested in the resear-

13. *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., both editions 1936 & 1952), ed. by Radhakrishnan and Muirhead; and *History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952-3), in 2 Vols. ed. by Radhakrishnan and others.

ches on Buddhist philosophy, in its variety of aspects.* I shall take here a little liberty to refer to such changes in the attitude of the leading thinkers of the world in general, in the areas of religious, philosophical and scientific consciousness and of the world as a whole. They are to a very great extent meditatively oriented and admit the limitations of the intellectual modes.

The Buddhist thought—in its evolution in India, in its spread to Asian countries, in its movement towards Western countries, including Africa and Western Russia, from the days of the great Maurya Emperor Asoka (322-296 B.C.), and in its revived interest from the late nineteenth century to this date, in all the countries of the world—has proved itself, in an aspect, a great restraining force with a world-wide possibility. The real, which is experienced and verified for several centuries in different cultural situations, cannot be dispensed with as superficial. The Buddhist thought in its essence is still now operative in the Indian Vedāntic and neo-Vedāntic thought as a claim for transcendent meditative function; it was operative in the aspects of a logical consciousness in the line of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and in varied *tāntric* shapes in Tibet and Mongolia; it was operative in the aspect of *Ch'an* in China and *Zen* in Japan as fostering detachment from all process for logic, metaphysics and theology, for many centuries, and it is still alive in Japan in all aspects of life specially in its *Bushido ideal*, which is a flowering of Japan's military culture of *Samuri*. The influence of Buddhism

* Stace W. T., *The Teachings of the Mystics*, A Mentor Book, N. Y., 1960 specially Chs. 1, 2, 3 add 10; and also his, *Against Darkness and other Essays*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967, Ch. VI.

in its triadic phases of Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna (or Tantra), is present throughout in the South-east Asian countries from Ceylon to the Philippines. America is open to *Zen influence* from Japan after the Second World War. The Vedānta, a post-Buddhist expression of India, in its complex form as presented by Swami Vivekānanda in the Parliament of Religions in 1893 at Chicago, has created interest in the resurgent *Hinduism* and it is spreading in America not only through the Rāmkrishna Mission and Vedānta centres, but also through other organisations which are primarily interested in Indian Yoga. The Indian Yoga has a long history in India, throughout the ages. The role of the Buddhists in the sphere of *Yoga* (meditative discipline) is perhaps the most important. People in America are enthusiastic about the new *Kriya-Yoga* as advocated by Swami Yogānanda and others. Aurobindo-yoga is also a fascinating study in America. America is greatly influenced by Tagore's international ideas and religion of Man which stems out of the Upaniṣads. Ānanda Coomeraswamy greatly influenced American aesthetic sense of dance, drama, music, painting, sculpture and architecture by his evaluative comments on Western aesthetic experience in relation to the Indian, Chinese and Japanese counterparts. Radhakrishnan, by his masterly understanding of Indian thought and Western thought in relation and prospect, influenced many great American scholars like Moore, Schilpp, Northrop, Schneider, Conger, Burtt, Hartshorne, Bahm and others. Gandhi's influence of non-violence is a great force to the Americans; it is generally utilized as a solver of any social or political problems. Besides the study of Buddhism, Vedānta, Yoga and non-

violence (all meditative disciplines in continuity and progress), the Americans are also interested in the study of the *Bhagavadgītā*. Professor Bahm of the University of New Mexico is interested in *Bhagavadgītā* besides his interest in Buddhism, Yoga and Vedānta. He wants to understand the *Bhagavadgītā* by a "*niṣkāmayoga*", which can be distinguished from other Yogas as *Jñāna*, *Karma* and *Bhakti*, and also from his own special interpretation of the Buddha's doctrine of desires.[14]

The Buddhist influence is an admission of a meditative function in all cultural processes and utilization of it for effecting further improvements in cultural prospects in the aspect of *peace* and *co-operation*. It is a liberation of philosophy to a *process* of unrestrictedness.

There are many European scholars who are deeply conscious of the superiority of the Buddhist psychology and the Buddhist mode of the interpretation of experience. Graham Howe, for example, tries to express through the investigations of the Psychologist Jung, that "We are all near-Buddhists on our hidden side....To read a little Buddhism is to realise that the Buddhists knew, two thousand five hundred years ago, far more about our modern problems of psychology than they have yet been given credit for. They studied these problems long ago and found their answers too. We are now rediscovering the Ancient Wisdom of the East...." (*Invisible Anatomy* p. 5).*

14. Bahm: *Philosophy of the Buddha* (Collier Books, N. Y., 1962), Ch. IV: Desire and Frustration; reference is also to his book *The Philosophy of Bhagavadgītā* to be published soon.

* Quoted from Humphreys' *Buddhism* (A Pelican Book, 1951, p. 230) with some changes.

Again, Humphreys' final statement (after his survey of Buddhism in all its cultural developments through the different Asian countries till today) is worth mentioning. He thinks that the Western minds have become *eclectic* and hence they cannot afford to miss what Buddhism has in store for them. According to Humphreys, Buddhism offers a series of choices as the following : "....the unity of life; mind-body; Karma and Rebirth to replace personal God; the alliance of Reason and Compassion; the reduction of suffering by the reduction of its cause, which is desire; tolerance for each point of view, and above all, a tested and well-trodden way, which leads, with a trusted Guide to follow, to that peace which passeth understanding, and which flowers when the *self* is dead."[15] In the last choice of the self, the self implies the selfish or the egoistic self. Humphreys' analysis of the discrete Buddhist ideas is to be meditatively understood.

Humphreys, with full sympathy and understanding, confirms the Buddhist philosophic and religious functions as one of the dominant cultural forces for mankind to choose. In this chapter, it has been shown that Buddhism has never been expelled from India, it was allowed to develop in India to its fullest extent, hence in its prospective aspect it became inextricably fused with the major currents of Indian thought and life. The Buddhist thought and religion can never be separated from major Indian thought and religion. Buddhism in its emergence may have been discovered in India, but it lies in the fundamentals of *human nature*. Once discovered it

15. Humphreys: *Buddhism*, p. 231. Any change in punctuation is mine.

becomes a human possession, and can be utilized in any cultural process to its advantage. Buddhism, in its development, is a challenge from a *depth psychology*; it is certainly deeper than the psycho-analysis and the *existentialist psychology* for its rich inheritance of transcendent meditative psychology, which has been tested in India and in the major Asian countries for several centuries. Buddhism openly challenges merely empirical and naturalist propensity in any cultural process. It also challenges restricted intellectual propensities; it is deeply conscious of the limitations of the intellectual capacity, and gives it up finally by drawing attention to the transcendent meditative disciplined function. In the evolution of any cultural process, the meditative function can never be neglected; it is operative by the side of intellectual processes, but it is finally more efficient than the intellectual function as it *supports* the intellectual function. The support is not the *cause*, but the sustaining ground, hence the causal mode of understanding has to be given up. Even the modern science in its development is abandoning the notion of causality and determinism in favour of the law of relativity and indetermination. Buddhism develops the traditional transcendent-meditative-nonsensuous process of the Upaniṣads by eliminating its possible intellectual suggestions, and it emerges in the superject current of the Vedānta, which is an approach to experience from a nondual-nonsensuous transcendent-meditative attitude. If the mentality of mankind is not taken away from the apparent and restricted sphere, and not directed to the nonsensuous transcendent-meditative process and function, then the destiny of man is towards a degradation. Man has

to be detached from the immediacy of interests; this does not mean neglect or inattention, but it only means a *right attitude*, which when properly cultivated, prepares man for developing a higher nature, the refined human types (the *Boddhisattvas*), for which Buddhism stands or which it tries to propagate through all cultural processes.

The book, by its title and also by its main discourses, tries to suggest that Buddhism is a living cultural process which can be utilized for ever by an individual and also by persons in general in any cultural milieu if the aim is for perfection in its pristine character. Buddhism, as standing for a spiritual ground, is never in the wane, but is a dynamic force, if it is understood from a proper perspective.

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

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